18. A COLD WAR DEVELOPS
THE COLD WAR – AN OVERVIEW
The 1950s
CONTENTS
Soviet Russia's quest for security
Realism vs. Idealism in post-war American foreign policy
The Cold War intensifies
China goes Communist
The war in Korea intensifies the Cold War
The Post-Stalinist Cold War Takes on New Dimensions
Western Europe's "Great Powers" Slip Deeply in Stature
Sputnik ... and the Soviet-American "space race"
American culture divides between the "Vets" and their "Boomer" children
SOVIET RUSSIA'S QUEST FOR SECURITY |
For
Soviet Russia’s Stalin the matter of what happens after Germany is
defeated is quite simple: the Soviet Red Army is in occupation of
nearly all of Eastern Europe – offering him and his people a sense of
security that they have never felt since Russia began opening up to
Western culture in the 1500s. There is no way, despite the
promises he made to hold free elections throughout Eastern Europe, that
Stalin (who is personally massively paranoid anyway) is going to allow
any but the most Moscow-dependent (even Stalin-dependent) regimes to be
"elected" to high office in those countries that his Red Army now
controls. In one country after another Stalinist puppets appeared
at the head of each of the new governments of Eastern Europe.
Stalin intends to spread Communism in other ways
But Stalin's pressures did not stop with the Eastern European countries
under his military control. He takes up support of a Communist
insurrection in Greece and begins putting pressures on neighbor Turkey
to extend the Soviet Russian sphere of influence all the way to the
Mediterranean Sea.
At the same time Stalin begins to look further West, to France, Italy.
Belgium and other Western European countries where local Communist
parties are rather large political organizations. He directs the
Communist Parties in France and Italy to get themselves in a position
of greater political control over their nation’s politics by joining
with the other French and Italian parties in forming "Popular Front"
coalition governments.
Then when that strategy failed to yield results, Stalin decides that it
is time for these Communist parties to end their cooperation with the
post-war 'United Front' coalitions governing these countries.
Instead he directs these Communist parties to begin a program of labor
uprisings in order to destabilize these same governments.
Stalin's goal is to force these Western governments to come under
Communist domination, which he in turn can control from Moscow.
From his own assessment of the currrent situation in a war-torn, hungry
and unemployed Europe, the time is ripe for just such a workers'
"Revolution."
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REALISM VS. IDEALISM IN POST-WAR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY |
How
much Truman really expected Russian cooperation in an increasingly
divided United Nations is hard to say... though it probably was not
much.
Americans, however, became increasingly incensed that the Soviets kept
vetoing measures in the United Nations Security Council (the only part
of the United Nations where forceful international policies could be
ordered). Each Soviet veto was viewed as a measure of depravity
of the Soviet position.
Actually it was the natural response of a major power that sensed that
the membership of the United Nations was for the most part an American
ally of one sort or another and thus pretty much lined up against
Soviet political interests everywhere. The Soviets might have
wanted to pull out of the organization altogether but did not, figuring
that it was better to stay in the organization where the Russians at
least had veto power than to leave the organization to the Americans to
rally the rest of the world in opposing Soviet political interests.
The "containment" of Communism
American President Truman had no intention of starting up a shooting
war with Russia. But he also had no intention of letting Stalin
expand his influence much beyond a theoretical line drawn around the
Soviet Russian position as it was at the war's end in mid 1945.
In short, he planned to ‘contain’ Soviet influence (an idea carefully
laid out for him in an 'anonymous' article in Foreign Affairs' by the
State Department's Moscow expert, George Kennan).
But it looked pretty much as if America was going to have to undertake
this task of containing the Soviets all by itself. Though
"victorious" in the war, France and England were suffering from major
war weariness after the war. Under their post-war Labour
Government, the British were quickly backing away from the larger
global responsibilities that once were considered theirs. In 1947
the Labour government surrendered English control over South Asia
(India/Pakistan) and in 1948 backed out of the Middle East – to let the
Jews and Arabs sort out their differences over Palestine.
Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech
An early warning about this problem ... and danger to world peace ...
occurred in March of 1946 when Churchill, then no longer in office as
British Prime Minister, came to America on a mission to warn the
country in his ‘Iron Curtain’ speech of a growing danger coming from
Stalin’s ambitions he found a very receptive audience with Truman (who
agreed heartily with Churchill). Churchill stated:
From
Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an "iron curtain" has
descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals
of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin,
Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these
famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call
the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not
only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases
increasing measure of control from Moscow. |
In effect he was appealing to Truman for America to take up Britain's
old role of 'balancer of power' on the European continent.
America needed to understand Stalin's broken promises about free
elections in Europe as a gauntlet thrown down in challenge at the feet
of his former allies ... as Stalin having established an ‘Iron Curtain’
between East and West Europe, on the one side lurking Communist
tyranny, on the other flourishing the Democratic ‘Free World.’
But a very Idealistic American press at that time responded quite
differently to this speech. They were shocked that Churchill
would talk so openly in such a hostile manner about our Russian or
Soviet Communist friends. They still saw the post-war peace
in the idealistic terms that Roosevelt himself had laid out for
Americans to expect.
A slowly growing awareness of problems with Stalin's Russia. But
by 1947 it was beginning slowly to dawn on a number of Americans how
right Churchill was about this growing problem with Stalin's
Russia. By this time it was becoming increasingly clear that
'Stalinists' now ruled in most of the Eastern European countries behind
the 'Iron Curtain.' These countries had become in effect Societ
'satellite' countries, drawing their political direction entirely from
Moscow.
The Truman Doctrine
Truman's first action against this Soviet expansionism occured in 1947
when Stalin began to pursue a long-standing Russian goal of securing a
position in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to give his navy free
exit from its bottled-up position in the Black Sea ... and in fact to
control events throughout that entire region.
Stalin's plan became clear to the rest of the world with his move to
take over Greece through Communist insurrection ... and with his
threats aimed at Turkey in order for them to surrender Turkey's
sovereign rights over the Dardanelles passage from the Black Sea to the
Mediterranean. Stalin wanted Russia, not Turkey, to hold those
rights.
Sensing the dangers this expansion of Russian power in the Eastern
Mediterrannean posed to the free flow of Western commerce to Asia
through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal (and thus to the economies
of Western or 'Free' Europe), Truman made it clear that America was not
going to let Russian expansion happen. Without designating Russia
or any particular nation as the villain, Truman announced clearly
however that America would directly aid Greece in its putting down any
insurrection aimed at overthrowing the legitimate government of that
country ... and woould support Turkey in maintaining its military
strength - and thus its national sovereignty.
This move to take up the traditional role of Britain as balancer and
stabilizer of power in the Mediterranean Truman had now made offical
American policy. He had established a major post-war
principle directing American diplomatic and military programming, a
principle that the world came to term 'the Truman Doctrine.'
The Marshall Plan
At the same time Truman realized that the terrible economic conditions
facing the Western European countries not yet under Soviet domination
presented the Soviets with further opportunities for Soviet expansion
through Moscow-directed workers' uprisings. The agitation of the
large French and Italian Communist Parties was clearly taking place
under the direction of Stalin. The goal of destablizing those
governments was clear ... and Truman knew that it was going to be up to
America to block that effort. And the best response America could
take in meeting this Communist challenge would be to help these West
European countries get back on their feet economically as soon as
possible.
In stark contrast to the war-destroyed societies of Europe, America
emerged from the war with its economy roaring (Europeans were buying
American goods to rebuild their own countries), wealth spreading to
even the working classes, and a new sense of personal and national
empowerment. By freely extending additional dollars (flowing in
large numbers back to America for the purchase of capital equipment
needed to rebuild Europe) to European countries they could now easily
purchase these much needed economic goods, helping the economies of
both Europe and the United States. Thus it was that the 'Marshall
Plan' was put into operation in 1948 – offering grants (not loans, but
outright grants) of billions of dollars to Europe to help it
recover.
The Marshall Plan was a huge success (1948-1952). It helped
Europe recover quickly, it broke the back of the Communist strategy in
West Europe, indeed it united these countries (including even the
Western half of Germany) in a strong economic and military bond that
Russia would not be able to dismantle ... and it kept American
factories booming and employment full.
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The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia - February 1948
It first appeared that Czechoslovakia would remain neutral in the
East-West Cold War. But the Czech Communist party had developed
great respect during the war for its strong resistance to Germany's
Nazi overlordship ... and thus in elections after the war, the
Communists were part of the governmental grand coalition working under
the presidency of Eduard Beneš.
But economic problems were hitting the country hard and Truman's
Marshall Plan began to look very attractive to the Czech government ...
infuriating Stalin, who understood how this would bring Czechoslovakia
into the American-led realm of Western Europe. Also political
polls taken at the time indicated that Czech support of the Communist
Party was slipping.
Thus Stalin and the Czech Communist Party (which was taking to the
streets in political protest) moved to put tremendous pressure on Beneš
... who yielded to the pressure and reassembled the cabinet in such a
way as bringing it under strong Communist control. The one
holdout to this change, Foreign Secretary, Jan Masaryk, was killed
(jumped or pushed from a window) ... ending any thoughts of
resistance elsewhere.
The world was shocked. And Americans who had not got Truman's
point about the threat that Stalin-directed Communism posed to the
freedom of Europe finally got the point.
The Berlin Blockade
That same year (1948) Stalin decided that it was time to squeeze
America, Britain and France out of their occupational sectors in the
former German capital city Berlin. The economic recovery of West
Berlin (under the administration of these three occupying powers) stood
in stark contrast to the devastation and gloom existing in the East
Berlin sector under Soviet administration. So Stalin shut down
land routes (highway and railroad) to West Berlin through the East
German occupation zone controlled by Russia (Berlin was located deep
within East German territory).
But Truman refused to be cowed by such pressure - and decided to use
the air corridors to bring in needed West Berlin supplies. It
proved to be a very expensive operation for America (imagine flying
coal into Berlin by plane in order to get the city through the cold of
winter!). But it proved to be an even greater embarrassment to
Stalin who, after a year of American defiance, finally backed down and
reopened the land routes. But by this time East-West feelings
were very bitter.
NATO
Thus in 1949 Truman signed America's first-ever military alliance
agreement with France, England, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, the
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Canada. Through the creation
of a permanent military organization, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, Truman agreed to commit American troops to an on-going
presence in Europe as a 'front-line' against any possible Soviet
military expansion into West Europe. These troops numbered only
in the thousands would not be sufficient to stop the full force of a
Soviet invasion. But they would be a signal to Stalin that such
an attempt would bring the full wrath of American force against Russia
- for having attacked America's soldiers in Europe. In short,
these soldiers stationed in Europe would serve as a 'trip-wire'
guaranteeing a full-scale American response to any Soviet military
engagements in West Europe.
Nuclear deterrence
Backing up the threat of American retaliation was always the implicit
threat of the use of nuclear weapons such as America used against Japan
in 1945. The possession of these awesome weapons gave America a
strong sense of security when contemplating trouble with any new rising
power wanting to take over the world.
But then in 1949 the Soviets exploded their own atomic
bomb. Now the nuclear threat worked both against as well as
for American power. American attitudes about the bomb went
directly from happy confidence to terrible fear as they realized that
atomic weapons could now be used on them
How could this be that the Soviets came up with their own nuclear force
so quickly? Immediately suspicions were aroused that Russia got
some inside help from Americans with Communist sympathies, traitors
working within sensitive government bureaus. Paranoia now added
to the fear stirred up by the Soviet nuclear explosion.
Cold War ideology
By the end of the 1940s every significant political development around
the world got drawn into this Cold War rivalry. The possession of
nuclear weapons by both powers continued to make direct military
conflict unthinkable. Thus the rivalry took on a highly symbolic
or ideological nature: Stalin’s Soviet Russia stood in defense of
international Communism (which it did not actually itself practice) and
America stood in defense of international Democracy (which America also
practiced more in name than in fact). Communism and Democracy
become battle symbols – potent battle symbols.
For the next few decades the biggest international question that would
be heard whenever a new political development occured was: is this
event going to promote Democracy ... or does it involve the advancement
of Communism? The issues themselves were always far more complex
than this ideological dualism. But those were the terms by which
every political and diplomatic challenge would be analyzed and
‘resolved’ by most Americans nonetheless.
The
situation in China became the first such example of America's
envisioning major events around this Cold-War ideological
dualism. At war’s end China, though "victorious" in its war with
Japan, nonetheless was deeply divided politically within.
Chiang’s Chinese Republican government had been greatly compromised in
the eyes of the Chinese by his reliance on foreigners (primarily
Americans) and warlords in his effort to preserve his government in the
face of the Japanese wartime occupation of coastal China. Mao’s
Chinese Communists did not contribute much to the effort to expel the
Japanese – but nonetheless remained untainted by the stigma of
political humiliation such as Chiang suffered. American advisors
at war’s end attempted to get the two Chinese groups to work
together. But there was only mutual hatred linking the two – and
by 1947 China had fallen into the state of intense civil war.
Diplomatic and military advisors urged cautious support of Chiang ...
but above all no direct involvement in the civil war. This was
something that only the Chinese themselves could successfully sort
out. So America largely stayed out of the Chinese Civil War.
But by early 1949 it was clear that Mao and his Communists – not Chiang and his "democratic" Nationalists – were the clear winners in China. Americans were shocked.
By this time Americans were not viewing this as a local or Chinese
national issue – but as a key part of the intense Cold War between
Communism and Democracy. China’s new Communist government was
identified in American minds as part of the great evil of International
Communism that threatened the Free World in spreading its doctrines
through conspiracy and social upheaval.
But not willing to take on Communist China directly, America simply
moved to quarantine China diplomatically – acting as if China no longer
existed except on the island of Taiwan (offshore from the Chinese
mainland) where Chiang and his "democratic" followers took refuge. This
isolation would last for over 20 years
But it actually helped Mao greatly in his efforts to remake China along
his own ideological lines. Because of the boycott he could do so
without any further intervention from outside powers. That even
includeed Communist Russia – although the West failed to take note of
Mao's "exceptionalism" within the so-called Communist bloc.
THE WAR IN KOREA INTENSIFIES THE COLD WAR |
The
outbreak of the Korean War (1950), when the Communist northern half of
the country invaded without warning the undefended southern
‘Democratic’ half, brought the first shots fired between the two sides
of the Cold War. Truman was able to line up the United Nations
behind the American side (the Russians had been boycotting meetings
because of the UN’s unwillingness to recognize Mao’s government as the
real government of China). The ‘UN’ troops (largely American)
were able to stem the flow south of the North Korean troops, reverse
the course, and push back through North Korea – almost up to the
Chinese border.
At this point Mao sent Chinese ‘volunteers’ (he did not want to find
himself officially fighting "UN" troops at the same time he was seeking
UN membership) up against advancing the Americans.
American general MacArthur began holding press conferences indicating
how he was ready to invade China to liberate it from Communism, even to
nuke the Chinese if necessary. This flew directly in the face of
Truman's policy of moving cautiously and merely 'containing' Communism,
not falling into (a probably highly destructive) military crusade
against it. Recognizing in MacArthur not only an egotistical but also a
highly insubordinate general wanting to direct American foreign policy
his way, Truman (very correctly) fired him.
But back home MacArthur was viewed as the hero – Truman as a coward
i... f not almost a traitor ... feeding the frenzy that at that time
had many Americans believing that they were being led to destruction by
Communists or at least individuals in high places 'soft' on
Communism. Truman was right, of course, for clearly America was
not ready for a foreign war against the full weight of the Chinese who
were coming to view Mao with deeper reverence for his boldness against
the imperialist West, America in particular. In any case the
Chinese threw the Americans back to the middle line of Korea – and a
stalemate set in.
THE POST-STALINIST COLD WAR TAKES ON NEW DIMENSIONS |
Stalin's death (1953)
By the early 1950s the Cold War has stalemated in Europe to a point
where both the Americans and Soviet Russians and their allies had
achieved something of a balance of power there. But confusion
following Stalin’s death in 1953 erupted within the upper reaches of
Soviet Russian authority: who was it now that commanded the
Soviet system?
Revolt in East Berlin
In mid-1953 workers in East Berlin saw in Stalin's death the
opportunity to go on strike against their Communist leaders. But
their hopes for freedom from Communist oppression were crushed by
Soviet tanks. However, things did free up a bit in Germany for
several years after the revolt
The rise of Khrushchev
Eventually (by 1956) it became clear to the outside world that
Khrushchev was in charge, he having staked his claim to Communist
leadership on the basis of some sort of ‘new look’ which he had
formulated for International Communism – and which he had convinced the
Central Committee to support. By denouncing Stalin’s harsh means
of holding the Soviet orbit together, Khrushchev hoped to make
Communism more appealing as a ‘voluntary’ program – attracting simply
on the merits of its ideological superiority over crass
‘capitalism.’ With the military dimension of the Cold War
supposedly downgraded, observers begin to talk hopefully of a new
‘thaw’ in the Cold War.
WESTERN EUROPE'S "GREAT POWERS" SLIP DEEPLY IN STATURE |
America's "anti-imperialism" is problematic for its European allies
The independence granted the Philippines in July of 1946
by its American "protectors" was very definitely designed to
demonstrate that America intended to follow faithfully the old
Wilsonian doctrine of the "rights of self-determination" of all nations
and peoples. For the Dutch and French, this would stand in direct
oppostion to their intensions to regain full control over their
Southeast Asian Empires. For the British, this had less immediate
impact, because under the Atlee Labour government, official policy was
to grant independence to its central holding in its Empire:
India. And they intended to do this as quickly as possible.
As far as their African holdings, neither Britain nor France (nor
Belgium or Portugal, for that matter) had any plans to back out of the
continent. Furthermore, America seemed to be rather indifferent
on the matter ... assuming that these African societies were much less
ready to take up the responsibilities of self-government.
The Hungarian uprising (late 1956)
Meanwhile,
Khrushchev's attempt to put a new face on Soviet Communism was
misunderstood in Hungary as an invitation for the satellite nations of
East Europe to freely choose their destinies. In late 1956
students went on strike in Hungary – encouraged in part by Khrushchev’s
announcement of a new look to Communism – and in part by Dulles’ vow
that America stood ready to help the subject peoples of the Soviet bloc
throw off their oppressors. But in the end America did nothing –
and Khrushchev sent in Soviet soldiers and tanks to end the
uprising. This was however a huge embarrassment to him and his
‘new look.’ His heavy hand however did succeed in putting things
back in good Soviet order in Hungary. But Khrushchev indicated
that he was still intending to follow his new policy (whatever exactly
that might have meant at that point!).
The Suez Crisis (also late 1956)
In the midst of the Hungarian uprising, the Suez Crisis erupted – much
to the pleasure of Russia and the intense displeasure of America.
Egyptian President Nasser had seized – or 'nationalized' – the Suez
Canal to pay for his Aswan Dam project. England and France
invaded Egypt to take the Canal back from Nasser (Israel joined them in
the invasion). None of this played well in the American policy
book. Americans were incensed that their West European allies
would be so 'imperialistic,' undercutting America's ideological
argument that the Soviets are by their instinctive nature always
imperialists endangering the freedoms of the nations everywhere – while
the West under American leadership is the defender of just such
national freedom. Americans had been hoping to score huge
ideological points against the Soviets for their cruel suppression of
Hungarian freedom. And here - at the very same time (October
1956) as the Hungarian crisis – America's European friends are acting
in exactly the same way in Egypt.
Thus Americans and Russians oddly stood together in opposing the
French, British and Israeli invasion of Nasser’s Egypt. America's
allies were thus stunned at this American 'intervention' in matters
long thought to be those of the old European powers.
In the end no one benefited from this fiasco - except Russia which
moved quickly to pose itself as the Arabs' best international
friend. And Egyptian President (and dictator) Nasser now became
the Arab hero of the Middle East for his 'standing up' to the European
imperialists. America meanwhile, because of its Isaeli-Arab
'neutrality,' gained no new political credits among the Arabs despite
its opposition to English, French and Israeli imperialism. In
this matter, only Russia was the one to come out the big winner.
Overall, America's allies were hugely embarrassed and humiliated - both
at home and abroad. The whole matter was very demoralizing to
America’s European allies – who were already suffering from a deep
sense of loss of national dignity.
De Gaulle returns to power in France
In 1958, with France spinning out
of control politically, De Gaulle was called out of retirement and
asked to set up a new French government (the 5th Republic). There was
high hope that he could resolve the widening civil war between those
calling for the creation of an Arab Algeria (FLN) and those desiring a
continuing French Algeria (OAS) ... as well as just in general restore
France's sagging national pride.
SPUTNIK ... AND THE SOVIET-AMERICAN "SPACE RACE" |
In
1957 the Soviets launched into orbit the first satellite (Sputnik I) –
indicating that the Soviets now possessed the means to deliver
virtually unstoppable nuclear weapons – a fact that Americans noted
with horror. Then in the fall of 1957 the Soviets launched
Sputnik II with a dog aboard – intensifying the American horror – and
shame at having fallen behind in the technological race with the
Soviets.
In 1958 Eisenhower created NASA and the space race was now fully underway.
AMERICAN CULTURE DIVIDES BETWEEN THE "VETS" AND THEIR "BOOMER" CHILDREN |
Sen. McCarthy’s "Red Scare" (1950-1955)
– and the alienating of the American intellectual
At this point a loud, accusatory voice in the US Senate became even
louder, as Sen. McCarthy moved to whip up American fury at ‘treachery’
in high places. McCarthy accused (without any specific details)
the American diplomatic corps, then the American civilian government in
general, and then finally even the US military, of being loaded with
Communists who were secretly subverting America. A huge Red Scare
was thus set loose – which turned in every direction.
The Red Scare hit especially hard America’s ‘intellectuals,’ many of
whom had long been suspected of harboring Communist sympathies.
Many authors, playwrights, journalists, professors, etc., had held
(since the 1930s) ‘fancy’ ideas about the need for social reform –
ideas which seemed overly critical, even unpatriotic, even treasonous,
to fiercely patriotic middle class Vets. The Vets therefore were
(with McCarthy’s help) easily led to believe that this class of
intellectuals formed a conspiratorial group seeking to overthrow the
nation and everything it stood for.
Needless to say, the intellectuals did all that they could do to fight
back. For example, Miller’s play, "The Crucible," ostensibly
slamming the witch-hunting instincts of the late 17th century American
Puritans, was actually a thinly disguised slam against the
‘witch-hunting’ Vets of the 1950s. But for the time being the Vet
middle class held the high ground. (Thus Miller’s play would get
little notice in the 1950s – but would become an iconic battle standard
in the massive cultural war which exploded in the 1960s).
The making of the "Boomer" generation
Because of the depth of the ‘Red Scare’ in America, a fateful decision
in the early 1950s was made by Vet parents, concerned about the
possible susceptibilities of their ‘Boomer’ children (‘Boomer’:
from the baby "boom" which followed the end of the war) to the subtle
appeals of totalitarian Communism. As an antidote to the appeals
of authoritarian Communism, the Vet parents were determined to train
their Boomer youth in the art of careful challenge of all voices posing
as ‘authority.’ “Think for yourself and thereby remain
free” was the general theme.
The Vets were very careful not to impose on their Boomer children any
values of their own (that would itself constitute a form of the very
"authoritarianism" that they were teaching the youth instinctively to
challenge) – supposing that their own well disciplined middle class
values would come as by nature, of their own, to the free-thinking
minds of their Boomer children.
The Vet’s great faith that democracy is the "natural" instinct
of any free individual
The Vets did not realize that their own Christian, free-market,
patriotic, hard-working, self-sacrificing, "democratic" American middle
class values had come to themselves through much trial and tribulation
– and were not simply the ‘natural’ inclinations of a ‘free’ people
everywhere. [This conceptual mistake will be repeated constantly
as a kind of hallmark of American ‘democratic’ foreign policy – and
will produce one diplomatic-military disaster after another in the
conduct of American foreign policy – even up to today]
Vet parents would soon discover (during the late 1960s when their
Boomer children entered young adulthood) that what is partly ‘natural’
to human nature are selfish, greedy, lazy, rebellious character traits
– such as are observable in the behavior of toddlers and small children
who have not yet been taught good social conduct. But because of
the Vets’ naive belief that their own social values were merely
instinctive human values of any truly free people, a highly disciplined
sense of commitment to solid social behavior (characteristic of the Vet
generation) was not passed on to the Boomer youth. Instead a
sense of the heroic importance of being free, “doing your own thing,”
challenging all authority – was primarily what the Boomers receive as
social training in the 1950s.
When this strange moral ideal was combined with the fact that Boomers
were raised in unprecedented material prosperity ... and that their
parents felt the need to give their children "everything they didn't
have growing up," a bizarre generation was created. Boomers would find
it virtually impossible to connect emotionally and socially to anything
larger than 'self' and all its expected 'entitlements' (things not
worked for but instead freely received as a matter of what life
naturally owed them): marriages would not survive stress or
boredom, no loyalties would unite workers to their jobs, no sense of
community spirit would arise ... and patriotism itself would be mocked
as being beneath the dignity of the Boomer.
This error of upbringing would soon come to haunt the 1960s – and the
years thereafter – as Boomers moved up in society and begin to leave
their peculiar cultural mark on American society (and to some extent
the world) – passing these Boomer values on as well to their own
children, the Gen-Xers, a confused generation set adrift by their
Boomer parents' lack of any particular social ideals (except the ideal
of having no ideals larger than self)!
Also: the Vets’ sense of "corporatism"
Another key feature of the strong Vet middle class culture was the deep
trust that the Vet generation placed in corporate life – to the point
of agreeing that all of life would function better using
corporate-style processes. Although the Vets presumed themselves
to be highly Christian (church attendance was at an all-time high) the
Vet approach to God and Christ tended to run along the idea that ‘God
helps those who help themselves.’ Though Vets would hold deep
personal trust in God’s love and grace, when it came to social trust,
Vets were great believers in the ‘rational’ organizing and management
of life. The Vet sincerely believed that although America’s wartime
victory was undoubtedly the results of God’s great help, the Vet saw
that help as having been transacted through the massive
military-industrial complex which organized millions of Americans into
an effective fighting machine. The Vets’ loyalties to such
organizational logic were virtually unshakeable.
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Go on to the next section: A Cold War Sets In
Miles
H. Hodges
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