Chapter
Eighteen
Seventeenth Year of the War -
The SicilianCampaign -
Affair of the Hermae - Departure
of the Expedition
The same winter the Athenians resolved
to sail again to Sicily, with a greater armament than that under Laches
and Eurymedon, and, if possible, to conquer the island; most of them being
ignorant of its size and of the number of its inhabitants, Hellenic and
barbarian, and of the fact that they were undertaking a war not much inferior
to that against the Peloponnesians. For the voyage round Sicily in a merchantman
is not far short of eight days; and yet, large as the island is, there
are only two miles of sea to prevent its being mainland.
It was settled originally as follows,
and the peoples that occupied it are these. The earliest inhabitants spoken
of in any part of the country are the Cyclopes and Laestrygones; but I
cannot tell of what race they were, or whence they came or whither they
went, and must leave my readers to what the poets have said of them and
to what may be generally known concerning them. The Sicanians appear to
have been the next settlers, although they pretend to have been the first
of all and aborigines; but the facts show that they were Iberians, driven
by the Ligurians from the river Sicanus in Iberia. It was from them that
the island, before called Trinacria, took its name of Sicania, and to the
present day they inhabit the west of Sicily. On the fall of Ilium, some
of the Trojans escaped from the Achaeans, came in ships to Sicily, and
settled next to the Sicanians under the general name of Elymi; their towns
being called Eryx and Egesta. With them settled some of the Phocians carried
on their way from Troy by a storm, first to Libya, and afterwards from
thence to Sicily. The Sicels crossed over to Sicily from their first home
Italy, flying from the Opicans, as tradition says and as seems not unlikely,
upon rafts, having watched till the wind set down the strait to effect
the passage; although perhaps they may have sailed over in some other way.
Even at the present day there are still Sicels in Italy; and the country
got its name of Italy from Italus, a king of the Sicels, so called. These
went with a great host to Sicily, defeated the Sicanians in battle and
forced them to remove to the south and west of the island, which thus came
to be called Sicily instead of Sicania, and after they crossed over continued
to enjoy the richest parts of the country for near three hundred years
before any Hellenes came to Sicily; indeed they still hold the centre and
north of the island. There were also Phoenicians living all round Sicily,
who had occupied promontories upon the sea coasts and the islets adjacent
for the purpose of trading with the Sicels. But when the Hellenes began
to arrive in considerable numbers by sea, the Phoenicians abandoned most
of their stations, and drawing together took up their abode in Motye, Soloeis,
and Panormus, near the Elymi, partly because they confided in their alliance,
and also because these are the nearest points for the voyage between Carthage
and Sicily.
These were the barbarians in Sicily,
settled as I have said. Of the Hellenes, the first to arrive were Chalcidians
from Euboea with Thucles, their founder. They founded Naxos and built the
altar to Apollo Archegetes, which now stands outside the town, and upon
which the deputies for the games sacrifice before sailing from Sicily.
Syracuse was founded the year afterwards by Archias, one of the Heraclids
from Corinth, who began by driving out the Sicels from the island upon
which the inner city now stands, though it is no longer surrounded by water:
in process of time the outer town also was taken within the walls and became
populous. Meanwhile Thucles and the Chalcidians set out from Naxos in the
fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse, and drove out the Sicels by
arms and founded Leontini and afterwards Catana; the Catanians themselves
choosing Evarchus as their founder.
About the same time Lamis arrived
in Sicily with a colony from Megara, and after founding a place called
Trotilus beyond the river Pantacyas, and afterwards leaving it and for
a short while joining the Chalcidians at Leontini, was driven out by them
and founded Thapsus. After his death his companions were driven out of
Thapsus, and founded a place called the Hyblaean Megara; Hyblon, a Sicel
king, having given up the place and inviting them thither. Here they lived
two hundred and forty-five years; after which they were expelled from the
city and the country by the Syracusan tyrant Gelo. Before their expulsion,
however, a hundred years after they had settled there, they sent out Pamillus
and founded Selinus; he having come from their mother country Megara to
join them in its foundation. Gela was founded by Antiphemus from Rhodes
and Entimus from Crete, who joined in leading a colony thither, in the
forty-fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse. The town took its name
from the river Gelas, the place where the citadel now stands, and which
was first fortified, being called Lindii. The institutions which they adopted
were Dorian. Near one hundred and eight years after the foundation of Gela,
the Geloans founded Acragas (Agrigentum), so called from the river of that
name, and made Aristonous and Pystilus their founders; giving their own
institutions to the colony. Zancle was originally founded by pirates from
Cuma, the Chalcidian town in the country of the Opicans: afterwards, however,
large numbers came from Chalcis and the rest of Euboea, and helped to people
the place; the founders being Perieres and Crataemenes from Cuma and Chalcis
respectively. It first had the name of Zancle given it by the Sicels, because
the place is shaped like a sickle, which the Sicels call zanclon; but upon
the original settlers being afterwards expelled by some Samians and other
Ionians who landed in Sicily flying from the Medes, and the Samians in
their turn not long afterwards by Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, the town
was by him colonized with a mixed population, and its name changed to Messina,
after his old country.
Himera was founded from Zancle by
Euclides, Simus, and Sacon, most of those who went to the colony being
Chalcidians; though they were joined by some exiles from Syracuse, defeated
in a civil war, called the Myletidae. The language was a mixture of Chalcidian
and Doric, but the institutions which prevailed were the Chalcidian. Acrae
and Casmenae were founded by the Syracusans; Acrae seventy years after
Syracuse, Casmenae nearly twenty after Acrae. Camarina was first founded
by the Syracusans, close upon a hundred and thirty-five years after the
building of Syracuse; its founders being Daxon and Menecolus. But the Camarinaeans
being expelled by arms by the Syracusans for having revolted, Hippocrates,
tyrant of Gela, some time later receiving their land in ransom for some
Syracusan prisoners, resettled Camarina, himself acting as its founder.
Lastly, it was again depopulated by Gelo, and settled once more for the
third time by the Geloans.
Such is the list of the peoples,
Hellenic and barbarian, inhabiting Sicily, and such the magnitude of the
island which the Athenians were now bent upon invading; being ambitious
in real truth of conquering the whole, although they had also the specious
design of succouring their kindred and other allies in the island. But
they were especially incited by envoys from Egesta, who had come to Athens
and invoked their aid more urgently than ever. The Egestaeans had gone
to war with their neighbours the Selinuntines upon questions of marriage
and disputed territory, and the Selinuntines had procured the alliance
of the Syracusans, and pressed Egesta hard by land and sea. The Egestaeans
now reminded the Athenians of the alliance made in the time of Laches,
during the former Leontine war, and begged them to send a fleet to their
aid, and among a number of other considerations urged as a capital argument
that if the Syracusans were allowed to go unpunished for their depopulation
of Leontini, to ruin the allies still left to Athens in Sicily, and to
get the whole power of the island into their hands, there would be a danger
of their one day coming with a large force, as Dorians, to the aid of their
Dorian brethren, and as colonists, to the aid of the Peloponnesians who
had sent them out, and joining these in pulling down the Athenian empire.
The Athenians would, therefore, do well to unite with the allies still
left to them, and to make a stand against the Syracusans; especially as
they, the Egestaeans, were prepared to furnish money sufficient for the
war. The Athenians, hearing these arguments constantly repeated in their
assemblies by the Egestaeans and their supporters, voted first to send
envoys to Egesta, to see if there was really the money that they talked
of in the treasury and temples, and at the same time to ascertain in what
posture was the war with the Selinuntines.
The envoys of the Athenians were
accordingly dispatched to Sicily. The same winter the Lacedaemonians and
their allies, the Corinthians excepted, marched into the Argive territory,
and ravaged a small part of the land, and took some yokes of oxen and carried
off some corn. They also settled the Argive exiles at Orneae, and left
them a few soldiers taken from the rest of the army; and after making a
truce for a certain while, according to which neither Orneatae nor Argives
were to injure each other's territory, returned home with the army. Not
long afterwards the Athenians came with thirty ships and six hundred heavy
infantry, and the Argives joining them with all their forces, marched out
and besieged the men in Orneae for one day; but the garrison escaped by
night, the besiegers having bivouacked some way off. The next day the Argives,
discovering it, razed Orneae to the ground, and went back again; after
which the Athenians went home in their ships. Meanwhile the Athenians took
by sea to Methone on the Macedonian border some cavalry of their own and
the Macedonian exiles that were at Athens, and plundered the country of
Perdiccas. Upon this the Lacedaemonians sent to the Thracian Chalcidians,
who had a truce with Athens from one ten days to another, urging them to
join Perdiccas in the war, which they refused to do. And the winter ended,
and with it ended the sixteenth year of this war of which Thucydides is
the historian.
Early in the spring of the following
summer the Athenian envoys arrived from Sicily, and the Egestaeans with
them, bringing sixty talents of uncoined silver, as a month's pay for sixty
ships, which they were to ask to have sent them. The Athenians held an
assembly and, after hearing from the Egestaeans and their own envoys a
report, as attractive as it was untrue, upon the state of affairs generally,
and in particular as to the money, of which, it was said, there was abundance
in the temples and the treasury, voted to send sixty ships to Sicily, under
the command of Alcibiades, son of Clinias, Nicias, son of Niceratus, and
Lamachus, son of Xenophanes, who were appointed with full powers; they
were to help the Egestaeans against the Selinuntines, to restore Leontini
upon gaining any advantage in the war, and to order all other matters in
Sicily as they should deem best for the interests of Athens. Five days
after this a second assembly was held, to consider the speediest means
of equipping the ships, and to vote whatever else might be required by
the generals for the expedition; and Nicias, who had been chosen to the
command against his will, and who thought that the state was not well advised,
but upon a slight aid specious pretext was aspiring to the conquest of
the whole of Sicily, a great matter to achieve, came forward in the hope
of diverting the Athenians from the enterprise, and gave them the following
counsel:
"Although this assembly was convened
to consider the preparations to be made for sailing to Sicily, I think,
notwithstanding, that we have still this question to examine, whether it
be better to send out the ships at all, and that we ought not to give so
little consideration to a matter of such moment, or let ourselves be persuaded
by foreigners into undertaking a war with which we have nothing to do.
And yet, individually, I gain in honour by such a course, and fear as little
as other men for my person- not that I think a man need be any the worse
citizen for taking some thought for his person and estate; on the contrary,
such a man would for his own sake desire the prosperity of his country
more than others- nevertheless, as I have never spoken against my convictions
to gain honour, I shall not begin to do so now, but shall say what I think
best. Against your character any words of mine would be weak enough, if
I were to advise your keeping what you have got and not risking what is
actually yours for advantages which are dubious in themselves, and which
you may or may not attain. I will, therefore, content myself with showing
that your ardour is out of season, and your ambition not easy of accomplishment.
"I affirm, then, that you leave many
enemies behind you here to go yonder and bring more back with you. You
imagine, perhaps, that the treaty which you have made can be trusted; a
treaty that will continue to exist nominally, as long as you keep quiet-
for nominal it has become, owing to the practices of certain men here and
at Sparta- but which in the event of a serious reverse in any quarter would
not delay our enemies a moment in attacking us; first, because the convention
was forced upon them by disaster and was less honourable to them than to
us; and secondly, because in this very convention there are many points
that are still disputed. Again, some of the most powerful states have never
yet accepted the arrangement at all. Some of these are at open war with
us; others (as the Lacedaemonians do not yet move) are restrained by truces
renewed every ten days, and it is only too probable that if they found
our power divided, as we are hurrying to divide it, they would attack us
vigorously with the Siceliots, whose alliance they would have in the past
valued as they would that of few others. A man ought, therefore, to consider
these points, and not to think of running risks with a country placed so
critically, or of grasping at another empire before we have secured the
one we have already; for in fact the Thracian Chalcidians have been all
these years in revolt from us without being yet subdued, and others on
the continents yield us but a doubtful obedience. Meanwhile the Egestaeans,
our allies, have been wronged, and we run to help them, while the rebels
who have so long wronged us still wait for punishment.
"And yet the latter, if brought under,
might be kept under; while the Sicilians, even if conquered, are too far
off and too numerous to be ruled without difficulty. Now it is folly to
go against men who could not be kept under even if conquered, while failure
would leave us in a very different position from that which we occupied
before the enterprise. The Siceliots, again, to take them as they are at
present, in the event of a Syracusan conquest (the favourite bugbear of
the Egestaeans), would to my thinking be even less dangerous to us than
before. At present they might possibly come here as separate states for
love of Lacedaemon; in the other case one empire would scarcely attack
another; for after joining the Peloponnesians to overthrow ours, they could
only expect to see the same hands overthrow their own in the same way.
The Hellenes in Sicily would fear us most if we never went there at all,
and next to this, if after displaying our power we went away again as soon
as possible. We all know that that which is farthest off, and the reputation
of which can least be tested, is the object of admiration; at the least
reverse they would at once begin to look down upon us, and would join our
enemies here against us. You have yourselves experienced this with regard
to the Lacedaemonians and their allies, whom your unexpected success, as
compared with what you feared at first, has made you suddenly despise,
tempting you further to aspire to the conquest of Sicily. Instead, however,
of being puffed up by the misfortunes of your adversaries, you ought to
think of breaking their spirit before giving yourselves up to confidence,
and to understand that the one thought awakened in the Lacedaemonians by
their disgrace is how they may even now, if possible, overthrow us and
repair their dishonour; inasmuch as military reputation is their oldest
and chiefest study. Our struggle, therefore, if we are wise, will not be
for the barbarian Egestaeans in Sicily, but how to defend ourselves most
effectually against the oligarchical machinations of Lacedaemon.
"We should also remember that we
are but now enjoying some respite from a great pestilence and from war,
to the no small benefit of our estates and persons, and that it is right
to employ these at home on our own behalf, instead of using them on behalf
of these exiles whose interest it is to lie as fairly as they can, who
do nothing but talk themselves and leave the danger to others, and who
if they succeed will show no proper gratitude, and if they fail will drag
down their friends with them. And if there be any man here, overjoyed at
being chosen to command, who urges you to make the expedition, merely for
ends of his own- specially if he be still too young to command- who seeks
to be admired for his stud of horses, but on account of its heavy expenses
hopes for some profit from his appointment, do not allow such a one to
maintain his private splendour at his country's risk, but remember that
such persons injure the public fortune while they squander their own, and
that this is a matter of importance, and not for a young man to decide
or hastily to take in hand.
"When I see such persons now sitting
here at the side of that same individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes
me; and I, in my turn, summon any of the older men that may have such a
person sitting next him not to let himself be shamed down, for fear of
being thought a coward if he do not vote for war, but, remembering how
rarely success is got by wishing and how often by forecast, to leave to
them the mad dream of conquest, and as a true lover of his country, now
threatened by the greatest danger in its history, to hold up his hand on
the other side; to vote that the Siceliots be left in the limits now existing
between us, limits of which no one can complain (the Ionian sea for the
coasting voyage, and the Sicilian across the open main), to enjoy their
own possessions and to settle their own quarrels; that the Egestaeans,
for their part, be told to end by themselves with the Selinuntines the
war which they began without consulting the Athenians; and that for the
future we do not enter into alliance, as we have been used to do, with
people whom we must help in their need, and who can never help us in ours.
"And you, Prytanis, if you think
it your duty to care for the commonwealth, and if you wish to show yourself
a good citizen, put the question to the vote, and take a second time the
opinions of the Athenians. If you are afraid to move the question again,
consider that a violation of the law cannot carry any prejudice with so
many abettors, that you will be the physician of your misguided city, and
that the virtue of men in office is briefly this, to do their country as
much good as they can, or in any case no harm that they can avoid."
Such were the words of Nicias. Most
of the Athenians that came forward spoke in favour of the expedition, and
of not annulling what had been voted, although some spoke on the other
side. By far the warmest advocate of the expedition was, however, Alcibiades,
son of Clinias, who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent
and also because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and
who was, besides, exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped
to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation
by means of his successes. For the position he held among the citizens
led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear, both
in keeping horses and in the rest of his expenditure; and this later on
had not a little to do with the ruin of the Athenian state. Alarmed at
the greatness of his licence in his own life and habits, and of the ambition
which he showed in all things soever that he undertook, the mass of the
people set him down as a pretender to the tyranny, and became his enemies;
and although publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired,
individually, his habits gave offence to every one, and caused them to
commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city. Meanwhile
he now came forward and gave the following advice to the Athenians:
"Athenians, I have a better right
to command than others- I must begin with this as Nicias has attacked me-
and at the same time I believe myself to be worthy of it. The things for
which I am abused, bring fame to my ancestors and to myself, and to the
country profit besides. The Hellenes, after expecting to see our city ruined
by the war, concluded it to be even greater than it really is, by reason
of the magnificence with which I represented it at the Olympic games, when
I sent into the lists seven chariots, a number never before entered by
any private person, and won the first prize, and was second and fourth,
and took care to have everything else in a style worthy of my victory.
Custom regards such displays as honourable, and they cannot be made without
leaving behind them an impression of power. Again, any splendour that I
may have exhibited at home in providing choruses or otherwise, is naturally
envied by my fellow citizens, but in the eyes of foreigners has an air
of strength as in the other instance. And this is no useless folly, when
a man at his own private cost benefits not himself only, but his city:
nor is it unfair that he who prides himself on his position should refuse
to be upon an equality with the rest. He who is badly off has his misfortunes
all to himself, and as we do not see men courted in adversity, on the like
principle a man ought to accept the insolence of prosperity; or else, let
him first mete out equal measure to all, and then demand to have it meted
out to him. What I know is that persons of this kind and all others that
have attained to any distinction, although they may be unpopular in their
lifetime in their relations with their fellow-men and especially with their
equals, leave to posterity the desire of claiming connection with them
even without any ground, and are vaunted by the country to which they belonged,
not as strangers or ill-doers, but as fellow-countrymen and heroes. Such
are my aspirations, and however I am abused for them in private, the question
is whether any one manages public affairs better than I do. Having united
the most powerful states of Peloponnese, without great danger or expense
to you, I compelled the Lacedaemonians to stake their all upon the issue
of a single day at Mantinea; and although victorious in the battle, they
have never since fully recovered confidence.
"Thus did my youth and so-called
monstrous folly find fitting arguments to deal with the power of the Peloponnesians,
and by its ardour win their confidence and prevail. And do not be afraid
of my youth now, but while I am still in its flower, and Nicias appears
fortunate, avail yourselves to the utmost of the services of us both. Neither
rescind your resolution to sail to Sicily, on the ground that you would
be going to attack a great power. The cities in Sicily are peopled by motley
rabbles, and easily change their institutions and adopt new ones in their
stead; and consequently the inhabitants, being without any feeling of patriotism,
are not provided with arms for their persons, and have not regularly established
themselves on the land; every man thinks that either by fair words or by
party strife he can obtain something at the public expense, and then in
the event of a catastrophe settle in some other country, and makes his
preparations accordingly. From a mob like this you need not look for either
unanimity in counsel or concert in action; but they will probably one by
one come in as they get a fair offer, especially if they are torn by civil
strife as we are told. Moreover, the Siceliots have not so many heavy infantry
as they boast; just as the Hellenes generally did not prove so numerous
as each state reckoned itself, but Hellas greatly over-estimated their
numbers, and has hardly had an adequate force of heavy infantry throughout
this war. The states in Sicily, therefore, from all that I can hear, will
be found as I say, and I have not pointed out all our advantages, for we
shall have the help of many barbarians, who from their hatred of the Syracusans
will join us in attacking them; nor will the powers at home prove any hindrance,
if you judge rightly. Our fathers with these very adversaries, which it
is said we shall now leave behind us when we sail, and the Mede as their
enemy as well, were able to win the empire, depending solely on their superiority
at sea. The Peloponnesians had never so little hope against us as at present;
and let them be ever so sanguine, although strong enough to invade our
country even if we stay at home, they can never hurt us with their navy,
as we leave one of our own behind us that is a match for them.
"In this state of things what reason
can we give to ourselves for holding back, or what excuse can we offer
to our allies in Sicily for not helping them? They are our confederates,
and we are bound to assist them, without objecting that they have not assisted
us. We did not take them into alliance to have them to help us in Hellas,
but that they might so annoy our enemies in Sicily as to prevent them from
coming over here and attacking us. It is thus that empire has been won,
both by us and by all others that have held it, by a constant readiness
to support all, whether barbarians or Hellenes, that invite assistance;
since if all were to keep quiet or to pick and choose whom they ought to
assist, we should make but few new conquests, and should imperil those
we have already won. Men do not rest content with parrying the attacks
of a superior, but often strike the first blow to prevent the attack being
made. And we cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall stop;
we have reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining
but must scheme to extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are in
danger of being ruled ourselves. Nor can you look at inaction from the
same point of view as others, unless you are prepared to change your habits
and make them like theirs.
"Be convinced, then, that we shall
augment our power at home by this adventure abroad, and let us make the
expedition, and so humble the pride of the Peloponnesians by sailing off
to Sicily, and letting them see how little we care for the peace that we
are now enjoying; and at the same time we shall either become masters,
as we very easily may, of the whole of Hellas through the accession of
the Sicilian Hellenes, or in any case ruin the Syracusans, to the no small
advantage of ourselves and our allies. The faculty of staying if successful,
or of returning, will be secured to us by our navy, as we shall be superior
at sea to all the Siceliots put together. And do not let the do-nothing
policy which Nicias advocates, or his setting of the young against the
old, turn you from your purpose, but in the good old fashion by which our
fathers, old and young together, by their united counsels brought our affairs
to their present height, do you endeavour still to advance them; understanding
that neither youth nor old age can do anything the one without the other,
but that levity, sobriety, and deliberate judgment are strongest when united,
and that, by sinking into inaction, the city, like everything else, will
wear itself out, and its skill in everything decay; while each fresh struggle
will give it fresh experience, and make it more used to defend itself not
in word but in deed. In short, my conviction is that a city not inactive
by nature could not choose a quicker way to ruin itself than by suddenly
adopting such a policy, and that the safest rule of life is to take one's
character and institutions for better and for worse, and to live up to
them as closely as one can."
Such were the words of Alcibiades.
After hearing him and the Egestaeans and some Leontine exiles, who came
forward reminding them of their oaths and imploring their assistance, the
Athenians became more eager for the expedition than before. Nicias, perceiving
that it would be now useless to try to deter them by the old line of argument,
but thinking that he might perhaps alter their resolution by the extravagance
of his estimates, came forward a second time and spoke as follows:
"I see, Athenians, that you are thoroughly
bent upon the expedition, and therefore hope that all will turn out as
we wish, and proceed to give you my opinion at the present juncture. From
all that I hear we are going against cities that are great and not subject
to one another, or in need of change, so as to be glad to pass from enforced
servitude to an easier condition, or in the least likely to accept our
rule in exchange for freedom; and, to take only the Hellenic towns, they
are very numerous for one island. Besides Naxos and Catana, which I expect
to join us from their connection with Leontini, there are seven others
armed at all points just like our own power, particularly Selinus and Syracuse,
the chief objects of our expedition. These are full of heavy infantry,
archers, and darters, have galleys in abundance and crowds to man them;
they have also money, partly in the hands of private persons, partly in
the temples at Selinus, and at Syracuse first-fruits from some of the barbarians
as well. But their chief advantage over us lies in the number of their
horses, and in the fact that they grow their corn at home instead of importing
it.
"Against a power of this kind it
will not do to have merely a weak naval armament, but we shall want also
a large land army to sail with us, if we are to do anything worthy of our
ambition, and are not to be shut out from the country by a numerous cavalry;
especially if the cities should take alarm and combine, and we should be
left without friends (except the Egestaeans) to furnish us with horse to
defend ourselves with. It would be disgraceful to have to retire under
compulsion, or to send back for reinforcements, owing to want of reflection
at first: we must therefore start from home with a competent force, seeing
that we are going to sail far from our country, and upon an expedition
not like any which you may undertaken undertaken the quality of allies,
among your subject states here in Hellas, where any additional supplies
needed were easily drawn from the friendly territory; but we are cutting
ourselves off, and going to a land entirely strange, from which during
four months in winter it is not even easy for a messenger get to Athens.
"I think, therefore, that we ought
to take great numbers of heavy infantry, both from Athens and from our
allies, and not merely from our subjects, but also any we may be able to
get for love or for money in Peloponnese, and great numbers also of archers
and slingers, to make head against the Sicilian horse. Meanwhile we must
have an overwhelming superiority at sea, to enable us the more easily to
carry in what we want; and we must take our own corn in merchant vessels,
that is to say, wheat and parched barley, and bakers from the mills compelled
to serve for pay in the proper proportion; in order that in case of our
being weather-bound the armament may not want provisions, as it is not
every city that will be able to entertain numbers like ours. We must also
provide ourselves with everything else as far as we can, so as not to be
dependent upon others; and above all we must take with us from home as
much money as possible, as the sums talked of as ready at Egesta are readier,
you may be sure, in talk than in any other way.
"Indeed, even if we leave Athens
with a force not only equal to that of the enemy except in the number of
heavy infantry in the field, but even at all points superior to him, we
shall still find it difficult to conquer Sicily or save ourselves. We must
not disguise from ourselves that we go to found a city among strangers
and enemies, and that he who undertakes such an enterprise should be prepared
to become master of the country the first day he lands, or failing in this
to find everything hostile to him. Fearing this, and knowing that we shall
have need of much good counsel and more good fortune- a hard matter for
mortal man to aspire to- I wish as far as may be to make myself independent
of fortune before sailing, and when I do sail, to be as safe as a strong
force can make me. This I believe to be surest for the country at large,
and safest for us who are to go on the expedition. If any one thinks differently
I resign to him my command."
With this Nicias concluded, thinking
that he should either disgust the Athenians by the magnitude of the undertaking,
or, if obliged to sail on the expedition, would thus do so in the safest
way possible. The Athenians, however, far from having their taste for the
voyage taken away by the burdensomeness of the preparations, became more
eager for it than ever; and just the contrary took place of what Nicias
had thought, as it was held that he had given good advice, and that the
expedition would be the safest in the world. All alike fell in love with
the enterprise. The older men thought that they would either subdue the
places against which they were to sail, or at all events, with so large
a force, meet with no disaster; those in the prime of life felt a longing
for foreign sights and spectacles, and had no doubt that they should come
safe home again; while the idea of the common people and the soldiery was
to earn wages at the moment, and make conquests that would supply a never-ending
fund of pay for the future. With this enthusiasm of the majority, the few
that liked it not, feared to appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands
against it, and so kept quiet.
At last one of the Athenians came
forward and called upon Nicias and told him that he ought not to make excuses
or put them off, but say at once before them all what forces the Athenians
should vote him. Upon this he said, not without reluctance, that he would
advise upon that matter more at leisure with his colleagues; as far however
as he could see at present, they must sail with at least one hundred galleys-
the Athenians providing as many transports as they might determine, and
sending for others from the allies- not less than five thousand heavy infantry
in all, Athenian and allied, and if possible more; and the rest of the
armament in proportion; archers from home and from Crete, and slingers,
and whatever else might seem desirable, being got ready by the generals
and taken with them.
Upon hearing this the Athenians at
once voted that the generals should have full powers in the matter of the
numbers of the army and of the expedition generally, to do as they judged
best for the interests of Athens. After this the preparations began; messages
being sent to the allies and the rolls drawn up at home. And as the city
had just recovered from the plague and the long war, and a number of young
men had grown up and capital had accumulated by reason of the truce, everything
was the more easily provided.
In the midst of these preparations
all the stone Hermae in the city of Athens, that is to say the customary
square figures, so common in the doorways of private houses and temples,
had in one night most of them their fares mutilated. No one knew who had
done it, but large public rewards were offered to find the authors; and
it was further voted that any one who knew of any other act of impiety
having been committed should come and give information without fear of
consequences, whether he were citizen, alien, or slave. The matter was
taken up the more seriously, as it was thought to be ominous for the expedition,
and part of a conspiracy to bring about a revolution and to upset the democracy.
Information was given accordingly
by some resident aliens and body servants, not about the Hermae but about
some previous mutilations of other images perpetrated by young men in a
drunken frolic, and of mock celebrations of the mysteries, averred to take
place in private houses. Alcibiades being implicated in this charge, it
was taken hold of by those who could least endure him, because he stood
in the way of their obtaining the undisturbed direction of the people,
and who thought that if he were once removed the first place would be theirs.
These accordingly magnified the matter and loudly proclaimed that the affair
of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae were part and parcel
of a scheme to overthrow the democracy, and that nothing of all this had
been done without Alcibiades; the proofs alleged being the general and
undemocratic licence of his life and habits.
Alcibiades repelled on the spot the
charges in question, and also before going on the expedition, the preparations
for which were now complete, offered to stand his trial, that it might
be seen whether he was guilty of the acts imputed to him; desiring to be
punished if found guilty, but, if acquitted, to take the command. Meanwhile
he protested against their receiving slanders against him in his absence,
and begged them rather to put him to death at once if he were guilty, and
pointed out the imprudence of sending him out at the head of so large an
army, with so serious a charge still undecided. But his enemies feared
that he would have the army for him if he were tried immediately, and that
the people might relent in favour of the man whom they already caressed
as the cause of the Argives and some of the Mantineans joining in the expedition,
and did their utmost to get this proposition rejected, putting forward
other orators who said that he ought at present to sail and not delay the
departure of the army, and be tried on his return within a fixed number
of days; their plan being to have him sent for and brought home for trial
upon some graver charge, which they would the more easily get up in his
absence. Accordingly it was decreed that he should sail.
After this the departure for Sicily
took place, it being now about midsummer. Most of the allies, with the
corn transports and the smaller craft and the rest of the expedition, had
already received orders to muster at Corcyra, to cross the Ionian Sea from
thence in a body to the Iapygian promontory. But the Athenians themselves,
and such of their allies as happened to be with them, went down to Piraeus
upon a day appointed at daybreak, and began to man the ships for putting
out to sea. With them also went down the whole population, one may say,
of the city, both citizens and foreigners; the inhabitants of the country
each escorting those that belonged to them, their friends, their relatives,
or their sons, with hope and lamentation upon their way, as they thought
of the conquests which they hoped to make, or of the friends whom they
might never see again, considering the long voyage which they were going
to make from their country. Indeed, at this moment, when they were now
upon the point of parting from one another, the danger came more home to
them than when they voted for the expedition; although the strength of
the armament, and the profuse provision which they remarked in every department,
was a sight that could not but comfort them. As for the foreigners and
the rest of the crowd, they simply went to see a sight worth looking at
and passing all belief.
Indeed this armament that first sailed
out was by far the most costly and splendid Hellenic force that had ever
been sent out by a single city up to that time. In mere number of ships
and heavy infantry that against Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same
when going against Potidaea under Hagnon, was not inferior; containing
as it did four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, three hundred horse, and
one hundred galleys accompanied by fifty Lesbian and Chian vessels and
many allies besides. But these were sent upon a short voyage and with a
scanty equipment. The present expedition was formed in contemplation of
a long term of service by land and sea alike, and was furnished with ships
and troops so as to be ready for either as required. The fleet had been
elaborately equipped at great cost to the captains and the state; the treasury
giving a drachma a day to each seaman, and providing empty ships, sixty
men-of-war and forty transports, and manning these with the best crews
obtainable; while the captains gave a bounty in addition to the pay from
the treasury to the thranitae and crews generally, besides spending lavishly
upon figure-heads and equipments, and one and all making the utmost exertions
to enable their own ships to excel in beauty and fast sailing. Meanwhile
the land forces had been picked from the best muster-rolls, and vied with
each other in paying great attention to their arms and personal accoutrements.
From this resulted not only a rivalry among themselves in their different
departments, but an idea among the rest of the Hellenes that it was more
a display of power and resources than an armament against an enemy. For
if any one had counted up the public expenditure of the state, and the
private outlay of individuals- that is to say, the sums which the state
had already spent upon the expedition and was sending out in the hands
of the generals, and those which individuals had expended upon their personal
outfit, or as captains of galleys had laid out and were still to lay out
upon their vessels; and if he had added to this the journey money which
each was likely to have provided himself with, independently of the pay
from the treasury, for a voyage of such length, and what the soldiers or
traders took with them for the purpose of exchange- it would have been
found that many talents in all were being taken out of the city. Indeed
the expedition became not less famous for its wonderful boldness and for
the splendour of its appearance, than for its overwhelming strength as
compared with the peoples against whom it was directed, and for the fact
that this was the longest passage from home hitherto attempted, and the
most ambitious in its objects considering the resources of those who undertook
it.
The ships being now manned, and everything
put on board with which they meant to sail, the trumpet commanded silence,
and the prayers customary before putting out to sea were offered, not in
each ship by itself, but by all together to the voice of a herald; and
bowls of wine were mixed through all the armament, and libations made by
the soldiers and their officers in gold and silver goblets. In their prayers
joined also the crowds on shore, the citizens and all others that wished
them well. The hymn sung and the libations finished, they put out to sea,
and first out in column then raced each other as far as Aegina, and so
hastened to reach Corcyra, where the rest of the allied forces were also
assembling.
Chapter
Nineteen
Seventeenth Year of the War -
Parties at Syracuse -
Story of Harmodius and Aristogiton
- Disgrace of Alcibiades
Meanwhile at Syracuse news came in
from many quarters of the expedition, but for a long while met with no
credence whatever. Indeed, an assembly was held in which speeches, as will
be seen, were delivered by different orators, believing or contradicting
the report of the Athenian expedition; among whom Hermocrates, son of Hermon,
came forward, being persuaded that he knew the truth of the matter, and
gave the following counsel:
"Although I shall perhaps be no better
believed than others have been when I speak upon the reality of the expedition,
and although I know that those who either make or repeat statements thought
not worthy of belief not only gain no converts but are thought fools for
their pains, I shall certainly not be frightened into holding my tongue
when the state is in danger, and when I am persuaded that I can speak with
more authority on the matter than other persons. Much as you wonder at
it, the Athenians nevertheless have set out against us with a large force,
naval and military, professedly to help the Egestaeans and to restore Leontini,
but really to conquer Sicily, and above all our city, which once gained,
the rest, they think, will easily follow. Make up your minds, therefore,
to see them speedily here, and see how you can best repel them with the
means under your hand, and do be taken off your guard through despising
the news, or neglect the common weal through disbelieving it. Meanwhile
those who believe me need not be dismayed at the force or daring of the
enemy. They will not be able to do us more hurt than we shall do them;
nor is the greatness of their armament altogether without advantage to
us. Indeed, the greater it is the better, with regard to the rest of the
Siceliots, whom dismay will make more ready to join us; and if we defeat
or drive them away, disappointed of the objects of their ambition (for
I do not fear for a moment that they will get what they want), it will
be a most glorious exploit for us, and in my judgment by no means an unlikely
one. Few indeed have been the large armaments, either Hellenic or barbarian,
that have gone far from home and been successful. They cannot be more numerous
than the people of the country and their neighbours, all of whom fear leagues
together; and if they miscarry forwant of supplies in a foreign land, to
those against whom their plans were laid none the less they leave renown,
although they may themselves have been the main cause of their own discomfort.
Thus these very Athenians rose by the defeat of the Mede, in a great measure
due to accidental causes, from the mere fact that Athens had been the object
of his attack; and this may very well be the case with us also.
"Let us, therefore, confidently begin
preparations here; let us send and confirm some of the Sicels, and obtain
the friendship and alliance of others, and dispatch envoys to the rest
of Sicily to show that the danger is common to all, and to Italy to get
them to become our allies, or at all events to refuse to receive the Athenians.
I also think that it would be best to send to Carthage as well; they are
by no means there without apprehension, but it is their constant fear that
the Athenians may one day attack their city, and they may perhaps think
that they might themselves suffer by letting Sicily be sacrificed, and
be willing to help us secretly if not openly, in one way if not in another.
They are the best able to do so, if they will, of any of the present day,
as they possess most gold and silver, by which war, like everything else,
flourishes. Let us also send to Lacedaemon and Corinth, and ask them to
come here and help us as soon as possible, and to keep alive the war in
Hellas. But the true thing of all others, in my opinion, to do at the present
moment, is what you, with your constitutional love of quiet, will be slow
to see, and what I must nevertheless mention. If we Siceliots, all together,
or at least as many as possible besides ourselves, would only launch the
whole of our actual navy with two months' provisions, and meet the Athenians
at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory, and show them that before fighting
for Sicily they must first fight for their passage across the Ionian Sea,
we should strike dismay into their army, and set them on thinking that
we have a base for our defensive- for Tarentum is ready to receive us-
while they have a wide sea to cross with all their armament, which could
with difficulty keep its order through so long a voyage, and would be easy
for us to attack as it came on slowly and in small detachments. On the
other hand, if they were to lighten their vessels, and draw together their
fast sailers and with these attack us, we could either fall upon them when
they were wearied with rowing, or if we did not choose to do so, we could
retire to Tarentum; while they, having crossed with few provisions just
to give battle, would be hard put to it in desolate places, and would either
have to remain and be blockaded, or to try to sail along the coast, abandoning
the rest of their armament, and being further discouraged by not knowing
for certain whether the cities would receive them. In my opinion this consideration
alone would be sufficient to deter them from putting out from Corcyra;
and what with deliberating and reconnoitring our numbers and whereabouts,
they would let the season go on until winter was upon them, or, confounded
by so unexpected a circumstance, would break up the expedition, especially
as their most experienced general has, as I hear, taken the command against
his will, and would grasp at the first excuse offered by any serious demonstration
of ours. We should also be reported, I am certain, as more numerous than
we really are, and men's minds are affected by what they hear, and besides
the first to attack, or to show that they mean to defend themselves against
an attack, inspire greater fear because men see that they are ready for
the emergency. This would just be the case with the Athenians at present.
They are now attacking us in the belief that we shall not resist, having
a right to judge us severely because we did not help the Lacedaemonians
in crushing them; but if they were to see us showing a courage for which
they are not prepared, they would be more dismayed by the surprise than
they could ever be by our actual power. I could wish to persuade you to
show this courage; but if this cannot be, at all events lose not a moment
in preparing generally for the war; and remember all of you that contempt
for an assailant is best shown by bravery in action, but that for the present
the best course is to accept the preparations which fear inspires as giving
the surest promise of safety, and to act as if the danger was real. That
the Athenians are coming to attack us, and are already upon the voyage,
and all but here- this is what I am sure of."
Thus far spoke Hermocrates. Meanwhile
the people of Syracuse were at great strife among themselves; some contending
that the Athenians had no idea of coming and that there was no truth in
what he said; some asking if they did come what harm they could do that
would not be repaid them tenfold in return; while others made light of
the whole affair and turned it into ridicule. In short, there were few
that believed Hermocrates and feared for the future. Meanwhile Athenagoras,
the leader of the people and very powerful at that time with the masses,
came forward and spoke as follows:
"For the Athenians, he who does not
wish that they may be as misguided as they are supposed to be, and that
they may come here to become our subjects, is either a coward or a traitor
to his country; while as for those who carry such tidings and fill you
with so much alarm, I wonder less at their audacity than at their folly
if they flatter themselves that we do not see through them. The fact is
that they have their private reasons to be afraid, and wish to throw the
city into consternation to have their own terrors cast into the shade by
the public alarm. In short, this is what these reports are worth; they
do not arise of themselves, but are concocted by men who are always causing
agitation here in Sicily. However, if you are well advised, you will not
be guided in your calculation of probabilities by what these persons tell
you, but by what shrewd men and of large experience, as I esteem the Athenians
to be, would be likely to do. Now it is not likely that they would leave
the Peloponnesians behind them, and before they have well ended the war
in Hellas wantonly come in quest of a new war quite as arduous in Sicily;
indeed, in my judgment, they are only too glad that we do not go and attack
them, being so many and so great cities as we are.
"However, if they should come as
is reported, I consider Sicily better able to go through with the war than
Peloponnese, as being at all points better prepared, and our city by itself
far more than a match for this pretended army of invasion, even were it
twice as large again. I know that they will not have horses with them,
or get any here, except a few perhaps from the Egestaeans; or be able to
bring a force of heavy infantry equal in number to our own, in ships which
will already have enough to do to come all this distance, however lightly
laden, not to speak of the transport of the other stores required against
a city of this magnitude, which will be no slight quantity. In fact, so
strong is my opinion upon the subject, that I do not well see how they
could avoid annihilation if they brought with them another city as large
as Syracuse, and settled down and carried on war from our frontier; much
less can they hope to succeed with all Sicily hostile to them, as all Sicily
will be, and with only a camp pitched from the ships, and composed of tents
and bare necessaries, from which they would not be able to stir far for
fear of our cavalry.
"But the Athenians see this as I
tell you, and as I have reason to know are looking after their possessions
at home, while persons here invent stories that neither are true nor ever
will be. Nor is this the first time that I see these persons, when they
cannot resort to deeds, trying by such stories and by others even more
abominable to frighten your people and get into their hands the government:
it is what I see always. And I cannot help fearing that trying so often
they may one day succeed, and that we, as long as we do not feel the smart,
may prove too weak for the task of prevention, or, when the offenders are
known, of pursuit. The result is that our city is rarely at rest, but is
subject to constant troubles and to contests as frequent against herself
as against the enemy, not to speak of occasional tyrannies and infamous
cabals. However, I will try, if you will support me, to let nothing of
this happen in our time, by gaining you, the many, and by chastising the
authors of such machinations, not merely when they are caught in the act-
a difficult feat to accomplish- but also for what they have the wish though
not the power to do; as it is necessary to punish an enemy not only for
what he does, but also beforehand for what he intends to do, if the first
to relax precaution would not be also the first to suffer. I shall also
reprove, watch, and on occasion warn the few- the most effectual way, in
my opinion, of turning them from their evil courses. And after all, as
I have often asked, what would you have, young men? Would you hold office
at once? The law forbids it, a law enacted rather because you are not competent
than to disgrace you when competent. Meanwhile you would not be on a legal
equality with the many! But how can it be right that citizens of the same
state should be held unworthy of the same privileges? "It will be said,
perhaps, that democracy is neither wise nor equitable, but that the holders
of property are also the best fitted to rule. I say, on the contrary, first,
that the word demos, or people, includes the whole state, oligarchy only
a part; next, that if the best guardians of property are the rich, and
the best counsellors the wise, none can hear and decide so well as the
many; and that all these talents, severally and collectively, have their
just place in a democracy. But an oligarchy gives the many their share
of the danger, and not content with the largest part takes and keeps the
whole of the profit; and this is what the powerful and young among you
aspire to, but in a great city cannot possibly obtain.
"But even now, foolish men, most
senseless of all the Hellenes that I know, if you have no sense of the
wickedness of your designs, or most criminal if you have that sense and
still dare to pursue them- even now, if it is not a case for repentance,
you may still learn wisdom, and thus advance the interest of the country,
the common interest of us all. Reflect that in the country's prosperity
the men of merit in your ranks will have a share and a larger share than
the great mass of your fellow countrymen, but that if you have other designs
you run a risk of being deprived of all; and desist from reports like these,
as the people know your object and will not put up with it. If the Athenians
arrive, this city will repulse them in a manner worthy of itself; we have
moreover, generals who will see to this matter. And if nothing of this
be true, as I incline to believe, the city will not be thrown into a panic
by your intelligence, or impose upon itself a self-chosen servitude by
choosing you for its rulers; the city itself will look into the matter,
and will judge your words as if they were acts, and, instead of allowing
itself to be deprived of its liberty by listening to you, will strive to
preserve that liberty, by taking care to have always at hand the means
of making itself respected."
Such were the words of Athenagoras.
One of the generals now stood up and stopped any other speakers coming
forward, adding these words of his own with reference to the matter in
hand: "It is not well for speakers to utter calumnies against one another,
or for their hearers to entertain them; we ought rather to look to the
intelligence that we have received, and see how each man by himself and
the city as a whole may best prepare to repel the invaders. Even if there
be no need, there is no harm in the state being furnished with horses and
arms and all other insignia of war; and we will undertake to see to and
order this, and to send round to the cities to reconnoitre and do all else
that may appear desirable. Part of this we have seen to already, and whatever
we discover shall be laid before you." After these words from the general,
the Syracusans departed from the assembly.
In the meantime the Athenians with
all their allies had now arrived at Corcyra. Here the generals began by
again reviewing the armament, and made arrangements as to the order in
which they were to anchor and encamp, and dividing the whole fleet into
three divisions, allotted one to each of their number, to avoid sailing
all together and being thus embarrassed for water, harbourage, or provisions
at the stations which they might touch at, and at the same time to be generally
better ordered and easier to handle, by each squadron having its own commander.
Next they sent on three ships to Italy and Sicily to find out which of
the cities would receive them, with instructions to meet them on the way
and let them know before they put in to land.
After this the Athenians weighed
from Corcyra, and proceeded to cross to Sicily with an armament now consisting
of one hundred and thirty-four galleys in all (besides two Rhodian fifty-oars),
of which one hundred were Athenian vessels- sixty men-of-war, and forty
troopships- and the remainder from Chios and the other allies; five thousand
and one hundred heavy infantry in all, that is to say, fifteen hundred
Athenian citizens from the rolls at Athens and seven hundred Thetes shipped
as marines, and the rest allied troops, some of them Athenian subjects,
and besides these five hundred Argives, and two hundred and fifty Mantineans
serving for hire; four hundred and eighty archers in all, eighty of whom
were Cretans, seven hundred slingers from Rhodes, one hundred and twenty
light-armed exiles from Megara, and one horse-transport carrying thirty
horses.
Such was the strength of the first
armament that sailed over for the war. The supplies for this force were
carried by thirty ships of burden laden with corn, which conveyed the bakers,
stone-masons, and carpenters, and the tools for raising fortifications,
accompanied by one hundred boats, like the former pressed into the service,
besides many other boats and ships of burden which followed the armament
voluntarily for purposes of trade; all of which now left Corcyra and struck
across the Ionian Sea together. The whole force making land at the Iapygian
promontory and Tarentum, with more or less good fortune, coasted along
the shores of Italy, the cities shutting their markets and gates against
them, and according them nothing but water and liberty to anchor, and Tarentum
and Locri not even that, until they arrived at Rhegium, the extreme point
of Italy. Here at length they reunited, and not gaining admission within
the walls pitched a camp outside the city in the precinct of Artemis, where
a market was also provided for them, and drew their ships on shore and
kept quiet. Meanwhile they opened negotiations with the Rhegians, and called
upon them as Chalcidians to assist their Leontine kinsmen; to which the
Rhegians replied that they would not side with either party, but should
await the decision of the rest of the Italiots, and do as they did. Upon
this the Athenians now began to consider what would be the best action
to take in the affairs of Sicily, and meanwhile waited for the ships sent
on to come back from Egesta, in order to know whether there was really
there the money mentioned by the messengers at Athens.
In the meantime came in from all
quarters to the Syracusans, as well as from their own officers sent to
reconnoitre, the positive tidings that the fleet was at Rhegium; upon which
they laid aside their incredulity and threw themselves heart and soul into
the work of preparation. Guards or envoys, as the case might be, were sent
round to the Sicels, garrisons put into the posts of the Peripoli in the
country, horses and arms reviewed in the city to see that nothing was wanting,
and all other steps taken to prepare for a war which might be upon them
at any moment.
Meanwhile the three ships that had
been sent on came from Egesta to the Athenians at Rhegium, with the news
that so far from there being the sums promised, all that could be produced
was thirty talents. The generals were not a little disheartened at being
thus disappointed at the outset, and by the refusal to join in the expedition
of the Rhegians, the people they had first tried to gain and had had had
most reason to count upon, from their relationship to the Leontines and
constant friendship for Athens. If Nicias was prepared for the news from
Egesta, his two colleagues were taken completely by surprise. The Egestaeans
had had recourse to the following stratagem, when the first envoys from
Athens came to inspect their resources. They took the envoys in question
to the temple of Aphrodite at Eryx and showed them the treasures deposited
there: bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and a large number of other pieces
of plate, which from being in silver gave an impression of wealth quite
out of proportion to their really small value. They also privately entertained
the ships' crews, and collected all the cups of gold and silver that they
could find in Egesta itself or could borrow in the neighbouring Phoenician
and Hellenic towns, and each brought them to the banquets as their own;
and as all used pretty nearly the same, and everywhere a great quantity
of plate was shown, the effect was most dazzling upon the Athenian sailors,
and made them talk loudly of the riches they had seen when they got back
to Athens. The dupes in question- who had in their turn persuaded the rest-
when the news got abroad that there was not the money supposed at Egesta,
were much blamed by the soldiers.
Meanwhile the generals consulted
upon what was to be done. The opinion of Nicias was to sail with all the
armament to Selinus, the main object of the expedition, and if the Egestaeans
could provide money for the whole force, to advise accordingly; but if
they could not, to require them to supply provisions for the sixty ships
that they had asked for, to stay and settle matters between them and the
Selinuntines either by force or by agreement, and then to coast past the
other cities, and after displaying the power of Athens and proving their
zeal for their friends and allies, to sail home again (unless they should
have some sudden and unexpected opportunity of serving the Leontines, or
of bringing over some of the other cities), and not to endanger the state
by wasting its home resources.
Alcibiades said that a great expedition
like the present must not disgrace itself by going away without having
done anything; heralds must be sent to all the cities except Selinus and
Syracuse, and efforts be made to make some of the Sicels revolt from the
Syracusans, and to obtain the friendship of others, in order to have corn
and troops; and first of all to gain the Messinese, who lay right in the
passage and entrance to Sicily, and would afford an excellent harbour and
base for the army. Thus, after bringing over the towns and knowing who
would be their allies in the war, they might at length attack Syracuse
and Selinus; unless the latter came to terms with Egesta and the former
ceased to oppose the restoration of Leontini.
Lamachus, on the other hand, said
that they ought to sail straight to Syracuse, and fight their battle at
once under the walls of the town while the people were still unprepared,
and the panic at its height. Every armament was most terrible at first;
if it allowed time to run on without showing itself, men's courage revived,
and they saw it appear at last almost with indifference. By attacking suddenly,
while Syracuse still trembled at their coming, they would have the best
chance of gaining a victory for themselves and of striking a complete panic
into the enemy by the aspect of their numbers- which would never appear
so considerable as at present- by the anticipation of coming disaster,
and above all by the immediate danger of the engagement. They might also
count upon surprising many in the fields outside, incredulous of their
coming; and at the moment that the enemy was carrying in his property the
army would not want for booty if it sat down in force before the city.
The rest of the Siceliots would thus be immediately less disposed to enter
into alliance with the Syracusans, and would join the Athenians, without
waiting to see which were the strongest. They must make Megara their naval
station as a place to retreat to and a base from which to attack: it was
an uninhabited place at no great distance from Syracuse either by land
or by sea.
After speaking to this effect, Lamachus
nevertheless gave his support to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this
Alcibiades sailed in his own vessel across to Messina with proposals of
alliance, but met with no success, the inhabitants answering that they
could not receive him within their walls, though they would provide him
with a market outside. Upon this he sailed back to Rhegium. Immediately
upon his return the generals manned and victualled sixty ships out of the
whole fleet and coasted along to Naxos, leaving the rest of the armament
behind them at Rhegium with one of their number. Received by the Naxians,
they then coasted on to Catana, and being refused admittance by the inhabitants,
there being a Syracusan party in the town, went on to the river Terias.
Here they bivouacked, and the next day sailed in single file to Syracuse
with all their ships except ten which they sent on in front to sail into
the great harbour and see if there was any fleet launched, and to proclaim
by herald from shipboard that the Athenians were come to restore the Leontines
to their country, as being their allies and kinsmen, and that such of them,
therefore, as were in Syracuse should leave it without fear and join their
friends and benefactors the Athenians. After making this proclamation and
reconnoitring the city and the harbours, and the features of the country
which they would have to make their base of operations in the war, they
sailed back to Catana.
An assembly being held here, the
inhabitants refused to receive the armament, but invited the generals to
come in and say what they desired; and while Alcibiades was speaking and
the citizens were intent on the assembly, the soldiers broke down an ill-walled-up
postern gate without being observed, and getting inside the town, flocked
into the marketplace. The Syracusan party in the town no sooner saw the
army inside than they became frightened and withdrew, not being at all
numerous; while the rest voted for an alliance with the Athenians and invited
them to fetch the rest of their forces from Rhegium. After this the Athenians
sailed to Rhegium, and put off, this time with all the armament, for Catana,
and fell to work at their camp immediately upon their arrival.
Meanwhile word was brought them from
Camarina that if they went there the town would go over to them, and also
that the Syracusans were manning a fleet. The Athenians accordingly sailed
alongshore with all their armament, first to Syracuse, where they found
no fleet manning, and so always along the coast to Camarina, where they
brought to at the beach, and sent a herald to the people, who, however,
refused to receive them, saying that their oaths bound them to receive
the Athenians only with a single vessel, unless they themselves sent for
more. Disappointed here, the Athenians now sailed back again, and after
landing and plundering on Syracusan territory and losing some stragglers
from their light infantry through the coming up of the Syracusan horse,
so got back to Catana.
There they found the Salaminia come
from Athens for Alcibiades, with orders for him to sail home to answer
the charges which the state brought against him, and for certain others
of the soldiers who with him were accused of sacrilege in the matter of
the mysteries and of the Hermae. For the Athenians, after the departure
of the expedition, had continued as active as ever in investigating the
facts of the mysteries and of the Hermae, and, instead of testing the informers,
in their suspicious temper welcomed all indifferently, arresting and imprisoning
the best citizens upon the evidence of rascals, and preferring to sift
the matter to the bottom sooner than to let an accused person of good character
pass unquestioned, owing to the rascality of the informer. The commons
had heard how oppressive the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons had become
before it ended, and further that that had been put down at last, not by
themselves and Harmodius, but by the Lacedaemonians, and so were always
in fear and took everything suspiciously.
Indeed, the daring action of Aristogiton
and Harmodius was undertaken in consequence of a love affair, which I shall
relate at some length, to show that the Athenians are not more accurate
than the rest of the world in their accounts of their own tyrants and of
the facts of their own history. Pisistratus dying at an advanced age in
possession of the tyranny, was succeeded by his eldest son, Hippias, and
not Hipparchus, as is vulgarly believed. Harmodius was then in the flower
of youthful beauty, and Aristogiton, a citizen in the middle rank of life,
was his lover and possessed him. Solicited without success by Hipparchus,
son of Pisistratus, Harmodius told Aristogiton, and the enraged lover,
afraid that the powerful Hipparchus might take Harmodius by force, immediately
formed a design, such as his condition in life permitted, for overthrowing
the tyranny. In the meantime Hipparchus, after a second solicitation of
Harmodius, attended with no better success, unwilling to use violence,
arranged to insult him in some covert way. Indeed, generally their government
was not grievous to the multitude, or in any way odious in practice; and
these tyrants cultivated wisdom and virtue as much as any, and without
exacting from the Athenians more than a twentieth of their income, splendidly
adorned their city, and carried on their wars, and provided sacrifices
for the temples. For the rest, the city was left in full enjoyment of its
existing laws, except that care was always taken to have the offices in
the hands of some one of the family. Among those of them that held the
yearly archonship at Athens was Pisistratus, son of the tyrant Hippias,
and named after his grandfather, who dedicated during his term of office
the altar to the twelve gods in the market-place, and that of Apollo in
the Pythian precinct. The Athenian people afterwards built on to and lengthened
the altar in the market-place, and obliterated the inscription; but that
in the Pythian precinct can still be seen, though in faded letters, and
is to the following effect:
Pisistratus, the son of Hippias,
Sent up this record of his archonship In precinct of Apollo Pythias.
That Hippias was the eldest son and
succeeded to the government, is what I positively assert as a fact upon
which I have had more exact accounts than others, and may be also ascertained
by the following circumstance. He is the only one of the legitimate brothers
that appears to have had children; as the altar shows, and the pillar placed
in the Athenian Acropolis, commemorating the crime of the tyrants, which
mentions no child of Thessalus or of Hipparchus, but five of Hippias, which
he had by Myrrhine, daughter of Callias, son of Hyperechides; and naturally
the eldest would have married first. Again, his name comes first on the
pillar after that of his father; and this too is quite natural, as he was
the eldest after him, and the reigning tyrant. Nor can I ever believe that
Hippias would have obtained the tyranny so easily, if Hipparchus had been
in power when he was killed, and he, Hippias, had had to establish himself
upon the same day; but he had no doubt been long accustomed to overawe
the citizens, and to be obeyed by his mercenaries, and thus not only conquered,
but conquered with ease, without experiencing any of the embarrassment
of a younger brother unused to the exercise of authority. It was the sad
fate which made Hipparchus famous that got him also the credit with posterity
of having been tyrant.
To return to Harmodius; Hipparchus
having been repulsed in his solicitations insulted him as he had resolved,
by first inviting a sister of his, a young girl, to come and bear a basket
in a certain procession, and then rejecting her, on the plea that she had
never been invited at all owing to her unworthiness. If Harmodius was indignant
at this, Aristogiton for his sake now became more exasperated than ever;
and having arranged everything with those who were to join them in the
enterprise, they only waited for the great feast of the Panathenaea, the
sole day upon which the citizens forming part of the procession could meet
together in arms without suspicion. Aristogiton and Harmodius were to begin,
but were to be supported immediately by their accomplices against the bodyguard.
The conspirators were not many, for better security, besides which they
hoped that those not in the plot would be carried away by the example of
a few daring spirits, and use the arms in their hands to recover their
liberty.
At last the festival arrived; and
Hippias with his bodyguard was outside the city in the Ceramicus, arranging
how the different parts of the procession were to proceed. Harmodius and
Aristogiton had already their daggers and were getting ready to act, when
seeing one of their accomplices talking familiarly with Hippias, who was
easy of access to every one, they took fright, and concluded that they
were discovered and on the point of being taken; and eager if possible
to be revenged first upon the man who had wronged them and for whom they
had undertaken all this risk, they rushed, as they were, within the gates,
and meeting with Hipparchus by the Leocorium recklessly fell upon him at
once, infuriated, Aristogiton by love, and Harmodius by insult, and smote
him and slew him. Aristogiton escaped the guards at the moment, through
the crowd running up, but was afterwards taken and dispatched in no merciful
way: Harmodius was killed on the spot.
When the news was brought to Hippias
in the Ceramicus, he at once proceeded not to the scene of action, but
to the armed men in the procession, before they, being some distance away,
knew anything of the matter, and composing his features for the occasion,
so as not to betray himself, pointed to a certain spot, and bade them repair
thither without their arms. They withdrew accordingly, fancying he had
something to say; upon which he told the mercenaries to remove the arms,
and there and then picked out the men he thought guilty and all found with
daggers, the shield and spear being the usual weapons for a procession.
In this way offended love first led
Harmodius and Aristogiton to conspire, and the alarm of the moment to commit
the rash action recounted. After this the tyranny pressed harder on the
Athenians, and Hippias, now grown more fearful, put to death many of the
citizens, and at the same time began to turn his eyes abroad for a refuge
in case of revolution. Thus, although an Athenian, he gave his daughter,
Archedice, to a Lampsacene, Aeantides, son of the tyrant of Lampsacus,
seeing that they had great influence with Darius. And there is her tomb
in Lampsacus with this inscription:
Archedice lies buried in this earth,
Hippias her sire, and Athens gave her birth; Unto her bosom pride was never
known, Though daughter, wife, and sister to the throne. Hippias, after
reigning three years longer over the Athenians, was deposed in the fourth
by the Lacedaemonians and the banished Alcmaeonidae, and went with a safe
conduct to Sigeum, and to Aeantides at Lampsacus, and from thence to King
Darius; from whose court he set out twenty years after, in his old age,
and came with the Medes to Marathon.
With these events in their minds,
and recalling everything they knew by hearsay on the subject, the Athenian
people grow difficult of humour and suspicious of the persons charged in
the affair of the mysteries, and persuaded that all that had taken place
was part of an oligarchical and monarchical conspiracy. In the state of
irritation thus produced, many persons of consideration had been already
thrown into prison, and far from showing any signs of abating, public feeling
grew daily more savage, and more arrests were made; until at last one of
those in custody, thought to be the most guilty of all, was induced by
a fellow prisoner to make a revelation, whether true or not is a matter
on which there are two opinions, no one having been able, either then or
since, to say for certain who did the deed. However this may be, the other
found arguments to persuade him, that even if he had not done it, he ought
to save himself by gaining a promise of impunity, and free the state of
its present suspicions; as he would be surer of safety if he confessed
after promise of impunity than if he denied and were brought to trial.
He accordingly made a revelation, affecting himself and others in the affair
of the Hermae; and the Athenian people, glad at last, as they supposed,
to get at the truth, and furious until then at not being able to discover
those who had conspired against the commons, at once let go the informer
and all the rest whom he had not denounced, and bringing the accused to
trial executed as many as were apprehended, and condemned to death such
as had fled and set a price upon their heads. In this it was, after all,
not clear whether the sufferers had been punished unjustly, while in any
case the rest of the city received immediate and manifest relief.
To return to Alcibiades: public feeling
was very hostile to him, being worked on by the same enemies who had attacked
him before he went out; and now that the Athenians fancied that they had
got at the truth of the matter of the Hermae, they believed more firmly
than ever that the affair of the mysteries also, in which he was implicated,
had been contrived by him in the same intention and was connected with
the plot against the democracy. Meanwhile it so happened that, just at
the time of this agitation, a small force of Lacedaemonians had advanced
as far as the Isthmus, in pursuance of some scheme with the Boeotians.
It was now thought that this had come by appointment, at his instigation,
and not on account of the Boeotians, and that, if the citizens had not
acted on the information received, and forestalled them by arresting the
prisoners, the city would have been betrayed. The citizens went so far
as to sleep one night armed in the temple of Theseus within the walls.
The friends also of Alcibiades at Argos were just at this time suspected
of a design to attack the commons; and the Argive hostages deposited in
the islands were given up by the Athenians to the Argive people to be put
to death upon that account: in short, everywhere something was found to
create suspicion against Alcibiades. It was therefore decided to bring
him to trial and execute him, and the Salaminia was sent to Sicily for
him and the others named in the information, with instructions to order
him to come and answer the charges against him, but not to arrest him,
because they wished to avoid causing any agitation in the army or among
the enemy in Sicily, and above all to retain the services of the Mantineans
and Argives, who, it was thought, had been induced to join by his influence.
Alcibiades, with his own ship and his fellow accused, accordingly sailed
off with the Salaminia from Sicily, as though to return to Athens, and
went with her as far as Thurii, and there they left the ship and disappeared,
being afraid to go home for trial with such a prejudice existing against
them. The crew of the Salaminia stayed some time looking for Alcibiades
and his companions, and at length, as they were nowhere to be found, set
sail and departed. Alcibiades, now an outlaw, crossed in a boat not long
after from Thurii to Peloponnese; and the Athenians passed sentence of
death by default upon him and those in his company.
Chapter
Twenty
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Years
of the War - Inaction of the Athenian Army -
Alcibiades at Sparta - Investment
of Syracuse
The Athenian generals left in Sicily
now divided the armament into two parts, and, each taking one by lot, sailed
with the whole for Selinus and Egesta, wishing to know whether the Egestaeans
would give the money, and to look into the question of Selinus and ascertain
the state of the quarrel between her and Egesta. Coasting along Sicily,
with the shore on their left, on the side towards the Tyrrhene Gulf they
touched at Himera, the only Hellenic city in that part of the island, and
being refused admission resumed their voyage. On their way they took Hyccara,
a petty Sicanian seaport, nevertheless at war with Egesta, and making slaves
of the inhabitants gave up the town to the Egestaeans, some of whose horse
had joined them; after which the army proceeded through the territory of
the Sicels until it reached Catana, while the fleet sailed along the coast
with the slaves on board. Meanwhile Nicias sailed straight from Hyccara
along the coast and went to Egesta and, after transacting his other business
and receiving thirty talents, rejoined the forces. They now sold their
slaves for the sum of one hundred and twenty talents, and sailed round
to their Sicel allies to urge them to send troops; and meanwhile went with
half their own force to the hostile town of Hybla in the territory of Gela,
but did not succeed in taking it.
Summer was now over. The winter following,
the Athenians at once began to prepare for moving on Syracuse, and the
Syracusans on their side for marching against them. From the moment when
the Athenians failed to attack them instantly as they at first feared and
expected, every day that passed did something to revive their courage;
and when they saw them sailing far away from them on the other side of
Sicily, and going to Hybla only to fail in their attempts to storm it,
they thought less of them than ever, and called upon their generals, as
the multitude is apt to do in its moments of confidence, to lead them to
Catana, since the enemy would not come to them. Parties also of the Syracusan
horse employed in reconnoitring constantly rode up to the Athenian armament,
and among other insults asked them whether they had not really come to
settle with the Syracusans in a foreign country rather than to resettle
the Leontines in their own.
Aware of this, the Athenian generals
determined to draw them out in mass as far as possible from the city, and
themselves in the meantime to sail by night alongshore, and take up at
their leisure a convenient position. This they knew they could not so well
do, if they had to disembark from their ships in front of a force prepared
for them, or to go by land openly. The numerous cavalry of the Syracusans
(a force which they were themselves without) would then be able to do the
greatest mischief to their light troops and the crowd that followed them;
but this plan would enable them to take up a position in which the horse
could do them no hurt worth speaking of, some Syracusan exiles with the
army having told them of the spot near the Olympieum, which they afterwards
occupied. In pursuance of their idea, the generals imagined the following
stratagem. They sent to Syracuse a man devoted to them, and by the Syracusan
generals thought to be no less in their interest; he was a native of Catana,
and said he came from persons in that place, whose names the Syracusan
generals were acquainted with, and whom they knew to be among the members
of their party still left in the city. He told them that the Athenians
passed the night in the town, at some distance from their arms, and that
if the Syracusans would name a day and come with all their people at daybreak
to attack the armament, they, their friends, would close the gates upon
the troops in the city, and set fire to the vessels, while the Syracusans
would easily take the camp by an attack upon the stockade. In this they
would be aided by many of the Catanians, who were already prepared to act,
and from whom he himself came.
The generals of the Syracusans, who
did not want confidence, and who had intended even without this to march
on Catana, believed the man without any sufficient inquiry, fixed at once
a day upon which they would be there, and dismissed him, and the Selinuntines
and others of their allies having now arrived, gave orders for all the
Syracusans to march out in mass. Their preparations completed, and the
time fixed for their arrival being at hand, they set out for Catana, and
passed the night upon the river Symaethus, in the Leontine territory. Meanwhile
the Athenians no sooner knew of their approach than they took all their
forces and such of the Sicels or others as had joined them, put them on
board their ships and boats, and sailed by night to Syracuse. Thus, when
morning broke the Athenians were landing opposite the Olympieum ready to
seize their camping ground, and the Syracusan horse having ridden up first
to Catana and found that all the armament had put to sea, turned back and
told the infantry, and then all turned back together, and went to the relief
of the city.
In the meantime, as the march before
the Syracusans was a long one, the Athenians quietly sat down their army
in a convenient position, where they could begin an engagement when they
pleased, and where the Syracusan cavalry would have least opportunity of
annoying them, either before or during the action, being fenced off on
one side by walls, houses, trees, and by a marsh, and on the other by cliffs.
They also felled the neighbouring trees and carried them down to the sea,
and formed a palisade alongside of their ships, and with stones which they
picked up and wood hastily raised a fort at Daskon, the most vulnerable
point of their position, and broke down the bridge over the Anapus. These
preparations were allowed to go on without any interruption from the city,
the first hostile force to appear being the Syracusan cavalry, followed
afterwards by all the foot together. At first they came close up to the
Athenian army, and then, finding that they did not offer to engage, crossed
the Helorine road and encamped for the night.
The next day the Athenians and their
allies prepared for battle, their dispositions being as follows: Their
right wing was occupied by the Argives and Mantineans, the centre by the
Athenians, and the rest of the field by the other allies. Half their army
was drawn up eight deep in advance, half close to their tents in a hollow
square, formed also eight deep, which had orders to look out and be ready
to go to the support of the troops hardest pressed. The camp followers
were placed inside this reserve. The Syracusans, meanwhile, formed their
heavy infantry sixteen deep, consisting of the mass levy of their own people,
and such allies as had joined them, the strongest contingent being that
of the Selinuntines; next to them the cavalry of the Geloans, numbering
two hundred in all, with about twenty horse and fifty archers from Camarina.
The cavalry was posted on their right, full twelve hundred strong, and
next to it the darters. As the Athenians were about to begin the attack,
Nicias went along the lines, and addressed these words of encouragement
to the army and the nations composing it:
"Soldiers, a long exhortation is
little needed by men like ourselves, who are here to fight in the same
battle, the force itself being, to my thinking, more fit to inspire confidence
than a fine speech with a weak army. Where we have Argives, Mantineans,
Athenians, and the first of the islanders in the ranks together, it were
strange indeed, with so many and so brave companions in arms, if we did
not feel confident of victory; especially when we have mass levies opposed
to our picked troops, and what is more, Siceliots, who may disdain us but
will not stand against us, their skill not being at all commensurate to
their rashness. You may also remember that we are far from home and have
no friendly land near, except what your own swords shall win you; and here
I put before you a motive just the reverse of that which the enemy are
appealing to; their cry being that they shall fight for their country,
mine that we shall fight for a country that is not ours, where we must
conquer or hardly get away, as we shall have their horse upon us in great
numbers. Remember, therefore, your renown, and go boldly against the enemy,
thinking the present strait and necessity more terrible than they."
After this address Nicias at once
led on the army. The Syracusans were not at that moment expecting an immediate
engagement, and some had even gone away to the town, which was close by;
these now ran up as hard as they could and, though behind time, took their
places here or there in the main body as fast as they joined it. Want of
zeal or daring was certainly not the fault of the Syracusans, either in
this or the other battles, but although not inferior in courage, so far
as their military science might carry them, when this failed them they
were compelled to give up their resolution also. On the present occasion,
although they had not supposed that the Athenians would begin the attack,
and although constrained to stand upon their defence at short notice, they
at once took up their arms and advanced to meet them. First, the stone-throwers,
slingers, and archers of either army began skirmishing, and routed or were
routed by one another, as might be expected between light troops; next,
soothsayers brought forward the usual victims, and trumpeters urged on
the heavy infantry to the charge; and thus they advanced, the Syracusans
to fight for their country, and each individual for his safety that day
and liberty hereafter; in the enemy's army, the Athenians to make another's
country theirs and to save their own from suffering by their defeat; the
Argives and independent allies to help them in getting what they came for,
and to earn by victory another sight of the country they had left behind;
while the subject allies owed most of their ardour to the desire of self-preservation,
which they could only hope for if victorious; next to which, as a secondary
motive, came the chance of serving on easier terms, after helping the Athenians
to a fresh conquest.
The armies now came to close quarters,
and for a long while fought without either giving ground. Meanwhile there
occurred some claps of thunder with lightning and heavy rain, which did
not fail to add to the fears of the party fighting for the first time,
and very little acquainted with war; while to their more experienced adversaries
these phenomena appeared to be produced by the time of year, and much more
alarm was felt at the continued resistance of the enemy. At last the Argives
drove in the Syracusan left, and after them the Athenians routed the troops
opposed to them, and the Syracusan army was thus cut in two and betook
itself to flight. The Athenians did not pursue far, being held in check
by the numerous and undefeated Syracusan horse, who attacked and drove
back any of their heavy infantry whom they saw pursuing in advance of the
rest; in spite of which the victors followed so far as was safe in a body,
and then went back and set up a trophy. Meanwhile the Syracusans rallied
at the Helorine road, where they re-formed as well as they could under
the circumstances, and even sent a garrison of their own citizens to the
Olympieum, fearing that the Athenians might lay hands on some of the treasures
there. The rest returned to the town.
The Athenians, however, did not go
to the temple, but collected their dead and laid them upon a pyre, and
passed the night upon the field. The next day they gave the enemy back
their dead under truce, to the number of about two hundred and sixty, Syracusans
and allies, and gathered together the bones of their own, some fifty, Athenians
and allies, and taking the spoils of the enemy, sailed back to Catana.
It was now winter; and it did not seem possible for the moment to carry
on the war before Syracuse, until horse should have been sent for from
Athens and levied among the allies in Sicily- to do away with their utter
inferiority in cavalry- and money should have been collected in the country
and received from Athens, and until some of the cities, which they hoped
would be now more disposed to listen to them after the battle, should have
been brought over, and corn and all other necessaries provided, for a campaign
in the spring against Syracuse.
With this intention they sailed off
to Naxos and Catana for the winter. Meanwhile the Syracusans burned their
dead and then held an assembly, in which Hermocrates, son of Hermon, a
man who with a general ability of the first order had given proofs of military
capacity and brilliant courage in the war, came forward and encouraged
them, and told them not to let what had occurred make them give way, since
their spirit had not been conquered, but their want of discipline had done
the mischief. Still they had not been beaten by so much as might have been
expected, especially as they were, one might say, novices in the art of
war, an army of artisans opposed to the most practised soldiers in Hellas.
What had also done great mischief was the number of the generals (there
were fifteen of them) and the quantity of orders given, combined with the
disorder and insubordination of the troops. But if they were to have a
few skilful generals, and used this winter in preparing their heavy infantry,
finding arms for such as had not got any, so as to make them as numerous
as possible, and forcing them to attend to their training generally, they
would have every chance of beating their adversaries, courage being already
theirs and discipline in the field having thus been added to it. Indeed,
both
these qualities would improve, since danger would exercise them in discipline,
while their courage would be led to surpass itself by the confidence which
skill inspires. The generals should be few and elected with full powers,
and an oath should be taken to leave them entire discretion in their command:
if they adopted this plan, their secrets would be better kept, all preparations
would be properly made, and there would be no room for excuses.
The Syracusans heard him, and voted
everything as he advised, and elected three generals, Hermocrates himself,
Heraclides, son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus, son of Execestes. They also
sent envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon to procure a force of allies to join
them, and to induce the Lacedaemonians for their sakes openly to address
themselves in real earnest to the war against the Athenians, that they
might either have to leave Sicily or be less able to send reinforcements
to their army there.
The Athenian forces at Catana now
at once sailed against Messina, in the expectation of its being betrayed
to them. The intrigue, however, after all came to nothing: Alcibiades,
who was in the secret, when he left his command upon the summons from home,
foreseeing that he would be outlawed, gave information of the plot to the
friends of the Syracusans in Messina, who had at once put to death its
authors, and now rose in arms against the opposite faction with those of
their way of thinking, and succeeded in preventing the admission of the
Athenians. The latter waited for thirteen days, and then, as they were
exposed to the weather and without provisions, and met with no success,
went back to Naxos, where they made places for their ships to lie in, erected
a palisade round their camp, and retired into winter quarters; meanwhile
they sent a galley to Athens for money and cavalry to join them in the
spring. During the winter the Syracusans built a wall on to the city, so
as to take in the statue of Apollo Temenites, all along the side looking
towards Epipolae, to make the task of circumvallation longer and more difficult,
in case of their being defeated, and also erected a fort at Megara and
another in the Olympieum, and stuck palisades along the sea wherever there
was a landing Place. Meanwhile, as they knew that the Athenians were wintering
at Naxos, they marched with all their people to Catana, and ravaged the
land and set fire to the tents and encampment of the Athenians, and so
returned home. Learning also that the Athenians were sending an embassy
to Camarina, on the strength of the alliance concluded in the time of Laches,
to gain, if possible, that city, they sent another from Syracuse to oppose
them. They had a shrewd suspicion that the Camarinaeans had not sent what
they did send for the first battle very willingly; and they now feared
that they would refuse to assist them at all in future, after seeing the
success of the Athenians in the action, and would join the latter on the
strength of their old friendship. Hermocrates, with some others, accordingly
arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and Euphemus and others from the Athenians;
and an assembly of the Camarinaeans having been convened, Hermocrates spoke
as follows, in the hope of prejudicing them against the Athenians:
"Camarinaeans, we did not come on
this embassy because we were afraid of your being frightened by the actual
forces of the Athenians, but rather of your being gained by what they would
say to you before you heard anything from us. They are come to Sicily with
the pretext that you know, and the intention which we all suspect, in my
opinion less to restore the Leontines to their homes than to oust us from
ours; as it is out of all reason that they should restore in Sicily the
cities that they lay waste in Hellas, or should cherish the Leontine Chalcidians
because of their Ionian blood and keep in servitude the Euboean Chalcidians,
of whom the Leontines are a colony. No; but the same policy which has proved
so successful in Hellas is now being tried in Sicily. After being chosen
as the leaders of the Ionians and of the other allies of Athenian origin,
to punish the Mede, the Athenians accused some of failure in military service,
some of fighting against each other, and others, as the case might be,
upon any colourable pretext that could be found, until they thus subdued
them all. In fine, in the struggle against the Medes, the Athenians did
not fight for the liberty of the Hellenes, or the Hellenes for their own
liberty, but the former to make their countrymen serve them instead of
him, the latter to change one master for another, wiser indeed than the
first, but wiser for evil.
"But we are not now come to declare
to an audience familiar with them the misdeeds of a state so open to accusation
as is the Athenian, but much rather to blame ourselves, who, with the warnings
we possess in the Hellenes in those parts that have been enslaved through
not supporting each other, and seeing the same sophisms being now tried
upon ourselves- such as restorations of Leontine kinsfolk and support of
Egestaean allies- do not stand together and resolutely show them that here
are no Ionians, or Hellespontines, or islanders, who change continually,
but always serve a master, sometimes the Mede and sometimes some other,
but free Dorians from independent Peloponnese, dwelling in Sicily. Or,
are we waiting until we be taken in detail, one city after another; knowing
as we do that in no other way can we be conquered, and seeing that they
turn to this plan, so as to divide some of us by words, to draw some by
the bait of an alliance into open war with each other, and to ruin others
by such flattery as different circumstances may render acceptable? And
do we fancy when destruction first overtakes a distant fellow countryman
that the danger will not come to each of us also, or that he who suffers
before us will suffer in himself alone?
"As for the Camarinaean who says
that it is the Syracusan, not he, that is the enemy of the Athenian, and
who thinks it hard to have to encounter risk in behalf of my country, I
would have him bear in mind that he will fight in my country, not more
for mine than for his own, and by so much the more safely in that he will
enter on the struggle not alone, after the way has been cleared by my ruin,
but with me as his ally, and that the object of the Athenian is not so
much to punish the enmity of the Syracusan as to use me as a blind to secure
the friendship of the Camarinaean. As for him who envies or even fears
us (and envied and feared great powers must always be), and who on this
account wishes Syracuse to be humbled to teach us a lesson, but would still
have her survive, in the interest of his own security the wish that he
indulges is not humanly possible. A man can control his own desires, but
he cannot likewise control circumstances; and in the event of his calculations
proving mistaken, he may live to bewail his own misfortune, and wish to
be again envying my prosperity. An idle wish, if he now sacrifice us and
refuse to take his share of perils which are the same, in reality though
not in name, for him as for us; what is nominally the preservation of our
power being really his own salvation. It was to be expected that you, of
all people in the world, Camarinaeans, being our immediate neighbours and
the next in danger, would have foreseen this, and instead of supporting
us in the lukewarm way that you are now doing, would rather come to us
of your own accord, and be now offering at Syracuse the aid which you would
have asked for at Camarina, if to Camarina the Athenians had first come,
to encourage us to resist the invader. Neither you, however, nor the rest
have as yet bestirred yourselves in this direction.
"Fear perhaps will make you study
to do right both by us and by the invaders, and plead that you have an
alliance with the Athenians. But you made that alliance, not against your
friends, but against the enemies that might attack you, and to help the
Athenians when they were wronged by others, not when as now they are wronging
their neighbours. Even the Rhegians, Chalcidians though they be, refuse
to help to restore the Chalcidian Leontines; and it would be strange if,
while they suspect the gist of this fine pretence and are wise without
reason, you, with every reason on your side, should yet choose to assist
your natural enemies, and should join with their direst foes in undoing
those whom nature has made your own kinsfolk. This is not to do right;
but you should help us without fear of their armament, which has no terrors
if we hold together, but only if we let them succeed in their endeavours
to separate us; since even after attacking us by ourselves and being victorious
in battle, they had to go off without effecting their purpose.
"United, therefore, we have no cause
to despair, but rather new encouragement to league together; especially
as succour will come to us from the Peloponnesians, in military matters
the undoubted superiors of the Athenians. And you need not think that your
prudent policy of taking sides with neither, because allies of both, is
either safe for you or fair to us. Practically it is not as fair as it
pretends to be. If the vanquished be defeated, and the victor conquer,
through your refusing to join, what is the effect of your abstention but
to leave the former to perish unaided, and to allow the latter to offend
unhindered? And yet it were more honourable to join those who are not only
the injured party, but your own kindred, and by so doing to defend the
common interests of Sicily and save your friends the Athenians from doing
wrong.
"In conclusion, we Syracusans say
that it is useless for us to demonstrate either to you or to the rest what
you know already as well as we do; but we entreat, and if our entreaty
fail, we protest that we are menaced by our eternal enemies the Ionians,
and are betrayed by you our fellow Dorians. If the Athenians reduce us,
they will owe their victory to your decision, but in their own name will
reap the honour, and will receive as the prize of their triumph the very
men who enabled them to gain it. On the other hand, if we are the conquerors,
you will have to pay for having been the cause of our danger. Consider,
therefore; and now make your choice between the security which present
servitude offers and the prospect of conquering with us and so escaping
disgraceful submission to an Athenian master and avoiding the lasting enmity
of Syracuse."
Such were the words of Hermocrates;
after whom Euphemus, the Athenian ambassador, spoke as follows:
"Although we came here only to renew
the former alliance, the attack of the Syracusans compels us to speak of
our empire and of the good right we have to it. The best proof of this
the speaker himself furnished, when he called the Ionians eternal enemies
of the Dorians. It is the fact; and the Peloponnesian Dorians being our
superiors in numbers and next neighbours, we Ionians looked out for the
best means of escaping their domination. After the Median War we had a
fleet, and so got rid of the empire and supremacy of the Lacedaemonians,
who had no right to give orders to us more than we to them, except that
of being the strongest at that moment; and being appointed leaders of the
King's former subjects, we continue to be so, thinking that we are least
likely to fall under the dominion of the Peloponnesians, if we have a force
to defend ourselves with, and in strict truth having done nothing unfair
in reducing to subjection the Ionians and islanders, the kinsfolk whom
the Syracusans say we have enslaved. They, our kinsfolk, came against their
mother country, that is to say against us, together with the Mede, and,
instead of having the courage to revolt and sacrifice their property as
we did when we abandoned our city, chose to be slaves themselves, and to
try to make us so.
"We, therefore, deserve to rule because
we placed the largest fleet and an unflinching patriotism at the service
of the Hellenes, and because these, our subjects, did us mischief by their
ready subservience to the Medes; and, desert apart, we seek to strengthen
ourselves against the Peloponnesians. We make no fine profession of having
a right to rule because we overthrew the barbarian single-handed, or because
we risked what we did risk for the freedom of the subjects in question
any more than for that of all, and for our own: no one can be quarrelled
with for providing for his proper safety. If we are now here in Sicily,
it is equally in the interest of our security, with which we perceive that
your interest also coincides. We prove this from the conduct which the
Syracusans cast against us and which you somewhat too timorously suspect;
knowing that those whom fear has made suspicious may be carried away by
the charm of eloquence for the moment, but when they come to act follow
their interests.
"Now, as we have said, fear makes
us hold our empire in Hellas, and fear makes us now come, with the help
of our friends, to order safely matters in Sicily, and not to enslave any
but rather to prevent any from being enslaved. Meanwhile, let no one imagine
that we are interesting ourselves in you without your having anything to
do with us, seeing that, if you are preserved and able to make head against
the Syracusans, they will be less likely to harm us by sending troops to
the Peloponnesians. In this way you have everything to do with us, and
on this account it is perfectly reasonable for us to restore the Leontines,
and to make them, not subjects like their kinsmen in Euboea, but as powerful
as possible, to help us by annoying the Syracusans from their frontier.
In Hellas we are alone a match for our enemies; and as for the assertion
that it is out of all reason that we should free the Sicilian, while we
enslave the Chalcidian, the fact is that the latter is useful to us by
being without arms and contributing money only; while the former, the Leontines
and our other friends, cannot be too independent.
"Besides, for tyrants and imperial
cities nothing is unreasonable if expedient, no one a kinsman unless sure;
but friendship or enmity is everywhere an affair of time and circumstance.
Here, in Sicily, our interest is not to weaken our friends, but by means
of their strength to cripple our enemies. Why doubt this? In Hellas we
treat our allies as we find them useful. The Chians and Methymnians govern
themselves and furnish ships; most of the rest have harder terms and pay
tribute in money; while others, although islanders and easy for us to take,
are free altogether, because they occupy convenient positions round Peloponnese.
In our settlement of the states here in Sicily, we should therefore; naturally
be guided by our interest, and by fear, as we say, of the Syracusans. Their
ambition is to rule you, their object to use the suspicions that we excite
to unite you, and then, when we have gone away without effecting anything,
by force or through your isolation, to become the masters of Sicily. And
masters they must become, if you unite with them; as a force of that magnitude
would be no longer easy for us to deal with united, and they would be more
than a match for you as soon as we were away.
"Any other view of the case is condemned
by the facts. When you first asked us over, the fear which you held out
was that of danger to Athens if we let you come under the dominion of Syracuse;
and it is not right now to mistrust the very same argument by which you
claimed to convince us, or to give way to suspicion because we are come
with a larger force against the power of that city. Those whom you should
really distrust are the Syracusans. We are not able to stay here without
you, and if we proved perfidious enough to bring you into subjection, we
should be unable to keep you in bondage, owing to the length of the voyage
and the difficulty of guarding large, and in a military sense continental,
towns: they, the Syracusans, live close to you, not in a camp, but in a
city greater than the force we have with us, plot always against you, never
let slip an opportunity once offered, as they have shown in the case of
the Leontines and others, and now have the face, just as if you were fools,
to invite you to aid them against the power that hinders this, and that
has thus far maintained Sicily independent. We, as against them, invite
you to a much more real safety, when we beg you not to betray that common
safety which we each have in the other, and to reflect that they, even
without allies, will, by their numbers, have always the way open to you,
while you will not often have the opportunity of defending yourselves with
such numerous auxiliaries; if, through your suspicions, you once let these
go away unsuccessful or defeated, you will wish to see if only a handful
of them back again, when the day is past in which their presence could
do anything for you.
"But we hope, Camarinaeans, that
the calumnies of the Syracusans will not be allowed to succeed either with
you or with the rest: we have told you the whole truth upon the things
we are suspected of, and will now briefly recapitulate, in the hope of
convincing you. We assert that we are rulers in Hellas in order not to
be subjects; liberators in Sicily that we may not be harmed by the Sicilians;
that we are compelled to interfere in many things, because we have many
things to guard against; and that now, as before, we are come as allies
to those of you who suffer wrong in this island, not without invitation
but upon invitation. Accordingly, instead of making yourselves judges or
censors of our conduct, and trying to turn us, which it were now difficult
to do, so far as there is anything in our interfering policy or in our
character that chimes in with your interest, this take and make use of;
and be sure that, far from being injurious to all alike, to most of the
Hellenes that policy is even beneficial. Thanks to it, all men in all places,
even where we are not, who either apprehend or meditate aggression, from
the near prospect before them, in the one case, of obtaining our intervention
in their favour, in the other, of our arrival making the venture dangerous,
find themselves constrained, respectively, to be moderate against their
will, and to be preserved without trouble of their own. Do not you reject
this security that is open to all who desire it, and is now offered to
you; but do like others, and instead of being always on the defensive against
the Syracusans, unite with us, and in your turn at last threaten them."
Such were the words of Euphemus.
What the Camarinaeans felt was this. Sympathizing with the Athenians, except
in so far as they might be afraid of their subjugating Sicily, they had
always been at enmity with their neighbour Syracuse. From the very fact,
however, that they were their neighbours, they feared the Syracusans most
of the two, and being apprehensive of their conquering even without them,
both sent them in the first instance the few horsemen mentioned, and for
the future determined to support them most in fact, although as sparingly
as possible; but for the moment in order not to seem to slight the Athenians,
especially as they had been successful in the engagement, to answer both
alike. Agreeably to this resolution they answered that as both the contending
parties happened to be allies of theirs, they thought it most consistent
with their oaths at present to side with neither; with which answer the
ambassadors of either party departed.
In the meantime, while Syracuse pursued
her preparations for war, the Athenians were encamped at Naxos, and tried
by negotiation to gain as many of the Sicels as possible. Those more in
the low lands, and subjects of Syracuse, mostly held aloof; but the peoples
of the interior who had never been otherwise than independent, with few
exceptions, at once joined the Athenians, and brought down corn to the
army, and in some cases even money. The Athenians marched against those
who refused to join, and forced some of them to do so; in the case of others
they were stopped by the Syracusans sending garrisons and reinforcements.
Meanwhile the Athenians moved their winter quarters from Naxos to Catana,
and reconstructed the camp burnt by the Syracusans, and stayed there the
rest of the winter. They also sent a galley to Carthage, with proffers
of friendship, on the chance of obtaining assistance, and another to Tyrrhenia;
some of the cities there having spontaneously offered to join them in the
war. They also sent round to the Sicels and to Egesta, desiring them to
send them as many horses as possible, and meanwhile prepared bricks, iron,
and all other things necessary for the work of circumvallation, intending
by the spring to begin hostilities.
In the meantime the Syracusan envoys
dispatched to Corinth and Lacedaemon tried as they passed along the coast
to persuade the Italiots to interfere with the proceedings of the Athenians,
which threatened Italy quite as much as Syracuse, and having arrived at
Corinth made a speech calling on the Corinthians to assist them on the
ground of their common origin. The Corinthians voted at once to aid them
heart and soul themselves, and then sent on envoys with them to Lacedaemon,
to help them to persuade her also to prosecute the war with the Athenians
more openly at home and to send succours to Sicily. The envoys from Corinth
having reached Lacedaemon found there Alcibiades with his fellow refugees,
who had at once crossed over in a trading vessel from Thurii, first to
Cyllene in Elis, and afterwards from thence to Lacedaemon; upon the Lacedaemonians'
own invitation, after first obtaining a safe conduct, as he feared them
for the part he had taken in the affair of Mantinea. The result was that
the Corinthians, Syracusans, and Alcibiades, pressing all the same request
in the assembly of the Lacedaemonians, succeeded in persuading them; but
as the ephors and the authorities, although resolved to send envoys to
Syracuse to prevent their surrendering to the Athenians, showed no disposition
to send them any assistance, Alcibiades now came forward and inflamed and
stirred the Lacedaemonians by speaking as follows:
"I am forced first to speak to you
of the prejudice with which I am regarded, in order that suspicion may
not make you disinclined to listen to me upon public matters. The connection,
with you as your proxeni, which the ancestors of our family by reason of
some discontent renounced, I personally tried to renew by my good offices
towards you, in particular upon the occasion of the disaster at Pylos.
But although I maintained this friendly attitude, you yet chose to negotiate
the peace with the Athenians through my enemies, and thus to strengthen
them and to discredit me. You had therefore no right to complain if I turned
to the Mantineans and Argives, and seized other occasions of thwarting
and injuring you; and the time has now come when those among you, who in
the bitterness of the moment may have been then unfairly angry with me,
should look at the matter in its true light, and take a different view.
Those again who judged me unfavourably, because I leaned rather to the
side of the commons, must not think that their dislike is any better founded.
We have always been hostile to tyrants, and all who oppose arbitrary power
are called commons; hence we continued to act as leaders of the multitude;
besides which, as democracy was the government of the city, it was necessary
in most things to conform to established conditions. However, we endeavoured
to be more moderate than the licentious temper of the times; and while
there were others, formerly as now, who tried to lead the multitude astray-
the same who banished me- our party was that of the whole people, our creed
being to do our part in preserving the form of government under which the
city enjoyed the utmost greatness and freedom, and which we had found existing.
As for democracy, the men of sense among us knew what it was, and I perhaps
as well as any, as I have the more cause to complain of it; but there is
nothing new to be said of a patent absurdity; meanwhile we did not think
it safe to alter it under the pressure of your hostility.
"So much then for the prejudices
with which I am regarded: I now can call your attention to the questions
you must consider, and upon which superior knowledge perhaps permits me
to speak. We sailed to Sicily first to conquer, if possible, the Siceliots,
and after them the Italiots also, and finally to assail the empire and
city of Carthage. In the event of all or most of these schemes succeeding,
we were then to attack Peloponnese, bringing with us the entire force of
the Hellenes lately acquired in those parts, and taking a number of barbarians
into our pay, such as the Iberians and others in those countries, confessedly
the most warlike known, and building numerous galleys in addition to those
which we had already, timber being plentiful in Italy; and with this fleet
blockading Peloponnese from the sea and assailing it with our armies by
land, taking some of the cities by storm, drawing works of circumvallation
round others, we hoped without difficulty to effect its reduction, and
after this to rule the whole of the Hellenic name. Money and corn meanwhile
for the better execution of these plans were to be supplied in sufficient
quantities by the newly acquired places in those countries, independently
of our revenues here at home.
"You have thus heard the history
of the present expedition from the man who most exactly knows what our
objects were; and the remaining generals will, if they can, carry these
out just the same. But that the states in Sicily must succumb if you do
not help them, I will now show. Although the Siceliots, with all their
inexperience, might even now be saved if their forces were united, the
Syracusans alone, beaten already in one battle with all their people and
blockaded from the sea, will be unable to withstand the Athenian armament
that is now there. But if Syracuse falls, all Sicily falls also, and Italy
immediately afterwards; and the danger which I just now spoke of from that
quarter will before long be upon you. None need therefore fancy that Sicily
only is in question; Peloponnese will be so also, unless you speedily do
as I tell you, and send on board ship to Syracuse troops that shall able
to row their ships themselves, and serve as heavy infantry the moment that
they land; and what I consider even more important than the troops, a Spartan
as commanding officer to discipline the forces already on foot and to compel
recusants to serve. The friends that you have already will thus become
more confident, and the waverers will be encouraged to join you. Meanwhile
you must carry on the war here more openly, that the Syracusans, seeing
that you do not forget them, may put heart into their resistance, and that
the Athenians may be less able to reinforce their armament. You must fortify
Decelea in Attica, the blow of which the Athenians are always most afraid
and the only one that they think they have not experienced in the present
war; the surest method of harming an enemy being to find out what he most
fears, and to choose this means of attacking him, since every one naturally
knows best his own weak points and fears accordingly. The fortification
in question, while it benefits you, will create difficulties for your adversaries,
of which I shall pass over many, and shall only mention the chief. Whatever
property there is in the country will most of it become yours, either by
capture or surrender; and the Athenians will at once be deprived of their
revenues from the silver mines at Laurium, of their present gains from
their land and from the law courts, and above all of the revenue from their
allies, which will be paid less regularly, as they lose their awe of Athens
and see you addressing yourselves with vigour to the war. The zeal and
speed with which all this shall be done depends, Lacedaemonians, upon yourselves;
as to its possibility, I am quite confident, and I have little fear of
being mistaken.
"Meanwhile I hope that none of you
will think any the worse of me if, after having hitherto passed as a lover
of my country, I now actively join its worst enemies in attacking it, or
will suspect what I say as the fruit of an outlaw's enthusiasm. I am an
outlaw from the iniquity of those who drove me forth, not, if you will
be guided by me, from your service; my worst enemies are not you who only
harmed your foes, but they who forced their friends to become enemies;
and love of country is what I do not feel when I am wronged, but what I
felt when secure in my rights as a citizen. Indeed I do not consider that
I am now attacking a country that is still mine; I am rather trying to
recover one that is mine no longer; and the true lover of his country is
not he who consents to lose it unjustly rather than attack it, but he who
longs for it so much that he will go all lengths to recover it. For myself,
therefore, Lacedaemonians, I beg you to use me without scruple for danger
and trouble of every kind, and to remember the argument in every one's
mouth, that if I did you great harm as an enemy, I could likewise do you
good service as a friend, inasmuch as I know the plans of the Athenians,
while I only guessed yours. For yourselves I entreat you to believe that
your most capital interests are now under deliberation; and I urge you
to send without hesitation the expeditions to Sicily and Attica; by the
presence of a small part of your forces you will save important cities
in that island, and you will destroy the power of Athens both present and
prospective; after this you will dwell in security and enjoy the supremacy
over all Hellas, resting not on force but upon consent and affection."
Such were the words of Alcibiades.
The Lacedaemonians, who had themselves before intended to march against
Athens, but were still waiting and looking about them, at once became much
more in earnest when they received this particular information from Alcibiades,
and considered that they had heard it from the man who best knew the truth
of the matter. Accordingly they now turned their attention to the fortifying
of Decelea and sending immediate aid to the Sicilians; and naming Gylippus,
son of Cleandridas, to the command of the Syracusans, bade him consult
with that people and with the Corinthians and arrange for succours reaching
the island, in the best and speediest way possible under the circumstances.
Gylippus desired the Corinthians to send him at once two ships to Asine,
and to prepare the rest that they intended to send, and to have them ready
to sail at the proper time. Having settled this, the envoys departed from
Lacedaemon.
In the meantime arrived the Athenian
galley from Sicily sent by the generals for money and cavalry; and the
Athenians, after hearing what they wanted, voted to send the supplies for
the armament and the cavalry. And the winter ended, and with it ended the
seventeenth year of the present war of which Thucydides is the historian.
The next summer, at the very beginning
of the season, the Athenians in Sicily put out from Catana, and sailed
along shore to Megara in Sicily, from which, as I have mentioned above,
the Syracusans expelled the inhabitants in the time of their tyrant Gelo,
themselves occupying the territory. Here the Athenians landed and laid
waste the country, and after an unsuccessful attack upon a fort of the
Syracusans, went on with the fleet and army to the river Terias, and advancing
inland laid waste the plain and set fire to the corn; and after killing
some of a small Syracusan party which they encountered, and setting up
a trophy, went back again to their ships. They now sailed to Catana and
took in provisions there, and going with their whole force against Centoripa,
a town of the Sicels, acquired it by capitulation, and departed, after
also burning the corn of the Inessaeans and Hybleans. Upon their return
to Catana they found the horsemen arrived from Athens, to the number of
two hundred and fifty (with their equipments, but without their horses
which were to be procured upon the spot), and thirty mounted archers and
three hundred talents of silver.
The same spring the Lacedaemonians
marched against Argos, and went as far as Cleonae, when an earthquake occurred
and caused them to return. After this the Argives invaded the Thyreatid,
which is on their border, and took much booty from the Lacedaemonians,
which was sold for no less than twenty-five talents. The same summer, not
long after, the Thespian commons made an attack upon the party in office,
which was not successful, but succours arrived from Thebes, and some were
caught, while others took refuge at Athens.
The same summer the Syracusans learned
that the Athenians had been joined by their cavalry, and were on the point
of marching against them; and seeing that without becoming masters of Epipolae,
a precipitous spot situated exactly over the town, the Athenians could
not, even if victorious in battle, easily invest them, they determined
to guard its approaches, in order that the enemy might not ascend unobserved
by this, the sole way by which ascent was possible, as the remainder is
lofty ground, and falls right down to the city, and can all be seen from
inside; and as it lies above the rest the place is called by the Syracusans
Epipolae or Overtown. They accordingly went out in mass at daybreak into
the meadow along the river Anapus, their new generals, Hermocrates and
his colleagues, having just come into office, and held a review of their
heavy infantry, from whom they first selected a picked body of six hundred,
under the command of Diomilus, an exile from Andros, to guard Epipolae,
and to be ready to muster at a moment's notice to help wherever help should
be required.
Meanwhile the Athenians, the very
same morning, were holding a review, having already made land unobserved
with all the armament from Catana, opposite a place called Leon, not much
more than half a mile from Epipolae, where they disembarked their army,
bringing the fleet to anchor at Thapsus, a peninsula running out into the
sea, with a narrow isthmus, and not far from the city of Syracuse either
by land or water. While the naval force of the Athenians threw a stockade
across the isthmus and remained quiet at Thapsus, the land army immediately
went on at a run to Epipolae, and succeeded in getting up by Euryelus before
the Syracusans perceived them, or could come up from the meadow and the
review. Diomilus with his six hundred and the rest advanced as quickly
as they could, but they had nearly three miles to go from the meadow before
reaching them. Attacking in this way in considerable disorder, the Syracusans
were defeated in battle at Epipolae and retired to the town, with a loss
of about three hundred killed, and Diomilus among the number. After this
the Athenians set up a trophy and restored to the Syracusans their dead
under truce, and next day descended to Syracuse itself; and no one coming
out to meet them, reascended and built a fort at Labdalum, upon the edge
of the cliffs of Epipolae, looking towards Megara, to serve as a magazine
for their baggage and money, whenever they advanced to battle or to work
at the lines.
Not long afterwards three hundred
cavalry came to them from Egesta, and about a hundred from the Sicels,
Naxians, and others; and thus, with the two hundred and fifty from Athens,
for whom they had got horses from the Egestaeans and Catanians, besides
others that they bought, they now mustered six hundred and fifty cavalry
in all. After posting a garrison in Labdalum, they advanced to Syca, where
they sat down and quickly built the Circle or centre of their wall of circumvallation.
The Syracusans, appalled at the rapidity with which the work advanced,
determined to go out against them and give battle and interrupt it; and
the two armies were already in battle array, when the Syracusan generals
observed that their troops found such difficulty in getting into line,
and were in such disorder, that they led them back into the town, except
part of the cavalry. These remained and hindered the Athenians from carrying
stones or dispersing to any great distance, until a tribe of the Athenian
heavy infantry, with all the cavalry, charged and routed the Syracusan
horse with some loss; after which they set up a trophy for the cavalry
action.
The next day the Athenians began
building the wall to the north of the Circle, at the same time collecting
stone and timber, which they kept laying down towards Trogilus along the
shortest line for their works from the great harbour to the sea; while
the Syracusans, guided by their generals, and above all by Hermocrates,
instead of risking any more general engagements, determined to build a
counterwork in the direction in which the Athenians were going to carry
their wall. If this could be completed in time, the enemy's lines would
be cut; and meanwhile, if he were to attempt to interrupt them by an attack,
they would send a part of their forces against him, and would secure the
approaches beforehand with their stockade, while the Athenians would have
to leave off working with their whole force in order to attend to them.
They accordingly sallied forth and began to build, starting from their
city, running a cross wall below the Athenian Circle, cutting down the
olives and erecting wooden towers. As the Athenian fleet had not yet sailed
round into the great harbour, the Syracusans still commanded the seacoast,
and the Athenians brought their provisions by land from Thapsus.
The Syracusans now thought the stockades
and stonework of their counterwall sufficiently far advanced; and as the
Athenians, afraid of being divided and so fighting at a disadvantage, and
intent upon their own wall, did not come out to interrupt them, they left
one tribe to guard the new work and went back into the city. Meanwhile
the Athenians destroyed their pipes of drinking-water carried underground
into the city; and watching until the rest of the Syracusans were in their
tents at midday, and some even gone away into the city, and those in the
stockade keeping but indifferent guard, appointed three hundred picked
men of their own, and some men picked from the light troops and armed for
the purpose, to run suddenly as fast as they could to the counterwork,
while the rest of the army advanced in two divisions, the one with one
of the generals to the city in case of a sortie, the other with the other
general to the stockade by the postern gate. The three hundred attacked
and took the stockade, abandoned by its garrison, who took refuge in the
outworks round the statue of Apollo Temenites. Here the pursuers burst
in with them, and after getting in were beaten out by the Syracusans, and
some few of the Argives and Athenians slain; after which the whole army
retired, and having demolished the counterwork and pulled up the stockade,
carried away the stakes to their own lines, and set up a trophy.
The next day the Athenians from the
Circle proceeded to fortify the cliff above the marsh which on this side
of Epipolae looks towards the great harbour; this being also the shortest
line for their work to go down across the plain and the marsh to the harbour.
Meanwhile the Syracusans marched out and began a second stockade, starting
from the city, across the middle of the marsh, digging a trench alongside
to make it impossible for the Athenians to carry their wall down to the
sea. As soon as the Athenians had finished their work at the cliff they
again attacked the stockade and ditch of the Syracusans. Ordering the fleet
to sail round from Thapsus into the great harbour of Syracuse, they descended
at about dawn from Epipolae into the plain, and laying doors and planks
over the marsh, where it was muddy and firmest, crossed over on these,
and by daybreak took the ditch and the stockade, except a small portion
which they captured afterwards. A battle now ensued, in which the Athenians
were victorious, the right wing of the Syracusans flying to the town and
the left to the river. The three hundred picked Athenians, wishing to cut
off their passage, pressed on at a run to the bridge, when the alarmed
Syracusans, who had with them most of their cavalry, closed and routed
them, hurling them back upon the Athenian right wing, the first tribe of
which was thrown into a panic by the shock. Seeing this, Lamachus came
to their aid from the Athenian left with a few archers and with the Argives,
and crossing a ditch, was left alone with a few that had crossed with him,
and was killed with five or six of his men. These the Syracusans managed
immediately to snatch up in haste and get across the river into a place
of security, themselves retreating as the rest of the Athenian army now
came up.
Meanwhile those who had at first
fled for refuge to the city, seeing the turn affairs were taking, now rallied
from the town and formed against the Athenians in front of them, sending
also a part of their number to the Circle on Epipolae, which they hoped
to take while denuded of its defenders. These took and destroyed the Athenian
outwork of a thousand feet, the Circle itself being saved by Nicias, who
happened to have been left in it through illness, and who now ordered the
servants to set fire to the engines and timber thrown down before the wall;
want of men, as he was aware, rendering all other means of escape impossible.
This step was justified by the result, the Syracusans not coming any further
on account of the fire, but retreating. Meanwhile succours were coming
up from the Athenians below, who had put to flight the troops opposed to
them; and the fleet also, according to orders, was sailing from Thapsus
into the great harbour. Seeing this, the troops on the heights retired
in haste, and the whole army of the Syracusans re-entered the city, thinking
that with their present force they would no longer be able to hinder the
wall reaching the sea.
After this the Athenians set up a
trophy and restored to the Syracusans their dead under truce, receiving
in return Lamachus and those who had fallen with him. The whole of their
forces, naval and military, being now with them, they began from Epipolae
and the cliffs and enclosed the Syracusans with a double wall down to the
sea. Provisions were now brought in for the armament from all parts of
Italy; and many of the Sicels, who had hitherto been looking to see how
things went, came as allies to the Athenians: there also arrived three
ships of fifty oars from Tyrrhenia. Meanwhile everything else progressed
favourably for their hopes. The Syracusans began to despair of finding
safety in arms, no relief having reached them from Peloponnese, and were
now proposing terms of capitulation among themselves and to Nicias, who
after the death of Lamachus was left sole commander. No decision was come
to, but, as was natural with men in difficulties and besieged more straitly
than before, there was much discussion with Nicias and still more in the
town. Their present misfortunes had also made them suspicious of one another;
and the blame of their disasters was thrown upon the ill-fortune or treachery
of the generals under whose command they had happened; and these were deposed
and others, Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias, elected in their stead.
Meanwhile the Lacedaemonian, Gylippus,
and the ships from Corinth were now off Leucas, intent upon going with
all haste to the relief of Sicily. The reports that reached them being
of an alarming kind, and all agreeing in the falsehood that Syracuse was
already completely invested, Gylippus abandoned all hope of Sicily, and
wishing to save Italy, rapidly crossed the Ionian Sea to Tarentum with
the Corinthian, Pythen, two Laconian, and two Corinthian vessels, leaving
the Corinthians to follow him after manning, in addition to their own ten,
two Leucadian and two Ambraciot ships. From Tarentum Gylippus first went
on an embassy to Thurii, and claimed anew the rights of citizenship which
his father had enjoyed; failing to bring over the townspeople, he weighed
anchor and coasted along Italy. Opposite the Terinaean Gulf he was caught
by the wind which blows violently and steadily from the north in that quarter,
and was carried out to sea; and after experiencing very rough weather,
remade Tarentum, where he hauled ashore and refitted such of his ships
as had suffered most from the tempest. Nicias heard of his approach, but,
like the Thurians, despised the scanty number of his ships, and set down
piracy as the only probable object of the voyage, and so took no precautions
for the present.
About the same time in this summer,
the Lacedaemonians invaded Argos with their allies, and laid waste most
of the country. The Athenians went with thirty ships to the relief of the
Argives, thus breaking their treaty with the Lacedaemonians in the most
overt manner. Up to this time incursions from Pylos, descents on the coast
of the rest of Peloponnese, instead of on the Laconian, had been the extent
of their co-operation with the Argives and Mantineans; and although the
Argives had often begged them to land, if only for a moment, with their
heavy infantry in Laconia, lay waste ever so little of it with them, and
depart, they had always refused to do so. Now, however, under the command
of Phytodorus, Laespodius, and Demaratus, they landed at Epidaurus Limera,
Prasiae, and other places, and plundered the country; and thus furnished
the Lacedaemonians with a better pretext for hostilities against Athens.
After the Athenians had retired from Argos with their fleet, and the Lacedaemonians
also, the Argives made an incursion into the Phlisaid, and returned home
after ravaging their land and killing some of the inhabitants. |
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