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18. A COLD WAR DEVELOPS

THE COLD WAR SPREADS

The 1950s


CONTENTS

Stalin dies ... so who's now in charge in
        Russia?

The 1953 East German uprising

The 1953 Iranian coup d'etat

The French abandon Indochina (1954)

The "Third World" forms at Bandung
        (April 1955)

The rearming of Germany ... and the
        creation of the Warsaw Pact (1955)

The Suez Crisis ... and the Hungarian
        uprising (October-November 1956)

American paternalism in the Western
        Hemisphere

Castro's Cuban revolution

European rule under challenge in Africa

The textual material on page below is drawn directly from my work A Moral History of Western Society © 2024, Volume Two, pages 266-281.


STALIN DIES ...
SO WHO'S NOW IN CHARGE IN RUSSIA?

In early March of 1953 Stalin experienced a stroke … and died five days later … with much mystery surrounding the unexpected development.  Apparently, he was considering another round of extensive purges within the upper circles of Communist leadership to further fortify his position and it was thus rumored that he had been poisoned … a rumor easy to believe given the way political fortunes in those days rose and fell in the most deadly of ways.
 
In any case it raised the question:  who was now in charge of the Soviet Empire?  It was immediately announced that Georgy Malenkov was the new Chairman of the Council of Ministers (something like a Prime Minister) … with Lavrentiy Beria continuing in his position both as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers … and as head of Internal Affairs (operating the NKVD or secret police).  The Foreign Ministry would continue to be directed by Molotov.

Nikita Khrushchev (Soviet leader 1953-1964)

Yet while Soviet public office was important, Communist Party leadership was vastly more important.  And here, Nikita Khrushchev was quick to take the position of leader of the party Presidium … that September (1953) taking the position as the party's First Secretary (Stalin's former position).
But Beria as head of the NKVD was a dangerous contender for power … and Khrushchev and Malenkov – fearing that Beria was actually planning a full takeover (and their deaths) – worked together in having Beria arrested (late June), tried, and then shot (that December).

But this now put Khrushchev and Malenkov in political competition … as Malenkov attempted to have the State take the lead in a post-Stalinist Soviet Empire … offering a program of social reforms.  But Khrushchev countered by offering his own "reform" program … at the same time securing his position among the lower ranks of the party (following Stalin's example).  Bit by bit, Malenkov lost status in the political dynamic … until in January of 1955, Khrushchev was able to get the Supreme Soviet to replace Malenkov with a Khrushchev loyalist, Nikolai Bulganin … offering Malenkov only a less important position in the state presidium (cabinet).  Clearly now Khrushchev had full control of the Soviet regime, both party and state.
 

Stalin's successors carry his casket from the Kremlin - March 1953. Meanwhile the question becomes critical concerning who was then leading the Soviet Union.

There were a number of possibilites:

Lavrentiy Beria (head of the NKVD)
... and the most feared of the leaders

TIME Cover, July 20, 1953

Georgy Malenkov (new Prime Minister)

Vyacheslav Molotov (Foreign Minister)
 Magnum Photos

Nikolai Bulganin
Bundesarchiv

Nikita Khrushchev

Bulganin, Malenkov and Khrushchev

Eventually emerging as the new leader of the Soviet Union was Nikita Khrushchev

Nikita Khrushchev announcing the "de-Stalinization" of Soviet Communism -- in order to give Communism a new face or new look -- the 23rd Party Congress in 1956
Russian Federation


THE 1953 EAST GERMAN UPRISING

Meanwhile, having heard talk of a possible loosening of Moscow's political hand since Stalin's death, East German workers – ultimately nearly a million of them – took to the streets, demanding that the Communist dictator commanding their country, Walter Ulbricht, also loosen up on his oppression.
 
Actually, the event had been building to the point of such explosion since the previous year.

There had been much talk of rearming West Germany … possibly as part of a new (West) European Defense Community.  But the fear of a rearmed West Germany was what brought dictator Ulbricht to tighten his grip on East Germany, taking greater control over his country's industries – and even undertaking the collectivization of East Germany's farmlands.  But the latter move sparked farmer resistance by their cutting back on food production, which in turn led to deep hunger in urban East Germany.  East Germany was thus very restless as it entered 1953.

When a massive revolt finally broke out across East Germany on the 16th of June, the Soviet collective leadership was quick to respond by sending on the following day 20,000 Russian troops to join some 8,000 East German police … and quickly and ruthlessly suppressing the rebellion.  In the process, the arrest, imprisonment, and even execution of East German participants was extensive.

Ulbricht was quick to blame the West for inciting the rioting with its propaganda campaign conducted by Western literature distribution and radio programs directed at Eastern Europe … and did what he could to block such Western efforts.

But for the new American President Eisenhower, the game was not over.  In July he announced the offering of food supplies to any East Germans able to get to American distribution centers in West Germany.  Of course Ulbricht did what he could to stop this maneuver.  But it even made Eisenhower's European allies concerned that this move merely increased East-West tensions, rather than relaxing them the way they were hoping a change in Soviet leadership might produce.  Thus Eisenhower terminated the food program that October.

All in all, nothing much seemed to have resulted from all of this … and things quickly settled back to more normal patterns in Europe.
  


Soviet tank in Leipzig to put down the East German strikes - June 1953
Deutsches Bundesarchiv

Soviet tanks in East Berlin to put down the strikes

Soviet tank in East Berlin - June 1953
Deutsches Bundesarchiv


THE 1953 IRANIAN COUP D'ETAT

But that was also because Cold War tensions were rising elsewhere at that point:  the Shah's Iran.  Iran found itself in a very tricky position.  The Soviets had demonstrated their strong interests in the country – neighboring Iran sitting atop huge oil reserves, plus commanding a strategic position overlooking the flow of much of the rest of Europe's oil resources out of the Persian Gulf.  At the same time, the British actually controlled Iran's oil production … vital to British industrial capacity – but also a major sore point for the Iranians themselves.  And Truman's America was rather unsupportive of such European imperialism … although Truman was growing increasingly concerned that every step-back of its European allies from their imperial positions abroad usually resulted not in constitutional democracy coming into being but instead a nationalist dictatorship taking over the "liberated" country … a dictatorship strongly supported by the Kremlin. And now as Iran entered the 1950s, it looked as if that same challenge was about to hit that country.

Iranian politics themselves were indeed quite tricky.  There were several political interests lining themselves up against each other in a bid to take over the country.  The young Shah himself actually played a rather restrained part in Iranian politics … allowing the Majlis (parliament) and the prime minister to take the lead in shaping Iranian politics.

But Iran's Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, (as of 1951) was intent on building up his own power position even more by playing up Iranian nationalist sentiments massively through an effort to have Britain's oil industry in Iran nationalized.  The previous prime minister, who had opposed such nationalization, was assassinated by a militant Shi'ite group headed up by the Ayatollah (Iran's religious leader) Abol-Ghasem Kashani,1 who was working hard to bring his Shi'ites to power as Iran's governing group.  And then there was the Iranian Communist Tudeh Party, also pursuing the same goal … although politically they were a relatively small group.

When in late 1951 Mossadegh's National Front finally nationalized Iran's oil industry, all this tension exploded.  The British did all they could to stop the move – pulling out their technicians and imposing an embargo on Iranian oil in the hope of forcing Mossadegh to return things to British control.  Then they found themselves deeply disappointed when Truman was unwilling to support them in this effort … despite the fact that they were supporting American troops in Korea.   But Truman was more focused on Korea than Iran at the time.  And besides, all this helped to promote the American oil industry greatly!

As for Iran itself, the embargo brought deep financial trouble to the country … as well as much political turmoil – as the various groups accused each other for the mess that was clearly developing.  And both Kashani's Shi'ite Party and the Tudeh Party were gaining strength in the process.  Consequently, Mossadegh countered by hardening his grip on Iran, in mid-1953 closing down the Majlis and arresting political opponents … merely deepening the anger tearing the country apart.

At this point, the American CIA, under orders of America's new President Eisenhower – with cooperation from Churchill, who had returned to power as British prime minister in 1951 – pressured the Shah to dismiss Mosaddegh (which the Shah had every right to do) and appoint in his place Faziollah Zahedi (mid-August 1953).  But Mosaddegh refused to leave office, arrested a number of political figures, forced Zahedi into hiding … and encouraged his supporters to take to the streets in loud protest over the "attempted coup."

At this point, the Shah decided to head off to Italy to wait out the crisis!  And then things quieted down with Mosaddegh securely in power.

But here too, the game was not over.  The CIA used its funds to encourage an unsuspecting Tudeh Party to take to the streets to demonstrate clearly their own support of Mosaddegh … which the CIA then used most cleverly by portraying Iran as facing a possible Mosaddegh-supported Communist coup … something the CIA knew would enrage the vast majority of Iranians!  Of course Mosaddegh had no such interest in a Tudeh Party coup.  But the ruse worked.  In reaction to this supposed Mosaddegh-Tudeh plot, huge numbers of pro-Shah protesters (joined by Muslim protesters) took to the streets, at the same time allowing Iranian military officers to have Mosaddegh arrested and imprisoned (August 19) … and replaced by Zahedi as Iranian prime minister.  So … the crisis was over.

The Shah then returned to Iran – accompanied by the American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.  America now had a very strong ally in the form of the young Shah of Iran!


1Kashani was the mentor of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who would take control of the country after the Shah was overthrown in 1979.


When politics in Iran takes a Leftward turn in the early 1950s, America intervenes

Reza Shah and his son Mohammed Reza Pahlavi

Iran's former premier Mohammed Mosaddegh on trial as a "Communist" after his ouster by a CIA-directed coup - 1953

Iranian soldiers surround the Majlis (Parliament) building in Tehran - August 19, 1953.
Iran's Cultural Heritage Organization

Iranian protesters during the coup
presstv.ir

Tanks in the streets of Tehran

General Zahedi (Coup Leader) and Ardeshir Zahedi (his son)

Mossadeq on military trial in Iran - 1953

The Shah of Iran is visited in Teheran by his benefactor, President Eisenhower - 1959

THE FRENCH ABANDON INDOCHINA (1954)

Neither the French nor the Vietnamese had given up in their fight for control of Indochina … with battles raging back and forth between the two parties.  But from the Vietnamese point of view, they had nothing to lose by continuing the battle … whereas the French were finding the effort very expensive, with no real rewards for the effort … and consequently were growing tired of the enterprise.  The French were good at running down and defeating small groups of the Viet Minh … but more would continue to pop up.  At one point Vietnamese General V Nguy n Gi p even extended the battle into Laos, just to wear down further the French resolve to hold its position in Indochina.  Then when fairly successful French General Jean De Lattre grew ill and died, the French resolve declined further.

Dien Bien Phu (1954)

At this point (November 1953) the French attempted one major assault into Vietnamese territory, dropping 1800 paratroops into the huge and strategically placed Dien Bien Phu valley … from which they could send out patrols to hunt down Viet Minh units.  But Gi p realized immediately that the French had put themselves in a very vulnerable position, with the valley surrounded by high hills from which Vietnamese artillery could bombard the French stations … as well as destroy the airstrip by which the French received ongoing supplies – food as well as war materiel.  And finally well positioned to undertake such an attack on the French, in March of 1954 Gi p began his attack on the well-surrounded French forces.  With the monsoon season also beginning at this point, there was no way that French supplies could even be dropped successfully into the valley.

The 1954 Geneva Accords

It took only two months for the French to realize that they had been defeated in a most humiliating way … at a time in which discussions were already underway in Geneva concerning the future of Indochina.  The French were finally ready to admit defeat.

In the 1954 Geneva Accords, Vietnam was divided North and South temporarily … "North Vietnam" designated as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, under the presidency of Hồ Ch Minh, and "South Vietnam" designated as the State of Vietnam, under the Emperor Bảo Đại.  But elections were to be held throughout Vietnam no later than July of 1956 to unite the two halves of the country.

Failed national elections.  But in October of 1955, Bảo Đại's prime minister Ng Đ nh Diệm deposed the emperor, proclaiming the Republic of Vietnam with himself as president.

Then as it came time to hold the 1956 elections, it was very clear that the elections would go strongly in favor of Hồ Ch Minh as the president of a united Vietnam.  Thus Diệm refused to hold elections in the south, claiming that his part of the country was "not ready" for such elections.  His people needed a bit more time in order to understand fully the dangers involved in a vote destined to bring on a Communist victory.

Does this sound familiar?  This was the same excuse the Communists used earlier in blocking such elections in Korea.  Anyway, now it was Diệm's turn to put forward this lame excuse … because he had the full backing of Eisenhower's America in taking this position.
 

French troops at Dong Khe defense position prior to the Vietminh attack which overwhelmed the French - 1950

French troops pushing a truck up muddy Route Colonial 4 along the Chinese border

French tricolor insignia being painted over the US insignia as it arrives at the Haiphong air base

Ho Chi Minh in his mountain headquarters in 1951

The French victory at Na San - 1952

Vice President Richard Nixon visiting Vietnamese nationalist troops - late 1953


The French last-stand at Dien Bien Phu - March 30 - May 7, 1954

French Foreign Legion reinforcements parachute into Dien Bien Phu on March 16, 1954 - two weeks before the massive Communist asault on the main camp

French Foreign Legionaires (in this photo mostly Czech)

Colonel Christian de Castries, the garrison commander at Dien Bien Phu, rarely emerged from his underground bunker
National Archives

A 4.7 inch mortar line in action dujring Operation Castor.
Huts in the background were torn down to clear fields of fire and build defenses
National Archives

The smoke-shrouded airstrip at Dien Bien Phu was closed in late March 1954 after heavy Viet Minh shelling

Highly trained and motivated Viet Minh troops mass for combat against the French

Hard-pressed French and Vietnamese soldiers wait for airlifted supplies

Vietnamese blasting away at surrounded French troops - Dien Bien Phu

Vietnamese raise the flag of victory over the French forces at Dien Bien Phu - May 7, 1954

French troops taken prisoner at Dien Bien Phu

Communist Viet Minh forces enter Haiphong shortly after the French surrender at Dien Bien Phu and soon after the US Navy evacuates French troops from the port city


The 1954 Geneva Conference convened to settle the French-Vietnamese conflict (April 26-July 20, 1954)

The British (left) Russian (upper right) and Chinese (center-right) delegations

The British delegation

The Russian (upper) and Chinese (lower) delegations

Under the provisions of the "Operation Passage to Freedom" any Vietnamese chosing to move from the North to the South and vice versa were to be allowed to do so.  Actually approximately a million Vietnamese (most Catholic and many French-speaking) moved South.  Only about 50 thousand Vietnamese moved Nort.  Pro-Communist southerners had been instructed to remain in place in the south in case the elections did not go favorably for Ho Chi Minh - and they could then resume the struggle to "free Vietnam from Western colonialism."

Anticommunist Vietnamese refugees moving from a French LSM landing ship to the USS Montague during Operation Passage to Freedom in August 1954.

Ngo Dinh Diem - Prime Minister (and US-supported dictator) of South Vietnam (1955-1963)


THE "THIRD WORLD" FORMS AT BANDUNG (APRIL 1955)

With the former imperial nations of West Europe on clear retreat internationally and with America and Russia caught up in a Cold War of their own, it was decided by Indonesian president Sukarno, in getting mutual support from India's prime minister Nehru, to call a conference at Bandung in Indonesia ... inviting African and Asian leaders to come and discuss the possibilities of working together both economically and diplomatically as the rising new world.  They were proposing the creation of an international alliance of nations "non-aligned" in the larger Cold War ... an alliance that would constitute what would come to be termed a "Third World."
 
Ultimately attending this week-long conference were leaders of 29 Asian and African nations.

This included China ... which did not want to be left out of this opportunity to register its importance internationally, seeing itself as the potential leader of what constituted basically an anti-European (both anti-East and West) independence movement.   Thus, besides helping organize this event, Mao sent his foreign secretary Zhou Enlai to the conference to align more nations in support of Mao's efforts to counter Eisenhower's strong support of Taipei rather than Beijing as the voice of China.  And indeed, in this matter Zhou succeeded grandly.

But other issues rallying the group were:  the efforts of France to hold onto its North African territory (mostly importantly Algeria); the Dutch about to offer independence to its West New Guinea colony (which Sukarno wanted to be included as part of Indonesia); and even the Soviet Union's treatment of Muslim societies ... the latter however the conference ultimately failing to touch on – instead simply taking the position that it was opposed to colonialism of any kind, Eastern or Western.

The conference actually achieved a diplomatic breakthrough on a very touchy issue ... in getting Sukarno and Zhou to agree to require the huge Chinese portion of the Indonesian population to end their dual citizenship status and decide whether they would continue as Chinese or Indonesian citizens.  That would help solve a huge matter of tension between these two countries (for a while at least).

But otherwise, the conference produced simply a broad agreement among these countries to work together on this matter of anti-colonialism.   They would stand united as members of the "Third World."
2

2Over time, various issues weakened the unity of this Third World front ... the term "Third World" ultimately coming to be merely a term referring to the poverty and violence that afflicted so many of the Third World nations.


The Bandung Conference of April 18-24,1955:  Gathering of "Non-Aligned" nations (thus neither First World (presumably the West) or Second World (presumably the Soviet), but "Third World"

The hall of Gedung Merdeka where the Conference took place.

Communist Chinese delegate Chou En-lai speaking to the conference

Chou En-lai speaking to Indian Prime Minister Jahawarlal Nehru

Kwame Nkrumah (2nd from left) with other co-founders of the Non-Aligned Movement: Nehru of India, Nassar of Egypt, Sukharno of Indonesia and Tito of Yugoslavia in late 1960

THE REARMING OF GERMANY ... AND THE CREATION OF THE WARSAW PACT (1955)

Most interestingly, the creation of NATO in 1949 did not seem to require a Soviet response.  However, the move in 1955 to bring a fully rearmed West Germany into NATO did in fact inspire a very strong response … from neighboring Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland – still recoiling from the horror of the Nazi era – who wanted some kind of security pact designed to counter possible West German expansion.

This all started back in May of 1952, when Truman – drawing on an earlier plan (1950) of French prime minister Ren Pleven – pushed hard to get his European allies to bring West German military potential to play in the Cold War … by getting them to create their own European Defense Community (EDC) – with West Germany as one of its members.  But this military union would come fully under the control of an international authority … just like its strategic coal and steel industries had been restored – and unified – under the Schuman Plan's ECSC.

However, even for the French, the "Pleven Plan" was a bit too frightening.  Thus in August of 1954 the French National Assembly voted "no" in the attempt to ratify the EDC treaty.  Italy then simply refused to put the matter to a vote.  The EDC was dead.

Then in 1954, Soviet foreign minister Molotov had proposed the idea of ending all military alliances of Europeans aimed at other Europeans, and instead having the Europeans join some kind of larger collective – but non-military – security organization … one which would include a reunited (but disarmed) "neutral" Germany, East and West.  This would take place with the withdrawal from Germany of all four occupying powers and the holding of national elections across Germany. 

But in "demilitarizing" Europe (all except the Soviet Union of course) it was clearly designed to undercut the reason for the existence of NATO.   There was no way that West Europe was willing however to leave itself without any means of military self-defense.   No … NATO was not going to go away.  In fact, with the failure of the Pleven Plan, it would have to be  NATO, not the EDC, which would have to serve as the means of bringing West Germany forward as a Western military ally.  And thus it was that in May of 1955, West Germany was brought into NATO as a fully armed military member.

In response to this development, at the very same time (also May of 1955), Soviet Russia and seven other countries of the Eastern Bloc (Communist Yugoslavia, of course, would not participate) came together in Warsaw to sign a treaty setting up the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) … or just simply "the Warsaw Pact."

This now made the military union of the Soviets and their satellite nations official. And it gave the world a new name for those satellite nations.  They were now the Warsaw Pact nations.

THE SUEZ CRISIS ... AND THE HUNGARIAN UPRISING (OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1956

Khrushchev's "New Look" … and a supposed "thaw" in the Cold War

At the 20th Party Congress in late February of 1956, Khrushchev stunned everyone by strongly denouncing Stalinism in the harshest of terms.  As he saw things, it was time for the Soviets to recognize that the challenges they faced were ideological, not military or police matters.  There were societies out there watching and deciding whether they wanted to go the Communist rather than Capitalist route.  Thus it was imperative for Soviet Russia to show that world the great benefits – not the horrors – of taking the Communist route.  There was a battle going on out there for the minds of men and women everywhere.  In short, it was time for a post-Stalinist "new look."

Although this address was supposedly delivered to a closed gathering, in fact it easily found its way to the outside world (as Khrushchev actually intended) … causing quite a stir within the ranks of the Party, both in Russia and in the Eastern Bloc.  But it also stirred the larger world – which was trying to interpret what this all meant with respect to the Cold War that had long been raging.   Was this some kind of "thaw" in that icy Cold War?

The British … and Nasser's Egypt

An area of particular interest to Khrushchev – and equally to the West – was the Middle East.  There, Arab nationalism was stirring strongly … offering the Soviets a grand opportunity to put themselves in the middle of political and economic developments which potentially had a distinctly anti-imperialist (meaning anti-Western) character to them.

The British had long held a very strong interest in that part of the world … as it lay directly across the British path to its grand empire in India.  Although the British had not built the vital Suez Canal which strategically linked India with Europe – in fact it was French engineers who designed and supervised its construction in the 1860s – the British were able to buy out the half-ownership of the Canal owned by the Egyptian king in 1875 – when he fell into huge economic difficulties.  Thus it had been under joint French-British control since that time.  In fact it was this interest in this strategic position that determined Britain to put itself in the position of "protector" of the Egyptian government – and the region around it – since then.

Of course under Atlee's Labour Government, that role had declined greatly – in line with Britain's departure from Palestine in 1947.

But the British – once again (since 1951) under Churchill and his Conservative Party – were doing what they could to get themselves back into a pivotal position in the Middle East.  Indeed, Churchill had succeeded in February of 1955 in putting together a Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) – better known as the Baghdad Pact – a military alliance of Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey.  America had supported the venture but had not joined, due to what Secretary of State Dulles termed the pro-Israel lobby in Congress. Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser had been asked to join … but he refused to be closely aligned with Iraq's president Nuri al-Said – with whom he saw himself in competition for the leadership of the broader Arab world.

Nassar's refusal to join the Baghdad Pact would draw Egypt away from its former close relations with Britain.  And it would certainly also undercut the importance of METO – which never really developed as a key player in the international game.  But it also inspired Nasser to begin to portray Egypt's former ally Britain as the Arab world's biggest problem in its quest to unite the numerous Arab "nations" that the imperialist British (but joined by the French) had set up after World War One in order to give themselves the role of "protector" … when in fact there was only one true Arab "nation" – namely all of the Arab-speaking world.  Nasser saw it as his job to unite that Arab nation into a single political entity.  But this was what Britain's Iraqi friend al-Said was also trying to do.  Consequently, relations between Egypt and Britain – the latter since mid-1955 now under Churchill's former deputy, Anthony Eden – grew hostile.

French problems in North Africa

But things in the Arab world were just as problematic for France … actually even more so.  Algeria, which was located across the Mediterranean just opposite southern France, had since 1848 been considered an integral part of France (three of its d partements) … and had been duly "Frenchified."  In fact, neighboring Tunisia and parts of Morocco – and much of West Africa - also found themselves under strong French influence.
 
At this point, some one million ethnic Frenchmen (the colons) – approximately 10% of the Algerian population (but a much larger percentage of Algeria's urban population) – lived in Algeria as fairly successful farmers, shopkeepers, and civil servants.  Additionally, some of the Arab population was well assimilated into French culture.  On the other hand, some of it was truly still wed to ancient Muslim ways (especially the Bedouin tribesmen of the interior).  But most of the Arab population simply served relatively silently within the larger, and still mostly alien French culture that dominated the land.

But by the mid-1950s, the situation in Algeria was becoming increasingly tense, with the colons and pro-French Arabs finding themselves targeted by Arab nationalists fighting for Algerian independence.  The independence of Vietnam in 1954, had greatly inspired the Algerian nationalist groups.  But the granting of independence to Morocco and Tunisia in 1956 had made the Algerian independence movement even stronger.   In response, by this time, France had over 500,000 troops in Algeria trying to crush the rebellion.  But this merely made an ever-stronger case for Algerian independence in the thinking of the Algerian Arab population.  And Nasser was playing up this Arab nationalist political potential in Algeria – to his own personal advantage, of course – as fully as possible.

Nasser and the Cold War

Meanwhile, Eisenhower and Dulles had become increasingly concerned about how the Cold War was reshaping itself into an East-West ideological contest for the loyalties of the rising nations of the Third World ... with the greatest potential for trouble in the rising Middle East.  Originally America wanted to build an Arab military alliance with Nasser's Egypt as its key component … but found that Nasser was interested in being seen as "unaligned."

However, Nassar's interest in building a high dam across the Nile River to provide the country with electricity did give Eisenhower and Nasser the possibility of working closely together.  Thus America (joined by Britain) offered a loan of $270 million to Nasser to build that dam.

But Nasser was also interested in taking on military leadership in the Arab world … and sought the weaponry designed to give him that role.  Again he looked to America for that aid … but found he did not like the conditions Americans demanded in the deal.  They were to be used for defensive purposes only and granted only under American training and supervision.  Nasser then turned to the Soviets … and in September of 1955 was pleased to announce the completion of an arms deal with the Russians.

Running out of options, in December, America and Britain announced the pledge of $70 million towards the dam – in the hopes of luring Nasser Westward.  But things did not improve.  America was furious that Nasser extended recognition to Mao's government in China.  And when, in June the following year (1956), the Soviets offered their own 2% loan worth $1.12 billion to build the dam … in July, America backed out of its offer of support.

The beginning of the Suez Crisis (July 1956)

This determined Nasser at the end of July to announce the takeover of the Suez Canal in order to complete the funding for the Aswan Dam project. He stated that the former owners (Britain and France) would be compensated for their loss over time.  But Britain and France were not about to be bullied by the seizure ... and planned secretly – with Israel joining in the venture – to take back the canal and occupy the canal zone to protect their interests there.
 
Also motivating the event was that France was furious with Nasser for the encouragement he gave the Algerian insurrectionists and wanted him stopped.  And Israel was also angry at the support Nasser gave the Palestinian fedayeen … and for his blocking of their exit at the Straits of Tiran into the Red Sea.
 
Sensing a growing international crisis, America tried to get Britain and France to ease up on any plans for what would constitute an act of war.  Attempts were made to find an international compromise concerning the administration of the canal and the distribution of the canal's finances.  But none of this proved able to shake British and French resolve to bring down Nasser.
 
Indeed, French premier Guy Mollet was deeply disappointed that his NATO partner America did not understand the importance to France of bringing Nasser down.  After all, Mollet had turned down a Soviet offer to end their support of the Arab nationalists if they would drop out of NATO.

And thus their military plans continued to develop ... even while they went through the meaningless motions of sitting through diplomatic meetings.  Also, Israel's planned military role in this whole affair was as yet unknown to any but the British and French.

Meanwhile – a student uprising in Hungary (October 1956)

Totally unrelated to what was developing in the Middle East was what was developing elsewhere … in Soviet-occupied East Europe.  Since Khrushchev's "new look" speech, attitudes had been growing in East Europe that post-Stalinization also meant post-Sovietization.  And thus on 23 October – at exactly the same time that the world was focused on the Suez crisis – 20,000 Hungarian students took to the streets to call for an end of the Soviet occupation of their country.  By that evening about ten times that number had joined the protest.

This did not happen of course without some kind of buildup.  And that buildup had actually been pushed by America itself … through the broadcasts of its news network, Radio Free Europe (RFE).  Dulles had issued promises through the RFE that America stood ready to help any people in overthrowing the Soviet tyranny that oppressed them so deeply.  And the Hungarian students naturally thought that such help meant direct intervention in case the Soviets should attempt a counter-move.

Taken by surprise by this event, Khrushchev's response at first was quite timid, sending in some troops to try to put some sense in things there … but not in such a way that it would give the appearance that Stalinism was still quite alive in Soviet Russia.  But things merely worsened for Khrushchev day by day.  The purging of pro-Soviet leaders was increasing and independent governing councils were rapidly being established in the country.  The killing of pro-Soviet agents and the RFE broadcasts were also becoming very dramatic indicators of where things stood in Hungary … and  in the rest of East Europe.  Something needed to be done.  But what?

Simultaneous action at the Suez Canal and in Hungary

Meanwhile, with winter coming on and with increasing pressure in Parliament for the Eden government to do something about developments at the Suez Canal, clearly it was high time to make a move.  Thus on 29 October the Israelis struck first, sweeping across the vast Sinai Desert and hitting an unprepared Egyptian army, forcing it back in fast retreat.  Three days later (November 1st) the British struck the Egyptian army from the air, finishing off the Egyptian army … and then several days later dropped British and French paratroopers near the canal in order to seize it.  The action was an immediate and huge military success for the Israelis, British and French.

But politically and diplomatically, it would prove to be a huge disaster.

Meanwhile on the Hungarian front, Khrushchev remained hesitant about responding to the rapidly deteriorating situation in Hungary.  Mao was even chiding Khrushchev for looking like such a weak leader.  Then two events finally determined Khrushchev to make a very strong move on Hungary.  One was Hungary's announcement that it would be leaving the Soviet bloc … and planned to continue as a neutral nation in international affairs.  That was totally inadmissible to Khrushchev.  The other was the British, French and Israeli assault on Egypt – which not only had the world distracted but which he hoped would also make a Soviet move on Hungary appear to be no more imperialistic than the simultaneous British, French and Israeli move on Egypt.

Thus on November 4th, Khrushchev sent thousands of tanks and hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops into Hungary to crush the rebellion. It was a very bloody affair.  Over 2,500 Hungarians were killed (but also 700 Soviet troops) and 20,000 Hungarians wounded (as well as 1,400 Soviet troops).  Thousands (20,000 to 30,000?) were arrested, hundreds executed, and some 200,000 Hungarians fled the country, never to return.

And although this undercut deeply Khrushchev's "new look" … it brought things quite quickly back into a proper Soviet order.  Nonetheless, Khrushchev would continue to affirm that he still stood on the principle of his "new look" … whatever that now meant – for clearly this had been an action of the Stalinist variety.

The "help" promised by America's RFE never materialized … although the matter was taken to the U.N. – where of course a call for action was naturally vetoed by the Soviets.  In short, the American superpower seemed not to be so super-powerful.

Worse, at the same time, America joined with Russia in bringing a resolution to the U.N. Security Council calling for a ceasefire and an immediate withdrawal of Britain, France and Israel from Egypt – with both resolutions vetoed by the British and French.  But Eisenhower remained upset that the actions of the British and French allies had done far more damage in driving the Arab world into the arms of the Soviets than what regaining the canal ever offered the British and French.  Furthermore, he was afraid that America's NATO commitments could have dragged them into a conflict in Egypt in which America had absolutely no interest whatsoever as a military action.  Eisenhower even went so far as to threaten economic reprisals against Britain and France if they did not immediately withdraw from Egypt.

The political-diplomatic fallout from these events

Facing such pressure from America – and from the home-front where thousands of British had turned out to protest their government's action in Egypt – Eden's government had to acknowledge that Nasser's government was now the owner of the canal … and that the British (and French) would withdraw.  For Eden, and for the British in general, this was a humiliating defeat.  Indeed, the event made it quite clear that the days of Britain as a great world power were over.  It was now simply just another one of the many European nations – nothing more.

As for France, it too was stung deeply by America standing against it in the Suez Crisis.  And that sting would come to be played for as much political gain as possible by De Gaulle when he soon returned to power (1958).  He distinctly did not trust – or even much care for – America.

As for America, it lost considerable face by using none of its power to counter the Soviet crushing of the Hungarian uprising.  Consequently, any hopes of the Eastern Europeans for American help in loosening the Soviet grip on their nations was now dead.  At the same time America gained nothing from the Arab world (or the Third World in general … as Eisenhower wished so much could have been the case) in its siding with the Soviets in coming up against its British and French allies (Israel was not yet considered any kind of American ally at the time).

Indeed, America's behavior raised all kinds of questions as to exactly where it stood on matters – and exactly how it could be counted on to support or oppose certain key diplomatic matters.  Would America continue to respect the "all for one – one for all" notion that underpinned NATO?  Or would America act only on the basis of its own national interest – and on that alone.  Basically, all of America's NATO allies in giving over much of their military sovereignty to the American-directed military alliance had placed themselves under what they thought was, in compensation, the promise of American backing in the conduct of their own national diplomacy.  But no such broader interest was shown by America to its British and French NATO allies in the Suez Crisis, when their traditional national interests were involved deeply and a military solution was the only serious option in the support of those interests.  America actually opposed them.

Sadly, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer thus grew uneasy about trusting America to come to Europe's aid (as required by NATO).  Indeed, he became very bitter about America lining itself up with the Soviets in the Suez Crisis.  All of this ultimately influenced deeply the German decision to draw closer to France in a special European relationship – one that would grow even deeper between Germany and France after De Gaulle took over in France.

At the same time, Soviet Russia played big to the Arab world its support of Nasser … making it appear that the Soviets were their best friends in their efforts to come out from under Western imperialism.  And though actually the Soviets played the role of oppressor in the Hungarian matter, it made quite clear that nothing was seriously going to change in the Soviet mastery of East Europe.  And if anything, it reconfirmed to a rather impressed world that indeed, under Khrushchev, the Soviets continued to be one of the world's great superpowers.

And of course now Nasser stood out in the Arab mind as the one person best able to bring about the Arab dream of an all-Arab republic.  Indeed in 1958, Syria would join with Egypt in setting up just such a United Arab Republic under the presidency of Nasser.
 

Budapest students and workers next to a toppled statue of Stalin - at the beginning of the Hungarian uprising - October 23, 1956

Hungarian security police being cut down by rebel fire
as they pour out of a Communist headquarters - November 1956

Dead Hungarian secret police lie at the feet of young protesters in Budapest - November 1956

Soviet tanks crushing the Hungarian uprising in Budapest, November, 1956

Burned-out Soviet tanks in Budapest, Hungary - November 1956


Meanwhile in the Suez region of Egypt




French soldiers with Egyptian prisoners - November 1956


British General Sir Charles Keightley greeting French paratroopers - November 1956



Trying to clear a ship sunk during the Suez Crisis - 1956



Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser greeting fellow Egyptians

AMERICAN PATERNALISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Ever since America's issuing of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, America had taken on a "protective" role with respect to its Latin-American neighbors to the south … a protection that differed hardly at all from what the Europeans saw as their role in Asia and Africa.  But that protection had the qualities of looking out in particular for the economic interests driving those countries … economic interests frequently built on American investments in those lands – and the local officials willing to play the American game and protect those economic interests from local groups that wanted to seize those assets.
 
America talked a lot about its grand mission to spread democracy around the world.  But with respect to the governments of these Latin-American neighbors, America tended to always look the other way because their associated officials were very dictatorial.  In part this was because dictatorial government was part of their Hispanic political tradition.  But it was also due to the fact that dictatorship was more or less required of these officials in order to guarantee the political and economic "stability" that those American investments required.
 
And when things did not always measure up to these American expectations – it was always easiest simply to send in U.S. Marines to straighten things out!

Guatemala - 1954

A general strike forced the U.S.-backed conservative President Jorge Ubico to resign on July 1, 1944.  Gen. Juan Federico Ponce then took over. Then a junta, led by Arana, in October of that year overthrew the governemnt of Gen. Ponce, opening the way for a new Guatemalan constitution ... in which Major Francisco Arana was granted special powers as head of the military  ... and promised support for the presidency six years hence. 

That December, Juan Jose Arevalo, a professor of philosophy, was elected President of Guatemala by 85% of the votes in a fairly free election.  His presidency was 'centrist':  anti-Communist, yet supportive of urban labor unions.  However his government largely ignored the peasant (largely Mayan Indian) countryside where poverty was severe.  Nonetheless the conservative upper class was very nervous about his support of the labor unions, considering this to be merely another version of Communism  ... with the U.S. became increasingly suspicious of him as well.

In July of 1949, Arana had been mysteriously assassinated, largely for personal political reasons, opening the path of rise to leadership of former Captain Jacobo Arbenz ... and producing a Leftward move in Guatemala's politics (Arbenz's Salvadoran wife was even a member of the Communist Party).

Jacobo Arbenz, freely elected as Guatemalan President in 1950, had displeased the United Fruit Company of Boston by beginning in 1952 to redistribute 400,000 acres of unused Company land and distributing it to landless peasants.  (A total of 1.5 million acres were distributed to about 100,00 families; Arbenz gave up 1,700 acres of his own land under the program).

Arbenz had offered the Company compensation in accordance with the same value the company had been claiming for the land in its tax returns ($3 per acre) -- but the outraged Company now claimed it was worth 15 times that amount ($75 per acre)!

Soon the claim was being broadcast by the US government that the land reform of the Arbenz government was conducted under the guidance of Soviet Communists ... in violation of the Monroe Doctrine.  A Guatemalan Liberation Army (CIA trained) was fthus ormed to 'liberate' Guatemala from these Communist influences.

Arbenz understood the implications of this and sensing that his days were numbered, resigned the presidency on June 27, 1954.  A number of junta regimes came and went in the next days until the government came finally to rest on the shoulders of Col. Castillo Armas.

The coup to overthrow the "Communist" Arbenz government in 1954 was thus itself conducted nearly entirely by the CIA
with virtually no help from any of the Guatemalan population except for the small number of Guatemalan soldiers (less than 500) flown in by US transports.  The rest of the world, including America's allies in Europe and the United Nations, was not deceived by the (American-directed) character of the coup and used America's own professed democratic ideals to condemn American "economic colonialism" in Latin America.

Three years later Castillo Armas would be assassinated in another military takeover ... and three years after that Guatemala would fall into a state of bloody civil war (lasting over 35 years) involving the massacre of huge numbers of the Guatemalan population, mostly the Mayan Indian peasant portion of the population ... the estimated numbers of dead and missing ranging between 140,000 and 200,000.
  

When politics in Guatemala takes a Leftward turn in the early 1950s, America once again intervenes

US-backed conservative President (and dictator since 1930) Jorge Ubico.

Revolutionary Junta of Oct. 20, 1944:  Major Francisco Arana, civilian Jorge Toriello and Captain Jacobo Arbenz

Juan José Arévalo (a professor of philosophy), elected Guatemalan president by 85% of the votes in free elections in Dec. 1944

Arbenz and his aristocratic Salvadoran wife María Vilanova, a member of the Communist Party

Arévalo passes the presidency to Arbenz in 1951

A CIA driver bringing the CIA's man, Former "Aranista" Castillo Armas (next to him) into Guatemala City - 1954


CASTRO'S CUBAN REVOLUTION

But the situation could become embarrassingly corrupt … such as in the case of the Cuban government of Fulgencio Batista.  Under his government not only extensive American interests in a vast number of industries were put under his protection, but so also was the Mafia in its business of prostitution, gambling and drugs.  Thus Batista was a very corrupt, but very rich man.  It had even come to a point that the American government itself was becoming quite embarrassed by his behavior.

Of course there was much local resistance against the Batista regime … and much sympathy in America toward those who wanted to get rid of Batista.  But the Cold War was also raging at the time (the mid-1950s) and thus there was equal concern that efforts to dump Batista might once again profit only the eager Soviets.  Caution was thus required.

One group attempting the overthrow of Batista was led by the young Socialist lawyer Fidel Castro. He and his brother Raul had attempted a coup in 1953, had failed and subsequently were imprisoned, then were released after two years.  But once again (1956) they were trying to remove Batista – Castro now joined by the very colorful Argentinian doctor Ernesto Che Guevara.

Finally (1958), Eisenhower himself took action to bring Batista under control, placing an arms embargo on Cuba … and even encouraging the anti-Batista groups (even Castro's) to rise up against Batista's corrupt regime.  At this point the crusading American press discovered the colorful Castro, and jumped into the matter, portraying Fidel Castro in very heroic terms.

Little by little the various groups advanced against a weakening Cuban army … with Castro's group receiving the greatest attention in the process.  Finally on the first day of January 1959, Batista fled the country … and, to the roar of the crowds, Castro then entered the capital Havana as Cuba's new prime minister.
 
This was the beginning of the purging and even execution of former Batista officials (state and military).  The casinos and hotels were also shut down … undercutting the Cuban economy greatly.  But with Castro finally able to take full command of the government, in the typical Socialist manner, huge estates were redistributed as small plots to the small farmers.  But so were even the small independent farms of Cuba's humbler classes.  And although Castro claimed that he was no Communist, he certainly filled a number of positions on his cabinet with Communists.

Now opposition to these "reforms" began to grow … as Castro turned on not only members of the middle and lower-middle classes but also on other anti-Batista revolutionaries.  As Castro's grip on Cuban society tightened, he forced hundreds, then thousands, to take to the hills … and even in vast numbers to nearby Florida.

Then when Eisenhower refused to lift the arms embargo he had earlier imposed on Cuba, Castro turned to the Soviets for military assistance.  Needless to say, Khrushchev was more than happy to make Russia of great use to a nation just off the coast of America.

Eisenhower then struck back against Castro, cutting back America's purchase of sugar and the sale of American oil to Cuba … in order to undercut Castro economically.  But this merely opened another door of opportunity for the Russians – who were quick to purchase that sugar and sell Cuba oil from Russia's vast reserves.  Then (August-October 1960) when American refineries refused to refine the Soviet oil, Castro simply nationalized these … plus all other major American assets in his country (homes, banks, sugar and coffee plantations).

In turn, Eisenhower closed down all trade between America and Cuba (October 1960) … and directed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to gather and train (in Guatemala and Honduras) anti-Castro Cubans in order to overthrow this growing problem in Cuba.  And he set plans to unleash this liberation force in early 1961 … although he would be out of office by then.
 


Castro in the Sierra Maestra with his rebel band - 1957

Cuban guerrilla leader Fidel Castro

Castro hailed in Cienfuegos, Cuba, - January 8, 1959, after his overthrow of the Bastista dictatorship

Fidel Castro being cheered in Cinefuegos, Cuba, after ousting dictator Fulgencio Batista

Fidel Castro at the podium - January 8, 1959

Castro addressing Cubans


EUROPEAN RULE UNDER CHALLENGE IN AFRICA

The British, French, Belgians and Portuguese are trying to hold on to the remnants of European colonial empire in Africa – despite very negative views by Americans on the matter

British paramilitaries in Kenya who fought to hold the colonyagainst a militant Mau-Mau (Kikuyu) independence movement - 1952-1956.  Though the Mau Mau were eventually broken, British opinion moved in favor of independence for the colony - which was finally granted in 1963.


An individual who began to come to prominence among the Africans in Kenya during this period was Jomo Kenyatta

Jomo Kenyatta at the 5th Pan-African Congress in England which he helped organize - 1945. He would return to Kenya the next year (after almost 15 years out of the country, achieving a high level of Western education) ... to advocate for the return of the white farms to the Kikuyu tribesmen and for Kenyan independence.

Jomo Kenyatta on trial for being a Mau Mau leader - 1953. He was imprisoned or detained from 1953 to 1961 ... and rose quickly to power after his release, becoming Kenya's first prime minister in 1963, then President in 1964 when the constitution was amended to make the country a full republic (the white officer's face in this photo has been blotted out to protect him from Mau Mau revenge)


Sudan moves towards Third-World independence ... by allying itself with Nasser's Egypt

Sudan's Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari with Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser in Cairo - 1954


Ghana - the first British colony in Africa to gain independence (not a lot of whites living there)

Kwame Nkrumah - outspoken anti-colonialist who lead Ghana from its status as the British colony of the Gold Coast

British Sir Charles Arden-Clarke and Kwame Nkrumah at the ceremonies marking Ghana's independence from Britain - March 1957


Here are Eisenhower and De Gaulle meeting with the new leader of the Ivory Coast, Houphouet-Boigny in 1959




Go on to the next section:  The Settling in of the Bipolar World


  Miles H. Hodges