20. MIDDLE AMERICA COMES OF AGE
DEVELOPMENTS ABROAD
CONTENTS
French Indochina
Stalin dies ... and a workers' uprising in East Germany results (June 1953)
The 1953 Iranian coup d'état
Khrushchev ... and the Hungarian uprising (October-November 1956)
The Suez Crisis (October-November 1956)
American paternalism in the Western Hemisphere
Castro's revolution in Cuba
Sputnik – followed by a "thaw" in East- West relations
Christian America ... as it is about to head into the 1960s
The textual material on this webpage is drawn directly from my work
America – The Covenant Nation © 2021, Volume Two, pages 119-138.
FRANCE LOSES ITS COLONY IN INDOCHINA |
In the early 1950s the French colonial war in
Indochina began to heat up considerably as the Communist Viet Minh,
under the direction of their General Vo Nguyen Giap, attacked scattered
French positions with devastating effect. Then the French under General
De Lattre regrouped and went after the Viet Minh whenever they appeared
in concentrated formations. The battles raged back and forth – with the
Viet Minh this time taking the beating.
But the French were tiring of the
expensive war effort at a time that the French economy at home was the
greater priority. Also in 1952 De Lattre grew ill and died. And the
Viet Minh, despite the pounding they had been receiving, showed no
signs of giving up the struggle.
Giap now redirected his army away from
attacks against the French positions in Vietnam and struck at French
outposts in Laos. Giap's goal there, as in all wars, was simply to wear
down the French resolve to continue to hold onto its position in
Indochina.
The French responded with their hitherto
successful strategy of placing themselves deep in enemy territory,
inviting the Viet Minh to come out to engage them directly. In November
1953 they dropped 1800 paratroopers into the Dien Bien Phu valley, and
waited, sending out patrols, but getting little solid resistance from
the Viet Minh. But Giap realized that the French had put themselves in
a perilous position, surrounded by high hills from which artillery
could be brought in to bombard the French position, including the
airfields in the valley by which French supplies were flown in. In
March of 1954 the Viet Minh were ready for their artillery assault on
the French. What then broke out was reminiscent of the trench warfare
of the First World War, artillery barrage and counter barrage.
But the French were cut off from
resupply, the Viet Minh well dug in in the hills above Dien Bien Phu,
and the monsoon weather had started, making it almost impossible to
parachute supplies to the trapped French.
The battle itself lasted two months,
resulting in a humiliating French surrender to the Viet Minh. And the
battle also coincided with the discussions being held in Geneva
concerning the future of Indochina. With the French loss at Dien Bien
Phu, the French were ready to call it quits.
According to the final 1954 Geneva
Accords, Vietnam was to be temporarily divided at the 17th parallel,
the northern territory designated as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
under Ho Chi Minh and the southern portion designated as the State of
Vietnam, under Bao Dai. Elections were to be held no later than July
1956 to unite the two Vietnams.
The Ngo Dinh Diem Regime in the South
But in October of 1955, Bao Dai's prime
minister Ngo Dinh Diem deposed the Emperor and proclaimed the Republic
of Vietnam, with himself as president. He then refused to hold the
agreed-on elections in the south (actually the delegates of neither the
United States nor the State of Vietnam had accepted the 1954 Geneva
Accords). Thus Vietnam would remain divided, much like Korea, except
this time it was the Americans and not the Soviets that wanted the
elections postponed. It was clear that any national elections were
likely to lead to a victory of the Communist leader, Ho Chi Minh, and
it was thus also equally clear (to the Americans anyway) that the
Vietnamese were not yet ready to make the "right" decision at the
polling booth. The elections needed to be held off until the Vietnamese
truly understood the implications of their national vote. They
obviously were not there yet. They needed a bit more enlightened
guidance.
|
With neither the French
nor Ho Chi Minh's Communists willing to back down, the controversy develops
into full-scale war
In a cave north of Hanoi,
and under a portrait of himself, Ho Chi Minh meets with the Vietminh governing
council
Some of Chiang Kai-Shek's
Nationalist Chinese troops streaming across the border into northern Vietnam
- 1949
French troops at Dong Khe
defense position prior to the Vietminh attack which overwhelmed the French
- 1950
French troops pushing a truck
up muddy Route Colonial 4 along the Chinese border
French tricolor insignia
being painted over the US insignia as it arrives at the Haiphong air
base
Ho Chi Minh in his mountain
headquarters in 1951
The French victory at Na
San – 1952
Vice President Richard Nixon
visiting Vietnamese nationalist troops – late 1953
The French last-stand at
Dien Bien Phu – March 30 - May 7 (1954)
French Foreign Legion
reinforcements
parachute into Dien Bien Phu on March 16, 1954 – two weeks before the massive
Communist assault on the main camp
French Foreign Legionnaires
(in this photo mostly Czech)
Colonel Christian de Castries,
the garrison commander at Dien Bien Phu, rarely emerged from his
underground bunker
National Archives
A 4.7 inch mortar line in
action during Operation Castor.
Huts in the background were
torn down to clear fields of fire and build defenses
National Archives
The smoke-shrouded airstrip
at Dien Bien Phu was closed in late March
1954 after heavy Viet Minh shelling
Highly trained and motivated
Viet Minh troops mass for combat against the French
Hard-pressed French and
Vietnamese
soldiers wait for airlifted supplies
Vietnamese blasting away
at surrounded French troops – Dien Bien Phu
Vietnamese raise the flag
of victory over the French forces at Dien Bien Phu – May 7, 1954
French troops taken prisoner
at Dien Bien Phu
Communist Viet Minh forces
enter Haiphong shortly after the French surrender at Dien Bien Phu and soon after the US Navy
evacuates French troops from the port city
The 1954 Geneva
Conference
convened to settle the French-Vietnamese conflict (April 26 - July 20, 1954)
The British (left) Russian
(upper right) and Chinese (center-right) delegations
The British delegation
The Russian
(upper) and Chinese (lower) delegations
Anticommunist Vietnamese
refugees moving from a French LSM landing ship to the USS
Montague during Operation Passage
to Freedom in August 1954.
Ngo Dinh Diem – Prime Minister
(and US-supported dictator) of South Vietnam (1955-1963)
WITH
THE DEATH OF STALIN IN 1953, THE WORLD HOPES FOR A "THAW" IN THE COLD
WAR |
By the early 1950s the Cold War had stalemated in
Europe to a point where both the Americans and the Russian Soviets and
their allies had achieved something of a balance of power there. But
confusion following Stalin's death in early March of 19531 erupted within the upper reaches of Soviet authority: who was it now that commanded the Soviet system?
1It
was never clear to Americans whether Stalin died of natural causes, or
was assassinated. Some of his comments made it appear that he was
possibly about to undertake another round of murderous purges of those
immediately around him, though who that would impact and why remained a
mystery to the outside world.
Stalin's successors carry
his casket from the Kremlin – March 1953. Meanwhile the
question becomes critical concerning who was then leading the Soviet Union.
There were a number of possibilities:
Lavrentiy Beria (head of
the NKVD) ... and the most feared of the leaders TIME Cover, July 20, 1953
Georgy Malenkov (new Prime
Minister)
Vyacheslav Molotov (Foreign Minister)
Magnum
Photos
Nikolai Bulganin Bundesarchiv
Nkita
Khrushchev
In East Berlin/East Germany
the news brings on a rising hope for a lighter Soviet hand on German life – at a time that the East
German government is deciding for stricter work quotas – sparking a huge uprising
in East Germany that has to be put down with the assistance of the
Soviet military (20 thousand troops) in June of 1953
A workers' uprising in East Germany (June 1953)
That same June nearly a million East German
workers went on strike against the oppressive hand of their
pro-Stalinist regime, inspired by the hope that with Stalin gone things
might lighten up in East Germany. But actually, the seeds of revolt had
been planted even before Stalin's death.
In May of 1952, Truman had succeeded in
getting its European allies to form their own military union (the
European Defense Community – EDC), and bring a rearmed West Germany
into that union. This action was in response to a Stalinist move
earlier that year to play European fears (the idea of a rearmed Germany
still made France very nervous) to the Soviet advantage, with a Soviet
offer to reunite Germany – provided that all of Germany remain disarmed
(and thus defenseless).
This American move to bring a rearmed
West Germany into full military union with the West consequently pushed
the East German Government to toughen up its own political act. East
German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht decided to pursue more
Stalinist lines of social development (a program he termed
"Constructing Socialism") in East Germany, by taking firmer state
control over the country's industry, and moving to collectivize East
German agriculture. This latter move would spark resistance from East
Germany's farmers and bring deep hunger to that country's cities over
the 1952-1953 winter.
The post-Stalinist collective leadership
in Moscow (the West was not yet sure who that exactly was at that
point) decided in April that the best policy was to back Ulbricht down
on his Stalinist program, to force him to ease up on his oppression.
This of course merely inspired rising expectations on the part of the
East Germans, which led finally to a workers' uprising on June 16th
(1953).
On the 17th, Moscow came to the rescue of
the hard-pressed Ulbricht regime, sending 20,000 Soviet troops to join
some 8,000 East German police officers in shutting down what at that
point had become a huge uprising.
Subsequently, besides the arrest,
imprisonment and even execution of numerous East Germans, the Ulbricht
regime went on the offensive against the role that Western propaganda
had played in this event – meaning the popularity of Western radio
programming and Western popular literature that had found its way into
the East. As Ulbricht saw things, he had a propaganda battle to fight.
Eisenhower was quick to see a similar
propaganda opportunity in all this, and in July announced a program
offering food supplies (worth some $15 million) to any East Germans
able to get to distribution centers located in American-held West
Berlin.
Needless to say, the Ulbricht regime did
what it could to block access to Eisenhower's program. Also, some of
America's European allies grew increasingly nervous that this would
bring increased rather than the relaxed East-West tensions which they
had been hoping for in the post-Stalinist days and which Moscow had
been proclaiming as its intended post-Stalinist "Peace and Unity"
program.
Finally the American food distribution
came to a halt in October when Eisenhower shut down the program. Who
was the winner and loser in all of that was hard to tell. Life simply
went on as before in central Europe. But West Europe did finally settle
into an acceptance of a military role for its West German partner.
|
|
A Soviet tank in Leipzig to
put down the East German strikes – June 1953
Deutsches Bundesarchiv
Soviet tanks in East Berlin
to put down the strikes
Soviet tank in East Berlin
- June 1953
Deutsches Bundesarchiv
cellpadding="0"
Bulganin, Malenkov and
Khrushchev
THE 1953 IRANIAN COUP D'ETAT |
In August of 1953 a series of political forces
came together in Iran to produce an event of lasting significance.
Shaping this event were: British oil interests; eventually an American
sense of the need to support its weakened ally, Britain; a rising
Iranian national spirit; American Cold War concerns about the
activities of the Tudeh (Communist) Party in Iran; the desire of the
American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to play a more aggressive
role in world affairs; and just a massive amount of political confusion
that had taken over Iran itself.
The origins of this event go all the way
back to the beginning of the 1900s when British oil interests cut a
deal with the Qajari Shah for the right to drill for oil in his
impoverished Persia (Iran), offering him 16 percent of the net profits
in the deal. No precise monitoring of the finances actually occurred,
thus working in such a way that Persia seemed to get relatively little
from this arrangement. But a little was better than nothing.
But the Persians were awakening to the
increasing role that Western powers were playing in their country and
in 1906 a revolution gave the country a strong Parliament (Majlis), a
modern party system, and a prime minister also with strong powers.
Persia had become something of a modern democracy.
In 1921 British military pressure and
Persian military interests forced the Qajari Shah to appoint General
Reza Khan as the country's prime minister. A strong hand, Reza Khan
finally got the country's finances in order and economy up and running,
and in 1925 the Persian Majlis voted an end to the Qajari monarchy and
placed Reza Khan at the head of the country as Reza Shah Pahlavi –
starting up a new Pahlavi monarchy. Shah Pahlavi skillfully guided
Persia (now renamed "Iran") through the difficulties of British-German
tensions developing in the 1930s, by trying to balance the influence in
Iran of each of these two powers against each other. This annoyed the
British greatly.
When World War Two broke out and when
Soviet Russia now found itself in the need of overland resupply from
America via Iran – and the British in need of securing Iran’s oil flow
to Britain – the British deposed the Shah and put his young, more
pro-British son, Mohammad Reza, on the throne as the new Pahlavi Shah.
Mohammad Reza’s rule in Iran would be less heavy-handed, allowing the
Majlis and the prime minister to recover much of their power in the
process.
When after the war British troops
withdrew from Iran and Soviet Russia attempted to replace British
influence in this strategically located country by setting up
pro-Soviet Republics in the north of the country, this brought a stiff
reaction from Truman and the United Nations. Russia backed out. But
America would henceforth keep a close eye on possible Soviet or at
least Communist activities (largely the same) in Iran, especially as
the Cold War developed.
In the later 1940s Iranian nationalism
began to grow, especially over the matter of the huge British
involvement in Iran's vital oil industry. Here, as in Dutch Indonesia
and French Indochina, America seemed to take a disapproving stance of
its allies' imperialism, encouraging democratic nationalism globally.
But beneath this public stance was a growing concern by the Truman
Administration that the real benefactors of such nationalist
development seemed always to be Soviet Communism, not Western (and thus
pro-American or "Free World") Democracy.
American nervousness about developments in Iran began to grow when
Mohammad Mosaddegh and his National Front won majority seating in the
Majlis in 1951 and Mosaddegh became Prime Minister, dedicating himself
to the very popular call to nationalize Iran's oil industry. The
previous prime minister, who had opposed such nationalization, had been
assassinated by a militant Shi'ite group headed by the Ayatollah (chief
religious leader) Abol-Ghasem Kashani,2
who had his own political ambitions for his religious party. Kashani
and Mosaddegh would soon find themselves in opposition – not so much
over the issue of oil as the issue of secular democracy (Mosaddegh)
versus religious or Muslim democracy (Kashani). For Kashani, the oil
issue simply became for him a useful tool to undercut the popular
Mosaddegh.
In late 1951 Mosaddegh's National Front
finally nationalized the country's oil industry. Britain was outraged,
but found Truman not willing to back Britain in some kind of counter
move (this nationalization actually helped the profitability of
American oil interests!). Nonetheless, Britain moved ahead, pulling out
all of its technicians and imposing an embargo on oil shipments out of
Iran. Britain also appealed to Truman for help, citing its own support
for America in Korea. However this appeal did not move Truman greatly.
He was more concerned about events in Korea at the time.
With the British embargo in full force,
Iran found itself in deep financial trouble. And in Iran itself
domestic politics became quite messy as blame was thrown around,
including against Mosaddegh. Meanwhile, Kashani's religious party –
plus the Communist Tudeh Party – seemed to gain strength in all of this
turmoil.
When Eisenhower came into office in early 1953, the American position
on the Iran crisis changed deeply. Eisenhower and his Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles were both deeply concerned about the
possibility of the Communists securing domination in yet another
country through this kind of confusion. They were ready to act.
As the economic and political situation
in Iran worsened (protesters for and against Mosaddegh's
nationalization), Mosaddegh began to clamp down on the mounting
opposition. In mid-1953 he shut down the Majlis, arrested a number of
political opponents, and turned himself into a virtual dictator over
the country.
At this point (mid-August) the Shah – who
had tried to keep his distance from the whole nationalization matter –
bowed to CIA pressure and announced the dismissal of Mosaddegh as prime
minister, and his replacement as prime minister by General Faziollah
Zahedi, which, according to the Constitution, the Shah actually was
allowed to do. But when General Nassiri took official notice of the
dismissal to Mosaddegh, Mosaddegh had Nassiri arrested, along with
other of Mosaddegh's opponents. General Zahedi went into hiding. And
the streets were filled with pro-Mosaddegh protesters angry about the
attempted "coup" (the attempted dismissal of Mosaddegh).
That was the signal for the Shah to head to Italy to wait out the crisis.
With the Shah gone, supposedly Mosaddegh had things back under control. The streets were quiet again.
But on the 19th of August things once
again exploded. Clever intrigue (and CIA money) was used to get the
not-all-that-powerful Communist Tudeh Party to take to the streets in
violent protest in support of the increasingly oppressive Mosaddegh,
something that also had the appearance of being an attempted Communist
coup. This in turn (which was the general intention of the plotters)
actually turned most Iranians in horror against Communist Tudeh, and
thus also Mosaddegh – who was actually not pro-Communist, just
nationalist. Also taking to the streets were large numbers of pro-Shah
protesters.
Ultimately the pro-Shah protesters seemed
to dominate, and then also that day the military stepped in and had
Mosaddegh arrested and imprisoned. General Zahedi now stepped forward
to take his post as Iran's prime minister. The crisis was over. The
Shah then returned to Iran with U.S. Secretary of State Dulles at his
side, and America now had a close ally in the Shah of Iran.
2Kashani
would be the mentor of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who would take control
of the country after the Shah was overthrown in 1979.
Reza Shah and his son
Mohammed
Reza Pahlavi
Iran's former premier Mohammed
Mosaddegh on trial as a "Communist" after his ouster by a CIA-directed
coup – 1953
Iranian soldiers surround
the Majlis (Parliament) building in Tehran – August 19, 1953.
Iran's Cultural Heritage
Organization
Iranian protesters during
the coup
presstv.ir
Tanks in the streets of
Tehran
General Zahedi (Coup Leader)
and Ardeshir Zahedi (his son)
Mossadeq on military trial
in Iran – 1953
The Shah of Iran is visited
in Teheran by his benefactor, President Eisenhower – 1959
KHRUSHCHEV'S "DE-STALINIZATION PROGRAM ... AND THE HUNGARIAN REVOLT -
1956 |
Hungarian students misinterpret
Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" program – October 1956 – presuming (incorrectly)
that it means new freedoms for them
Eventually (by 1956) it had become clear to the
outside world that Nikita Khrushchev was in charge in Soviet Russia,
having staked his claim to power on the basis of some sort of "new
look" which he formulated for International Communism – and which he
convinced the Central Committee to support. By denouncing Stalin's
harsh means of holding the Soviet orbit together, Khrushchev hoped to
make Communism more appealing as a voluntary program – attracting
popular support simply on the merits of its ideological superiority
over crass capitalism. With the military dimension of the Cold War
supposedly downgraded, observers begin to talk hopefully of a new thaw
in the Cold War.
Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s,
the Cold War itself increasingly became fought ideologically: it was
conceived in America in terms not of "American power versus Russian or
Soviet power," but in such terms as "the Free World of democratic
nations" (America and its allies) versus "the Communist dictatorship
and its captive nations imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain" (Russia and
its satellite nations).
Even Russia by the late 1950s portrayed
the Cold War with the West in ideological terms: the Cold War was not
about territory or other material gain; it was about acquiring the
loyalty or support of people and nations of the world. It was "a
battle for the minds of men and women everywhere."
The Hungarian uprising (late October-early November of 1956)
Khrushchev's attempt to put a new face on
Soviet Communism was misunderstood in Hungary, a number of Hungarians
(especially university students) interpreting this as an invitation for
the satellite nations of East Europe to freely choose their destinies.
On October 23rd (1956) some 20,000 students conducted a protest march
in Hungary (with the number rapidly expanding to more than 200,000 by
that evening) – encouraged not only by Khrushchev's announcement of a
new look to Communism – but also by American Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles's declaration that America stood ready to help the
subject peoples of the Soviet bloc throw off their oppressors.
Hungarians had been hearing this message repeatedly beamed across the
Iron Curtain in their direction by the American government news
network, Radio Free Europe (RFE).
Khrushchev was caught by surprise by this
uprising, and although he sent some Soviet troops into Hungary to try
to restore order, he initially was cautious in his effort (he did not
want to revive the Stalinist image of Soviet Russia as a blunt
oppressor society). But Mao now chided Khrushchev for his loss of
nerve. However, Khrushchev was concerned that the Americans might
respond by force in protection of the Hungarian rebellion. Meanwhile
over the next days the Hungarians were moving swiftly to purge the
country of pro-Soviet leaders, and establish independent governing
councils. Also, America's RFE was continuing to encourage the
rebellion, claiming that America stood strongly with the anti-Communist
rebels.
But at the same time, Khrushchev had
pulled most of the Soviet troops out of Hungary toward the end of
October. The Suez Crisis, which was going on at the same time, was
bringing condemnation on Britain and France for their bullying of
Egypt's President Nasser after he grabbed the British-French-run Suez
Canal, and Khrushchev did not want to divert all the negative attention
away from Britain and France – by acting in the same manner in Hungary.
But then the Hungarian government
announced that it was going to exit the Soviet bloc, and move at least
to an independent, neutral position in Cold War Europe. That decision
on the part of the Hungarians finally inspired Khrushchev to take
strong action, sending into Hungary (November 4th) thousands of tanks
and hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops to crush the rebellion.
Within a week the rebellion was broken
In the conflict, over 2,500 Hungarians
had died (also 700 Soviet troops) and 20,000 Hungarians (and 1,400
Soviet troops) wounded. Some 200,000 Hungarians would flee the country,
never to return. Thousands (20,000 to 30,000?) were arrested and
hundreds executed, although the exact figures were not revealed to the
public.
This all proved to be a huge
embarrassment to Khrushchev and his "new look." His heavy hand however
did succeed in putting things back in good Soviet order in Hungary. But
Khrushchev indicated that he was nonetheless still intending to follow
his new policy (whatever exactly that might have meant at that point!).
America, meanwhile, did very little. The
matter was taken to the U.N. Security Council, and the Soviets
naturally vetoed any decision to take action. Beyond that America did
nothing, despite all the promises. And those promises themselves, plus
American inaction, raised a lot of questions concerning why such a
tepid and confused response? Was Secretary of State Dulles to blame?
How about Eisenhower?
But a big part of the American inaction
was influenced very heavily by the Suez Crisis going on in Egypt at
exactly the same time.
|
Eventually emerging as the
new leader of the Soviet Union was Nikita Khrushchev
Nikita Khrushchev announcing
the "de-Stalinization" of Soviet Communism – in order to give Communism
a new face or new look – the 23rd Party Congress in 1956
Russian Federation
Budapest students and workers
next to a toppled statue of Stalin – at the beginning of the
Hungarian uprising – October 23, 1956
Hungarian security police
being cut down by rebel fire
as they pour out of a Communist
headquarters – November 1956
Dead Hungarian secret police
lie at the feet of young protesters in Budapest – November 1956
 Soviet tanks crushing the
Hungarian uprising in Budapest, November, 1956

Burned-out Soviet tanks in
Budapest, Hungary – November 1956
The Suez Crisis (also late October-early November of 1956)
The Suez Canal had been built by French engineers
back in the 1860s, with ownership shared by private French investors
and by the Egyptian king. But in 1875, because of a major financial
crisis in Egypt, the king sold all his shares to the British
government, which was very interested in the canal because it provided
a direct link between Great Britain and the British Empire in India.
Indeed, it was so important to the British that they eventually placed
themselves in the position as protector of the Egyptian government, and
would continue in that role in the decades ahead – even into the
beginning of the 1950s.
But economic hard times in Egypt at the
beginning of the 1950s had produced widespread protesting in Egypt,
leading to the dismissing of the king and his replacement by a military
council, one that would eventually be led by the very ambitious Gamal
Abdel Nasser – who took for himself not only the role of president of
Egypt but potentially the leader of the entire Arab world. After all,
the divisions of that Arab world into the (fictional) nations of Iraq,
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, etc. had been designed
by the European powers – and not the Arabs themselves – during a period
of robust Western Imperialism, mostly just before or immediately after
World War One, solely according to European power considerations.
Nasser however intended to unite that
broader Arab world into a single United Arab Republic, under his own
leadership of course. But he had a contender for this leadership
position in the form of the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri al-Said – who
himself had the same ambitions as Nasser, and who also enjoyed a close
working relationship with the British.
The British, now back under Conservative
Party leadership, were again attempting to maintain something of a
pivotal position in the Middle East. Thus they had set up the Baghdad
Pact in 1955, uniting al-Said's Iraq with Pakistan, Turkey, and
Britain. Nasser was invited to join, but suspected that to do so was to
undermine his own position in the Arab world to the benefit of Nuri. He
thus refused to join, and drew Egypt away from the former close
relationship it had long held with Britain. In fact at this point,
Nasser began to portray Britain as the Arab world's major stumbling
block in its quest for collective unity and Arab national pride. It
would thus not be long before British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden
would develop a passionate hostility towards Nasser.
At the same time, the French were growing
increasingly hostile toward Nasser for his support of the Arab
rebellion going on within Algeria (which at the time was considered an
integral part of France itself). And Israel was just as angry toward
Nasser for his support of Palestinian fedayeen and their attacks on
Israeli settlements, and for his refusal to allow Israeli ships – or
any ships supplying goods to Israel – to pass through the Suez Canal.
Consequently, by early 1956, both France and Israel found themselves
working closely together in their desire to neutralize Nasser. The
British would soon join them in this enterprise.
Meanwhile, Eisenhower's America was
focused intensely on the ongoing Cold War with Soviet Russia, deeply
concerned that the Soviets were going to make a move to insert
themselves in the heart of the Middle East. For Eisenhower's Secretary
of State Dulles, this concern to keep the Soviets contained also was
passionate, almost obsessive.
The Americans wanted to build a NATO-like
military defense organization focused on the Middle East, and like the
British had tried to entice Nasser to join, recognizing him to be of
central importance to any plan to unite the Arab world against Soviet
expansion. But when Nasser could not secure military arms purchases
from America (because of an earlier agreement among America, Britain,
and France to minimize Arab-Israeli tensions by cutting back on arms
sales to the Middle East), in September of 1955 he purchased Soviet
arms through Soviet-controlled Czechoslovakia, irritating Dulles and
Eisenhower greatly.
Soon after this, trouble also erupted
between America and Egypt over the financing of the construction of the
very expensive Aswan High Dam along the upper Nile River. This project
was deeply important to Nasser as a means of providing Egypt with both
hydroelectric power and flood control protecting farms and industries
along the Lower Nile. America had been supplying funds for this venture
with the expectation of drawing Nasser into the American political
orbit. But when in May of 1956 Nasser extended official recognition to
Mao's Communist China, this angered Eisenhower so much that he cut off
funding for the project. Eisenhower expected that Nasser would then
turn to the Soviets for financial assistance, but find in doing so that
the Soviets would not be able to grant funding equal to the loss of the
previous American support. This then should drive Nasser back into the
arms of the Americans
But instead Nasser decided in late July
of 1956 to grab the one money-maker he had at hand, the Suez Canal,
still owned by British and other foreign financial interests. This
immediately spun the diplomatic world into a round of debate as to how
to respond to Nasser's actions – in violation of a number of
international laws, but more importantly with a number of political
implications for Britain, France, Israel, and even Iraq. For instance,
Iraqi King Faisal and Prime Minister Nuri urged immediate military
action. But the British Parliament was divided between those also
wanting such action, and those who insisted that Nasser's actions did
not warrant military attack. Also the English dominions Canada,
Australia and New Zealand were very lukewarm on the idea of a military
response to Nasser. To Australia and New Zealand, the Panama Canal was
much more important to their national interests than the Suez Canal.
The French on the other hand were a bit more united (except the French
Communists) around the idea of a military countermove, for Nasser
needed to be curbed, not just for his actions concerning the canal but
for his support of the Algerian Arab nationalists who were trying to
split the Algerian Department from the rest of France (which had
millions of non-Arab Frenchmen living there, plus many Algerian Arabs
who also saw themselves as French first and foremost).
Eisenhower urged his European allies
merely to proceed cautiously in their response to the crisis, something
that upset French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, who expected stronger
support from America – especially since, out of loyalty to NATO, he had
passed up an offer from the Soviets to cease their support of the
Algerian Arab nationalists if the French were to drop out of NATO. This
weak response of Eisenhower seemed to indicate to the French that they
were going to have to respond to Nasser on their own, with or without
American support.
For the next couple of months America
held the upper hand in trying to get its allies and Nasser to come to
some kind of diplomatic solution to the crisis. Eisenhower was hoping
to mobilize the broader world opinion against Nasser as a way of
forcing him to return control of the canal to its European owners.
Eisenhower even proposed some kind of international authority
controlling this strategic canal. Meanwhile the British and the French
quietly went along with all the diplomatic maneuvering, mostly to give
themselves the time necessary to prepare themselves for a military move
on the canal (they were actually working together in their military
planning, including also Israel).
Finally, with winter coming on and with
pressure mounting from fellow members of the British Parliament calling
on the Anthony Eden Government to do something soon, the decision was
made to hit Egypt hard. With the Israelis on October 29th coming across
the Sinai Desert from the East, the British subsequently (November 1st)
attacked Egypt by air from their bases in nearby Cyprus and from navy
ships offshore from Alexandria. Then British and French paratroopers
were dropped several days later near the Canal in order to seize it
(November 5th). The Egyptians were quickly overwhelmed, their
casualties greatly outnumbering (about 100 to one) French and British
casualties. Militarily, the action was an immediate and grand success.
But politically the action was a grand
disaster. Members of the British Opposition (Labour and Liberals)
protested loudly concerning the sheer imperialism of the action. And
the move itself was not widely popular with the British public. In
fact, a huge public demonstration took place in London in opposition to
the action.
The Americans were also irritated greatly
by the action, because the British and French seizing of the Suez Canal
took place the very next day after the Soviet invasion in Hungary.
America was trying to score major diplomatic or simply ideological
points against the Soviets for their brutal crushing of the Hungarian
national spirit. But the behavior of its allies Britain and France in
Egypt looked much the same, thus undercutting deeply this diplomatic
opportunity to score huge ideological points concerning Soviet bullying
of smaller nations.
Furthermore, any support America might
have been willing to show its allies Britain and France Eisenhower knew
would merely alienate the Arab world all the more, even possibly drive
that world into the arms of the Soviet Russians.
Khrushchev, naturally, was deeply pleased
by this English and French action, because it diverted world public
opinion away from his heavy-handed move against Hungary. In fact the
early action in late October and the first days of November by the
Israelis, French, and English in Egypt helped him immensely to come to
the decision to undertake that move in Hungary. Thus it was that on the
4th of November he had sent those 2,500 tanks and 120,000 soldiers to
Budapest to crush the Hungarian rebellion.
Oddly enough, both America and Russia
brought resolutions before the United Nations Security Council calling
for an immediate ceasefire in Egypt – and for an Israeli, British and
French withdrawal from Egypt ... with both resolutions vetoed by the
British and French.3
Meanwhile, with the Suez Crisis dragging on, Eisenhower took an even
stronger stance against America's British and French allies, worried
that this event gave the Soviets the opportunity to move into Egypt as
Nasser's new friend and protector, even to come out threatening the
West with Soviet nuclear reprisals if Israel, Britain and France did
not immediately withdraw from Egypt. NATO commitments would necessarily
draw America into such a war, something that Eisenhower wanted to avoid
at all costs. Fearing just such a scenario (Eisenhower truly believed
that Khrushchev was just crazy enough to do exactly that), Eisenhower
now put huge pressure, including threats of economic reprisals, if the
British and French did not immediately pull back from the Egyptian
venture.
Facing such enormous pressure, Eden's
British Government finally capitulated, and was forced to acknowledge
what America itself demanded: British (and French) recognition that
Nasser's Egypt was indeed now the owner of their canal.
In the end only the Soviet Russians and
Nasser's Egypt gained from this event. Russia had moved quickly to pose
itself as the Arabs' best international friend. And Nasser now became
the Arab hero of the Middle East for his standing up to the European
imperialists.
America meanwhile, because of its
Israeli-Arab neutrality, gained no new advance of its position in the
Middle East through its behavior in this crisis. Eisenhower's attempt
to look like the friend of the Arabs failed to impress the Arab world,
which now looked more to the Soviets as their friend in their efforts
to get out from under European domination. At the same time
Eisenhower's heavy hand against his British and French allies weakened
tremendously the appearance of NATO as a solidly-united military front
lined up against Soviet expansion.4
And America's allies were hugely
embarrassed both at home and abroad. The whole thing was very
demoralizing to America's European allies – who were already suffering
from a deep sense of loss of national dignity.
And perhaps most importantly, it allowed
the Soviets to deflect the hostility that the world otherwise would
have felt towards the Soviets in reaction to their brutal behavior in
Hungary. Indeed, at a deeper level, it reminded the world that even
under Khrushchev, the Soviets were still a major superpower, one that
the world needed to respect in order to survive and thrive.
3This
strange alliance between America and Soviet Russia over this issue – at
the expense of America's traditional allies Britain and France – stung
Europe deeply, especially the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer who was
very bitter about America lining itself up with the Soviets. Further,
Adenauer now grew uneasy about trusting America to come to Europe's aid
(as required by NATO). All of this influenced deeply the German
decision to draw closer to France in a special European relationship –
one that would grow even deeper between Germany and France after De
Gaulle took over France in 1958.
4Basically
all NATO members had placed themselves under what they thought was the
promise of American backing in the conduct of their own national
diplomacy, as part of their willingness to give over much of their
military sovereignty to the American-directed military alliance. That
idea included the former great powers France and Britain as well as the
other NATO members.


French soldiers with Egyptian prisoners – November 1956

British General Sir Charles Keightley greeting French paratroopers – November 1956

Trying to clear a ship sunk during the Suez Crisis – 1956

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser greeting fellow Egyptians
AMERICAN PATERNALISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE CONTINUES ... AS "PROTECTION AGAINST GLOBAL COMMUNISM" |
Although America never admitted it, America's
relations with its neighbors to the South in Latin America had much the
same quality as Europe's imperial positions in Asia and Africa. America
went from a paternalistic instinct to protect its neighbors from the
meddling of European powers (the Monroe Doctrine) to a paternalistic
interest itself in seeing its neighbors join America in exemplifying
New World Democracy, such as America believed that it itself
exemplified.
But there would always be a number of
problems behind this policy, most importantly that America's neighbors
had their own approach to
political life and resented America's high-handed involvement in their
affairs. There were exceptions to this of course, particularly among
ambitious local politicians who would form some kind of
economic-political alliance with America in order to promote their own
political careers locally. Usually this came in the form of a working
alliance with an American industry based in their country (such as the
United Fruit Company in Guatemala, Honduras, and elsewhere, or various
sugar companies in Cuba), these American companies heavily invested in
the local economy. American companies themselves looked to these select
officials for protection of their investments in that country, and made
sure that these officials had all the backing that money and the U.S.
Marines (sent often to these countries to straighten things out) could
offer.
Of course, this virtually unlimited American support inevitably led to
local dictatorship, and massive economic and political (and military)
corruption that accompanied such dictatorship. This usually would end
up eventually as a huge embarrassment to America, although mostly
America avoided looking too closely at what was going on locally so as
to dodge this problem. In places like neighboring Cuba this situation
would grow so bad that the Mafia moved in to run the gambling,
prostitution and drug rings that dictator Fulgencio Batista allowed to
develop in Cuba, because it brought him such vast income personally.
There would be local rebellions against such corrupt systems led by
populist leaders, at which point the U.S. government itself had to
decide which side of the contest it would take. Usually it took the
side of the dictators, who supposedly represented the stability that
sound economics (i.e. the profitability of the American companies
invested in that country) demanded.
Then in the 1950s, with the rise of Soviet Russian ambitions and the
Cold War scare at home in America, such populist rebellions were easily
interpreted as opening the doors of the country to the grave dangers of
Communism. At this point Eisenhower took the attitude that such
rebellions must be stopped at all cost, lest Communism secure a
foothold in the Western Hemisphere.
|
When politics in Guatemala
also takes a Leftward turn in the early 1950s, America once again
intervenes
US-backed conservative President
(and dictator since 1930) Jorge Ubico. A general strike forced
him to resign on July 1, 1944. Gen. Juan Federico Ponce then took
over.
Revolutionary Junta of Oct.
20, 1944: Major Francisco Arana, civilian Jorge Toriello and Captain Jacobo Arbenz.
The junta, led by Arana,
overthrew the government of Gen. Ponce, opening the way for a new Guatemalan
constitution – in which Arana was granted
special powers as head of the military and promised support for
the presidency six years hence.
|
Juan José Arévalo
(a professor of philosophy), elected Guatemalan president
by 85% of the votes in free elections in Dec. 1944.
Arévalo's presidency was "centrist":
anti-Communist, yet supportive of urban labor unions. However his government largely
ignored the peasant (largely Mayan Indian) countryside where poverty was
severe. Nonetheless the conservative
upper class was very nervous about his support of the labor unions, considering this to be merely
another version of Communism (the U.S. became increasingly suspicious of
him as well).
|
Jacobo Arbenz and his aristocratic
Salvadoran wife María Vilanova, a member of the Communist
Party
Arana had been mysteriously
assassinated in July of 1949, largely for personal political reasons, opening the path of rise
to leadership of Jacobo Arbenz (and a Leftward move in Guatemala's politics).
|
Arévalo passes the
presidency to Arbenz in 1951
The freely-elected
Guatemalan President
Arbenz (1950) had displeased the United Fruit Company of Boston
by beginning in 1952 to redistribute 400,000 acres of unused Company land
and distributing it to landless peasants. (A total of 1.5 million
acres were distributed to about 100,00 families. Arbenz gave up 1,700 acres
of his own land under the program). Arbenz had offered the Company
compensation
in accordance with the value the company had claimed for the land in its
tax returns ($3 per acre) – but the Company now claimed it was worth 15
times that amount ($75 per acre)! |
A CIA driver bringing the
CIA's man, Former "Aranista" Castillo Armas (next to him) into Guatemala
City – 1954
CASTRO'S CUBAN REVOLUTION |
The political rise in
Cuba of the Socialist lawyer Fidel Castro began with a failed attempt
in 1953 of a small group he led, hoping to spark a national uprising
and thus overthrow Batista. Castro was arrested and imprisoned, but he
and his brother Raul were freed two years later – and soon headed to
Mexico where they met Argentinian rebel doctor Ernesto Che Guevara.
There they assembled another rebel group and slipped back into Cuba in
1956, to begin their anti-Batista movement in the Sierra Maestra
mountains.
Then in 1958 the U.S. government – which
had been distancing itself from Batista because of his growing
reputation for corruption – placed an arms embargo on Cuba, weakening
Batista's position, and encouraging Cubans to join Castro's growing
guerrilla group (or a number of other anti-Batista groups). Meanwhile
American journalists were led to Castro and took up his cause,
portraying him in heroic terms.
By 1958 a small war was raging between
Batista's army and these guerrilla groups, a war which gradually
further undercut Batista's power base. Finally, on the first day of
January 1959, Batista fled the country, and Castro soon entered the
capital to celebrate the liberation of his country. Castro immediately
began to purge the government of corruption (Batista officials), and
soon the execution of pro-Batista officials and military officers got
underway. New Prime Minister Cardona objected to the negative impact on
the Cuban economy caused by a range of Castro's new revolutionary
(socialist) policies, and resigned, opening the way for Castro to take
the position himself. Now Castro's program truly got underway,
confiscating the land of wealthy landowners – to be distributed to the
small farmers – and shutting down the casinos and hotels.
Although he denied being a Communist, he
began to fill the upper ranks of his new governmental bureaucracy with
well-known Communists. This in turn led to a huge flight into the
mountains – or even from Cuba itself – of thousands of Cubans, not just
former Batista officials but many of Cuba's entrepreneurial middle and
upper class. But soon anti-Castro Cubans included even large numbers of
angry campesinos, who had even their small independent farms
expropriated by Castro, and a number of former revolutionaries who now
found themselves hunted down by Castro, who was attempting to bring all
political authority in Cuba under his personal control. A large number
of these Cuban expatriates made their escape by boat to nearby southern
Florida.
Then when Eisenhower refused to lift the
old anti-Batista arms embargo, Castro (like Nasser) turned to the
Soviet Russians for military assistance. The Soviets were more than
happy to offer their assistance, infuriating Eisenhower – who responded
by cutting back America's purchase of Cuban sugar and sale of oil to
Cuba. Here too the Soviets were happy to make up the difference,
purchasing Cuban sugar and selling Russian oil. When American-owned oil
refineries then refused to refine the Soviet oil, Castro responded by
nationalizing the oil companies, plus all other key American assets in
the country (private homes, banks, sugar and coffee plantations). At
this point Eisenhower imposed a full economic embargo on Cuba.
But Eisenhower also began to develop plans to organize, train and unleash
a liberation force of expatriate Cubans, with the expectation of
ridding Latin America of this cancerous pro-Communist (or at least
pro-Soviet) tyrant. Thus the secretive American Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) began to conduct military training of disaffected Cubans
in Guatemala and Honduras.
|
Castro in the Sierra Maestra
with his rebel band – 1957
Cuban guerrilla leader Fidel
Castro
Castro hailed in Cienfuegos,
Cuba – January 8, 1959 after his overthrow
of the Batista dictatorship
Fidel Castro being cheered
in Cienfuegos, Cuba after ousting dictator Fulgencio
Batista
Fidel Castro at the
podium – January 8, 1959.
Castro addressing
Cubans
THE SOVIET SPUTNIK SATELLITES LAUNCHED IN 1957 (AND AFTER) PUT AMERICA AT A NEW DISADVANTAGE |
Models on display in East
Germany of the Sputnik (launched 1957) and the more elaborate Sputnik III
(launched 1958)
Sovfoto
Laika – space dog, launched
into space November 3, 1957 on a one-way trip
Sovfoto
However efforts were made by a newly confident Khrushchev to demonstrate
that he only wanted a greater sense of peace to reign in the world ... and invited
Vice President Nixon to visit Russia to see what the Russian world was truly like.
Khrushchev and Nixon having
their "kitchen debate" at the U.S. exhibition in Moscow – July 1959

Khrushchev follows up a supposed "thaw" in the Cold War with his own visit to America, 15-27 September 1959

Here he is with Eisenhower riding in an open car (still considered safe at the time)
He visits American farms
He even visits Hollywood
Here he is with Frank Sinatra ... and Shirley MacLaine during the filming of Can Can
And thus the world closes out the 1950s with the hope
that it has entered a new era of total peace
CHRISTIAN AMERICA ... AS IT IS ABOUT TO HEAD INTO THE 1960s |
Certainly, as America headed into the next decade,
it had no way of knowing how much that decade would bring deep changes
to the nation. In many ways for Middle America, the 1950s had been a
time of relative domestic innocence – at least since the downfall of
McCarthy in 1954. True, the Cold War with Russia, and Communism in
general, still raged beyond America's borders. But it was easy enough
in the security of Fortress American for Vet society (and its children)
to turn its attentions away from such complexities ... and spend many
untroubled hours watching I Love Lucy and The Adventures of Ozzie and
Harriet (and family) on television. True, there was also the deeply
troubling question of Black-White race relations, except that this
issue seemed to gain only marginal notice outside of the Deep South.
The 1950s "Happy Days" ... that disappeared by the mid-1970s
In fact, in the mid-1970s (running until
the mid-1980s) – as a follow-up to the chaotic period running from the
mid-1960s to the early 1970s – a very popular television program during
many of those years was Happy Days, a nostalgic TV series looking back
wistfully on the halcyon period of mid-1950s to mid-1960s America.
Comparatively speaking, those were indeed fairly Happy Days.
But the troubles that would explode in
America by the mid-1960s were there underneath the surface, waiting for
the right opportunity to reveal themselves.
One of the most important of these
actually had its planting in the American soil all the way back at the
Age of American Progressivism at the turn into the 20th century and the
American involvement in World War One soon thereafter. What is being
referred to here is the rising sense among Americans that a new
millennium was definitely upon the country. But it was no longer (as it
was in the time period leading up to and including the American Civil
War) based on a sense of Divine accounting or judgment – or Christ’s
coming to save the world from its sinful state.
Human Enlightenment once again to replace true Christian faith
The millennial instincts that seemed to
take over America at the beginning of the 20th century were more about
the rising ideals of social science, finding and putting into place the
social formulas (always identified as democracy) that would by man’s
own hand bring the world to perfection. In general, Americans did not
reject the idea of a God in Heaven (although some did, especially among
the rising group of Humanists). But that God once again, just like in
America’s earlier Ages of Enlightenment, no longer played any kind of
central role in bringing such perfection into being. Although most
Christians would not have considered themselves Humanists in the
precise way that others in fact did, there was something very
Humanistic about their Christianity. Once again good works – rather
than a deep faith or dependency on the Fatherhood of God, the direct
counsel or guidance of Jesus Christ and the personal empowerment by the
Holy Spirit – typically characterized such Christianity. Was it then
truly still Christianity?
In any case, it was the call of democracy
rather than God or his covenant with America that, through Wilson,
called America to war in the early years of the 20th century, a war
that unsurprisingly was totally needless and socially worthless –
except that it turned out to be very costly to many young Americans. In
any case, it disrupted post-war life in rural America and it sent many
youthful urban Americans off in the Roaring Twenties in the search of
some kind of spiritual high, one that possibly might be found in
collecting material goodies – or just in abandoning social boundaries.
But this quest for existential purpose, or even just psychological
freedom, ultimately led nowhere.
The Great Depression of the 1930s
ultimately terminated whatever it was that the Roaring Twenties was all
about – and put America through a long period of major personal
testing. No one was thanking God for this new boot-camp training that
came their way. But it is hard to see otherwise, given the moral
dissipation of the 1920s, how America, had it not gone through such
toughening up, would have been willing – or even able – to take on,
much less defeat, the two huge military empires of Japan and Germany.
Where will the tough social-moral discipline of the Depression '30s
come from in the supposedly "Progressive Days" of the '60s?
So from a larger historical view, it is
easy to see that only God, through the means of the Great Depression,
could have imposed the necessary discipline that Americans themselves
otherwise would have avoided at all costs. Had they not been put
through this tough experience, they, like so much of the rest of
Western Civilization, would most likely have simply capitulated to the
German and Japanese Übermenschen.
And also, had they not become involved
(involuntarily, of course) in this Second World War, eventually Russia
would have ground down the vastly overextended German Empire and moved
ever-forward to replace Germany as the dominating power over all of
Europe. With that, Western Civilization would have come to a complete
end. But apparently God had other plans for the West.
This time America came out of a huge war,
not cynical this time, but indeed deeply committed to the call to save
what they could of Western Civilization. And clearly God was understood
by most Americans as playing a central role in that call. This is when
Americans added to the Pledge of Allegiance the words "under God" in
describing the America they were committed to protecting at home and
defending abroad.
But how deep did that pledge go? How well
was the dynamic behind it understood? Was this a renewing of the
First-Generation attitudes and values of Americans or was it more of
the order of Second-Generation Christianity – or even touches of
Third-Generation Christianity? How much besides good works (importantly
accomplished through regular Sunday Church attendance) did this
Christianity involve? Better yet, what did their children, the Boomers,
make of their Vet parents' Christianity?
The "Christian" identity begins to be dropped ... rapidly
In any case, as we will see, the speed by
which the next generation dropped their Christian identities was
breathtaking. Was that just because their parents taught them to look
for Truth on their own … and not take it from some higher authority?
But did the parents themselves not evidence real Christian Truth in the
way they lived out their own lives – such as would have most certainly
attracted even a free-rising generation such as the Boomers? Was their
Christianity only a set of social and theological doctrines and
principles? Was there any real power in it?
It is important to understand that
Christianity is actually about a relationship with God. It is not a
religious program. The essence of God in Christ is taught through
visible example – by loved ones and by individuals around us in whom we
sense the very spirit of Jesus himself. If that is missing in the life
of the rising generation, then no amount of formal Christian training
is going to turn them into true believers as adults. And sadly, way too
much of Christianity in the 1950s was about good behavior – not about
that vital, personal relationship with God in Jesus Christ, a
relationship that develops through both good times and bad.
Eisenhower's warning on leaving office
Eisenhower, just prior to his departure
from the presidency, warned Americans to be on the lookout for
corporate tyranny right there at home in America. Probably at the time
the vast majority of Americans had little real understanding of what
Eisenhower was talking about. Certainly they could see some problems
with the huge military-industrial complex that seemed to be driving the
American economy, and thus also American society as a whole. But in
fact, such corporatism infected every part of American life at the time
– including its Christianity.
And ultimately, it would be against just
such corporatism that the rising Boomer youth – and their intellectual
tutors – would set themselves in full opposition. And with that,
everything about the corporate Happy Days of the Vet world would come
under full attack.
But such corporatism would sneak back
into the American social dynamic – not through Christianity, or
industrial corporatism, or the vast military machine. Those would be
greatly undone by the Boomer-Intellectual anti-Establishment crusade.
But that crusade would open the doors for something even more
threatening to America’s way of life, of its democratic instincts – and
certainly of its Covenant with God. The mid-1960s would see the
beginning of the rise of the corporate superstate, the federal
political machinery located in Washington, D.C. This institution would
take over America’s instincts for self-government – and replace the
system with a huge, incredibly expensive, bureaucratic superstructure,
passing out entitlements as the fruits of democracy, entitlements that
supposedly someone else would be paying for. Of course such a someone
else would be simply the future generations of Americans, the ones
stuck with an absolutely unpayable government-debt – the kind of debt
that always in history crumbled any empire or kingdom that allowed its
finances to fall so deeply into such debt. But the general American
attitude would come to be "hey, if we don’t obsess about it, maybe it
will just go away on its own!"
Where was God in all this?
Which raises the question: where was God
in all this? Would he once again come to the rescue of his Covenant
People – who now were oblivious to the Divine relationship that so many
American leaders of the past had relied on to get America through yet
another massive challenge to the nation’s very existence? Did America
even deserve the privilege of God’s continuing protection? Or had
America finally squandered that privilege? But if God was still willing
to work with America, how much was it going to cost the nation?
Something that could pull America out of its self-inflicted Fourth
Generation mentality in fact could possibly take on such hard form that
it would make even the Great Depression look like small stuff by
comparison.
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Go on to the next section: The Idealism of the Early 1960s
Miles
H. Hodges
| | |